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A Constitutional Jurisprudence
of Children’s Vulnerability
LOIS A. WEITHORN*
The Unites States Supreme Court identified “the peculiar vulnerability of children” as one
of the “three reasons” for differentiating the treatment of children under the Constitution
from that of adults. Yet, although explicit and implicit characterizations of children as
vulnerable abound in the Court’s opinions and scholarly commentary, there has been little
analysis of how the construct of vulnerability mediates children’s relationship to the
Constitution.
This Article examines the Court’s analytic uses of constructions of children’s vulnerability.
Informed by legal scholarship and empirical findings on human vulnerability emerging
from the field of bioethics, philosophy, psychology, and developmental neuroscience, the
Article deconstructs the concept of children’s vulnerability and proposes five categories
derived from the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence and interdisciplinary scholarship:
harm-based vulnerability; influence-based vulnerability; capacity-based vulnerability;
status-based vulnerability; and dependency-based vulnerability. It applies the
classification to representative cases from among the approximately one hundred
relevant cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Article contextualizes the analyses
of constitutional jurisprudence and children’s vulnerability with discussions of relevant
social history and developmental science. It then critically examines the Court’s use of
vulnerability constructs in a narrower subset of cases, exploring the relationship between
these constructs and relevant empirical knowledge.
In conclusion, the Article critiques the often-tenuous relationship between the state of
scientific knowledge and the Court’s characterizations of children’s vulnerability. The
Court frequently relies upon these constructs when determining constitutional questions.
This Article contends that when the Court makes “factual” assertions about children’s
characteristics of functioning¾assertions that are the subject matter of developmental
science¾these assertions should rest on the best available evidence. The Article
recommends continued scholarly attention to, and scrutiny of, judicial reliance on notions
of children’s vulnerability in constitutional analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
“[C]hildren are constitutionally different from adults. . . .”1 A U.S.
Supreme Court majority voiced this assertion in Montgomery v.
Louisiana,2 a recent addition to the remarkable line of Eighth
Amendment decisions that began in 2005 with Roper v. Simmons.3 Few
would disagree with the notion that children differ from adults in many
ways.4 Yet, there is substantially less agreement as to the implications of
those distinctions for constitutional jurisprudence relating to childhood.
Although Montgomery and its precedents focused on constitutional
distinctions “for purposes of sentencing,”5 the question of whether
matters affecting children’s welfare, rights, or interests require
child-specific constitutional approaches, and if so, what those
approaches should be, has been debated by the members of the Court in
an exceptionally broad range of cases.6
The Court identified “three reasons” for treating children differently
under the Constitution in its 1979 decision in Bellotti v. Baird.7 It cited
“the peculiar vulnerability of children; [children’s] inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of
the parental role in child rearing,” in justifying the constitutionality of
state limitations on minors’ access to abortion that would be
unconstitutional if applied to adults. 8 In recent decades, rich bodies of

1. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,
471 (2012) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
68 (2010))).
2. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733.
3. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (holding unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty on
minors, rev’g Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (holding
unconstitutional sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide offenses for crimes committed by
minors); Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (holding unconstitutional mandatory sentences of life without parole
for homicide offenses committed by minors).
4. The term “children” is used here to refer to all persons under the age of eighteen, in that
eighteen is the age at which persons in the United States typically attain majority in most jurisdictions
and for most purposes. See, e.g., CHILDREN AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 109–10 (Samuel S. Davis, Elizabeth
S. Scott, Walter Wadlington & Lois A. Weithorn eds., 5th ed. 2014). Clearly, therefore, the limits of
generalizations about differences between adults and children become immediately apparent, in
recognizing, as Hillary Rodham did in 1973, that older adolescents, such as seventeen year olds, may
have more in common based on maturational levels with legal adults aged eighteen than they do with
newborns. Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487, 488–89 (1973).
Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, “[t]he physiological and psychological immaturity of many minors
is undeniable, as is the dependency upon adults intrinsic to this immaturity and our social structure.
Yet, the ages of 18 and 21 delineating majority are arbitrary and stem from currently irrelevant
historical concerns such as sufficient physical strength to bear heavy armor.” Lois A. Weithorn,
Involving Children in Decisions Affecting Their Own Welfare, in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT
235, 239 (G.B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Weithorn, Involving Children].
5. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733.
6. See infra notes Part I.B.
7. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
8. Id. In Bellotti, however, the Court did not allow the Massachusetts statute requiring parental
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scholarship have explored the latter two factors cited by the Court. In
particular, substantial commentary has examined the constitutional
significance of children’s decisionmaking capacities and maturity9 and of
the relative roles and authority of parents, state, and children in matters
affecting minors’ welfare.10 By contrast, although explicit and implicit
characterizations of children as vulnerable abound in the Court’s
opinions, there has been comparatively little analysis of how the
construct of vulnerability mediates children’s relationship to the
Constitution.11
Most commonly, images of children as vulnerable make their way
into the Court’s opinions in the context of constitutional challenges to
allegedly child-protective governmental policies that limit the exercise of
children’s or adults’ constitutional rights. Notions of children as
vulnerable are most commonly employed to justify the constitutionality
of differential treatment of children and adults. Sometimes, however,

consent for minors’ access to abortion to stand without modification. The Court held unconstitutional
parental consent statutes that grant parents exclusive veto power over their minor daughters’ access
to abortion. It concluded that minors’ unique needs, characteristics, and status under the law required
an alternative that balanced the competing interests and concerns. The judicial by-pass procedure
approved by the Court in Bellotti governs in most states, although some jurisdictions, such as
California, allow minors direct access to abortion, independent of parental or court involvement. See,
e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997).
9. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?: Minors’
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOL.
583 (2009); ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008);
Thomas Grisso, Adolescents’ Decision Making: A Developmental Perspective on Constitutional
Provisions in Delinquency Cases, 32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2006); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83
N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003); YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds., 2003); Thomas Grisso, The Competence of
Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 3 (1997); CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO
CONSENT (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency
of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982); Lois
A. Weithorn, Developmental Factors and Competence to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 5
CHILD & YOUTH SERVS 85 (1982).
10. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S
POLITICAL IDEALS (2010); Anne C. Daily, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431 (2006); Emily Buss, Allocating
Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27 (2004);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995).
11. But see Deanna Pollard, Children’s Developmental Vulnerability and the Roberts Court’s ChildProtective Jurisprudence: An Emerging Trend?, 40 STETSON L. REV. 777 (2011). Many scholars have
acknowledged or discussed notions of children’s vulnerability relevant to the Court’s decisions in the
context of related analytic works. See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott, Thomas Grisso, Marsha Levick, & Laurence
Steinberg, Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 675, 679 (2016)
(analyzing the Court’s reliance on notions of children’s vulnerability to influence by others and reduced
ability to control their environment; Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in
Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 502–09 (2000) (discussing the
role of notions of children as vulnerable to harm in free speech cases).
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vulnerability constructs are used to challenge the constitutionality of
policies that treat minors and adults similarly. Other analytic uses of
these constructs appear as well. 12
These characterizations of children as vulnerable (or not) are
assertions about aspects of the psychological or physiological nature of
children that are endorsed or rejected by the Justices. As such, they
represent the Justices’ conclusions about certain facts relevant to the
constitutional cases they are deciding.13 Because these vulnerability
constructs concern general phenomena (that is, children’s
characteristics, needs, or responses to certain situations, stimuli, or
influences more generally) rather than information specific to the parties
in the litigation, the constructs have been referred to as legislative facts14
or¾using Monahan and Walker’s formulation¾social authority,15 when
judges offer them as reflecting the true state of the world.
One might wonder about the sources of the Justices’ conclusions
about children’s vulnerability, or more broadly, where judges get the
“facts” about children’s development (or any phenomenon relating to
human behavior or functioning) that they cite in resolving constitutional

12. For a survey of some of the ways in which vulnerability constructs are used by the litigants
and the Court, see infra notes 96–160.
13. In the past thirty years, a rich body of scholarship has provided theoretical frameworks for
analyzing and appraising judicial use of “facts” in constitutional and other legal decisions. See John
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social
Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986) [hereinafter Monahan & Walker, Social Authority]
(asserting that social science research should be treated by courts more like legal precedent, or “social
authority,” than pure facts); David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: Exploring
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991) [hereinafter
Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding] (discussing the role that empirical research has
played in analyzing and interpreting constitutional issues); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008) [hereinafter FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
FICTIONS]; John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Twenty-Five Years of Social Science in Law, 35 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 72 (2011) (discussing the changes over time in how courts have used and relied on social
science research). For application of the work of these and others to judicial constructs of children’s
vulnerability in constitutional analysis, see infra notes 14–20, 203–211 and accompanying text.
14. “[L]egislative facts are those facts that transcend the particular dispute and have relevance to
legal reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules.” Faigman, Normative Constitutional Factfinding,
supra note 13, at 552 (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942)). Legislative facts can be distinguished
from adjudicative facts, which are particular to the dispute before the court. Id. Thus, for example,
facts relating to the developmental maturity of minors for the purpose of fashioning an age-based rule
regarding the constitutionality of death sentences in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), are
legislative facts. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 13, at 50. By contrast, adjudicative facts
or the “facts of the case,” are “the who/ where/ why questions that should ultimately go to a jury or fact
finder.” Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2012).
15. Monahan and Walker reframe Davis’ concept of “legislative facts” using the characterization
“social authority,” “argu[ing] that courts should treat social science research relevant to creating a rule
of law as a source of authority rather than as a source of facts. More specifically, we propose that courts
treat social science research as they would legal precedent under the common law.” Monahan &
Walker, Social Authority, supra note 13, at 488.
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questions.16 To the extent that relevant methodologically rigorous
empirical research addressing the developmental vulnerabilities of
children exists, one would hope that the Justices would become
sophisticated consumers of such scientific work and apply that science
faithfully.17 While this does occasionally occur,18 more frequently the
Justices rely on unsupported or unsubstantiated assumptions about the
phenomena at issue.19 In some of these instances, Justices explicitly or
implicitly eschew the need for scientific data, offering notions about
children’s nature as statements of reality, sometimes asserting that the
facts are too well-established to require empirical support. In still other
cases, the Justices recognize the need for empirical data, but observe that
the database is inadequate to resolve the questions before the court.20
Where the Justices make assertions as to children’s functioning or
characteristics in the real world¾such as constructs of children’s
vulnerability¾and rely on those constructs in analyzing and deciding a
case, the constructs should be measured against the state of relevant
scientific evidence. While constitutional cases must be resolved through

16. See generally Judicial Notice of “Facts” about Child Development, in REFORMING THE LAW:
IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 232, 232–247 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987) [hereinafter
Judicial Notice of “Facts”] (discussing the problematic role that judicially noticed social facts play in
children’s cases); see also Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of
Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633 (1983–84). For in-depth analyses of these
issues as they relate to social science evidence (and scientific evidence) more generally, see Faigman,
Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 13; FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra
note 13; Larsen, supra note 14; Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV.
1757 (2014); Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 13; Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).
17. See, e.g., Monahan and Walker, Social Authority, supra note 13; FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
FICTIONS, supra note 13, at 159–81, which provide guidelines for how such social authority or
legislative facts might be presented to and reviewed by courts.
18. The U.S. Supreme Court’s use of empirical research in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868
(1990), as discussed infra at notes 305–16 and accompanying text, and of developmental science in
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70, 617 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62–68 (2010),
J.D.B. v. N.C., 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470–72 (2012), and
Montgomery v. Louisiana 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016), reflect reliance on research about child
development by the Court that is both appropriate and relatively sophisticated.
19. See Judicial Notice of “Facts,” supra note 16, at 239 (noting that the Court has characterized
many of its asserted “facts” about child development as derived from ordinary “human experience,”);
Perry & Melton, supra note 16, at 636–45 (discussing the evolution of judicial notice of social facts);
FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 13, at 17 (arguing that unsupported judicial
pronouncements as to the state of the empirical world, or “fact-finding by fiat,” erodes the legitimacy
of the Court).
20. Monahan and Walker note that that when “no research, or inadequate research, exists to
support empirical assumptions,” courts may rely on their “experience and intuition, along with
whatever information may be available,” to develop “working hypotheses” as to the phenomena in
question. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers, 1991
WIS. L. REV. 569, 579–81 (1991). Yet, importantly, the authors emphasize that “judicial candor about
the role of empirical assumptions and the speculative nature of their resolution” keeps the door open
to doctrinal evolution as the data base informing it evolves. Id. at 581.
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application of constitutional principles, if the Court integrates “facts”
relating to children’s vulnerability into its analyses¾as it often does
when scrutinizing state purposes asserted to justify child protective
legislation¾those facts should ideally reflect the best available
knowledge regarding children’s functioning and development.
This Article commences an examination of the Court’s analytic uses
of constructions of children’s vulnerability. Part I deconstructs the
concept of children’s vulnerability and proposes five categories derived
from the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence and interdisciplinary
scholarship: (1) Harm-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability as
greater susceptibility to physical or psychological harm from exposure to
certain stimuli or situations); (2) Influence-Based Vulnerability (that is,
vulnerability as greater susceptibility to influence, pressure, coercion by
others); (3) Capacity-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising
from immature decisional and self-protective capacities); (4)
Status-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising from legal,
social, and situational concomitants of minority status and
subordination to the authority and control of others); and (5)
Dependency-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising from
greater dependence or reliance on others to meet one’s basic needs).
In Subpart A, I define and distinguish these categories. Legal
scholarship informs the definitional and classification process, as do
theoretical insights and empirical findings on human vulnerability
emerging from the fields of bioethics, philosophy, psychology, and
developmental neuroscience. In Subpart B, for the purpose of clarifying
the categories and the distinctions among them, I apply the classification
to representative cases from among the approximately one hundred
relevant cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.21
Part II contextualizes the discussions that precede and follow it.
Subpart A embeds this Article’s analyses in the social and historical
antecedents of modern constructs of children’s vulnerability. Subpart B
provides essential understandings from developmental science to
inform, and create a backdrop for, subsequent Parts. It first highlights
the need to distinguish between generality and specificity in legal
responses to perceptions of children’s vulnerability. It then underscores
two important themes relating children’s vulnerability: children’s status
at any given moment in time as not-yet-fully-developed persons; and
children’s nature as persons undergoing a biologically driven,
environmentally responsive, and exceedingly rapid process of
maturation, unparalleled when compared with other stages of
development in the effects experiences may have on future functioning.

21. The discussion of cases within this format is selective to best illustrate the themes discussed.
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Each of these facets introduces the potential for distinct¾although
overlapping¾vulnerabilities.
Part III considers how the Court uses constructs of children’s
vulnerability, and in particular, the relationship between the constructs
offered by the Court and relevant empirical knowledge. In doing so, it
examines selected cases within the first of the five vulnerability subtypes:
Harm-Based Vulnerability.22 Subpart A considers constructs of
children’s vulnerability as alleged or potential victims of abuse in cases
relating to prohibitions on child pornography and laws developed to
accommodate the perceived needs of alleged child abuse victims
testifying in court. Section B focuses on constructs offered to support
limitations on speech asserted to have a detrimental impact on children’s
well-being. It examines selected cases restricting children’s access to
sexual content, “indecent” speech, communications by child speakers in
school settings, and video games with violent content.
In its analysis of selected cases involving judicial constructions of
children’s vulnerability, this Article considers the support, or lack
thereof, for constructs about children’s vulnerability offered by the
Justices. It observes that, in some instances, whether in the presence or
absence of purported empirical support, the Court’s use of vulnerability
constructs appears highly pretextual. At times, notions of children’s
vulnerability are strategically manipulated, allowing the Court to
sidestep the provision of a more credible account of the reasoning leading
to its result.
The analysis of constructs of children’s vulnerability deserves
continued attention by legal policymakers, jurists, and scholars. Policy
decisions as to the roles of government in protecting children, regulating
parental discretion, and restricting constitutional rights of children or
others will be the subject of ongoing debate. Not every policy affecting
children’s welfare demands scientific examination. But, to the extent that
policies are justified, in part, by assertions about children’s
psychological, physiological, or social vulnerability¾that is, matters
within the purview of developmental science¾we must honestly assess
the degree to which the factual assumptions and premises underlying any
such polices are empirically supported. Scrutiny of the Court’s constructs
about children’s vulnerability, their analytic roles, and their congruence
with the state of scientific evidence may promote greater fidelity to the
science employed and greater honesty in the legal reasoning employing
it. 23
22. Subsequent scholarship will further examine and analyze cases falling within the other four
vulnerability subtypes.
23. This point has been effectively made by others in related contexts. See, e.g., FAIGMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 13, at 155–58; Judicial Notice of “Facts,” supra note 16,
at 240–41. See infra notes 203–11 and accompanying text for further discussion of their insights.
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I. CONSTRUCTING CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY
Constitutional litigants, amici, and judges rely often on constructs
of children as vulnerable to bolster their arguments as to the asserted
need (or lack thereof) for child protective laws facing constitutional
scrutiny. In addition, in some instances, vulnerability constructions are
used to argue that children are sufficiently different from adults to
justify¾indeed mandate¾that certain policies not accounting for such
differences be held unconstitutional. Depending on the constitutional
provision at issue, the precise question before the Court, and the
applicable standard of review, vulnerability constructs may be mobilized
in service of a wide range of showings regarding alleged “facts” about
children’s psychological or physiological functioning.
In Subpart A, I deconstruct the concept of children’s vulnerability,
proposing, defining, and distinguishing five categories culled from the
U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, aided by scholarship
and empirical work in law, bioethics, philosophy, psychological science,
and developmental neuroscience. The typology includes the following
subtypes of vulnerability, to be elaborated upon below: (1) Harm-Based
Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability as greater susceptibility to physical
or psychological harm from exposure to certain stimuli or situations);
(2) Influence-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability as greater
susceptibility to influence, pressure, coercion by others); (3) CapacityBased Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising from immature
decisional and self-protective capacities); (4) Status-Based Vulnerability
(that is, vulnerability arising from legal, social, and situational
concomitants of minority status and subordination to the authority and
control of others); and (5) Dependency-Based Vulnerability (that is,
vulnerability arising from greater dependence or reliance on others to
meet one’s basic needs). These subtypes are not wholly independent;
there exist overlaps and interrelationships. I propose this classification
as an initial step in clarifying the themes and variables that relate to
vulnerability constructs used by the Court. In Subpart B, I provide
illustrative examples of the Court’s references to children’s vulnerability,
applying these typologies.
Vulnerability constructs play any of a variety of roles in the Court’s
decisions. Characterizations of minors as vulnerable may be cited to
justify more narrowly defined constitutional rights for minors than
adults and greater oversight over minors’ lives by parents or the state.
Thus, for example, the Court has rejected minors’ claims for
constitutional parity with adults in decisionmaking regarding abortion,
and has held that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to a trial
by jury in juvenile court, noting in both contexts that “the State is entitled
to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability” and
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special needs for protection and concern.24 The Court has also held
constitutional certain school-based drug testing policies not generally
permissible with adults, relying in part on its findings that the “[s]chool
years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects
of drugs are most severe.”25
The Court has also relied on vulnerability constructs to justify
extension of broader constitutional protections to minors than adults. It
has held that certain penal sentences cannot constitutionally be imposed
on minors. Here, children’s vulnerability renders them inappropriate
subjects of the harshest criminal punishments, such as the death penalty
and in some circumstances, life sentences without parole.26
At times, the Court employs constructs of children’s vulnerability to
support limitations of the constitutional rights of others. Thus, for
example, the Court has held that the state’s interest in “‘safeguard[ing]
the physical and psychological well-being of child victims [of abuse]
by . . . minimizing the emotional trauma [of] testifying’” sometimes
justifies modification of procedures for defendants’ confrontation of
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment.27 The Court has also held that the
First Amendment rights of some speakers and prospective
audience-members may be limited where the speech, or its creation,
allegedly endangers minors’ well-being.28
Notions of children’s vulnerability also may be associated with
broader or more robust constitutional protections for others. Most
notably, views of children as needing parental protection combine with
other justifications to support parents’ constitutionally grounded claims
24. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
550 (1971) (plurality opinion)). In McKeiver, the Court determined that the Constitution did not
require that the Sixth Amendment right of trial by jury be extended to juvenile court proceedings.
25. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661–64 (1995) (citing empirical research indicating
that the effects of drugs on “[m]aturing nervous systems . . . are lifelong and profound”); Bd. of Educ.
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834–37 (2002) (relying on the findings set forth in Vernonia and evidence of
the prevalence of teen drug use).
26. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (characterizing minors as more
vulnerable than adults, in part because “juveniles have less control, or less experience with control,
over their own environment”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (observing a “greater
capacity for change’” and that “a child’s character is not as ‘well-formed’ as an adults’; his traits are
‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievable[e] deprav[ity].”); Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 466, 471 (2012) (same) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 and Roper,
543 U.S. at 570).
27. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852–57 (1990) (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275,
286 (1987)) (holding constitutional Maryland’s policy allowing minor child abuse victims to testify via
closed-circuit television under certain circumstances).
28. See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (holding
constitutional a Federal Communications Commission sanction following a daytime radio broadcast
of a comedic monologue containing language referring to “excretory or sexual activities or organs”);
N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749, 774 (1982) (upholding a New York statute that criminalized the
knowing promotion of “sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing
materials that depicts such performances”).
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of authority. Thus, for example, in upholding Utah’s requirement that
physicians notify parents of a minor seeking an abortion, the Court relied
on a view that the “particularly” “serious” and potentially “traumatic and
permanent” “medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an
abortion” when patients are minors may be mitigated where parents are
informed.29
A. DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING VULNERABILITY
What does the Court mean when referring to children as vulnerable
in the context of constitutional jurisprudence? It has provided only
limited illumination of the meanings it ascribes to the concept of
vulnerability. For instance, it has never explained its choice of the
modifier “peculiar,”30 in describing children’s vulnerability in Bellotti
v. Baird. Common use of the term “peculiar” suggests distinctiveness and
atypicality.31 Some features of children’s vulnerability are indeed
distinctive, such as those related to the natural patterns and pace of
children’s physiological and psychological development, or to the unique
role of parents in minor children’s lives.32 At the same time, the
commonalities between children’s vulnerability and that of others in
society33 help inform our understanding of the term’s relevance in
constitutional analyses involving children.
For a concept used so frequently in both lay and scholarly discourse,
there is remarkably little written to elucidate the nature of the concept of
vulnerability as it relates to human beings.34 And, unfortunately, when
29. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411–13 (1981).
30. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (citing “the peculiar vulnerability of children”).
31. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary provides the following definitional alternatives for the word
“peculiar:” “1. [C]haracteristic of only one person, group, or thing: distinctive . . . . ; 2. different from
the usual or normal: (a) special, particular[;] (b) odd, curious [;] (c) eccentric, queer . . . .” Peculiar,
MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peculiar (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
32. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children Is a World Fit for Everyone:
Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 817, 824 (2009); notes 162–67,
216–37 infra and accompanying text.
33. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of
Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71 (2012) [hereinafter Fineman, “Elderly” as
Vulnerable] (discussing the need for state and social institutions to consider the vulnerabilities of the
elderly population); Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference—The Restrained State, 66
ALA. L. REV. 609, 621–23 (2015) [hereinafter Fineman, Equality and Difference] (emphasizing that a
formal equality approach to implementation of laws ignores the structural disadvantages that certain
groups face).
34. Ironically, there appears to be more systematic investigation and analysis of the meaning(s)
of the term in the fields concerned with environmental hazards and the effects of climate change. See,
e.g., BEN WISNER ET AL., AT RISK: NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE’S VULNERABILITY, AND DISASTERS 11–16
(2d ed. 2004); see also Christina Zarowsky et al., Beyond “Vulnerable Groups”: The Contexts and
Dynamics of Vulnerability, 20 GLOBAL HEALTH PROMOTION SUPPL. (2013); Susan L. Cutter,
Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards, 20 PROG. HUM. GEOGRAPHY 529 (1996) (reviewing a range
of definitions and concepts of vulnerability). The conceptual struggles in that field bear some
resemblance to the analyses ongoing in other fields. See infra notes 45–76 and accompanying text.
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the term is used, it is rarely defined, and frequently used interchangeably
with the conceptually distinct term “risk.”35 In this section, I begin to
clarify the terms as I use them in this Article, with the help of those who
have thought through these issues before me.
The terms “vulnerable” and “vulnerability” are commonly used in
everyday parlance. Their ordinary meaning provides a useful starting
point. One dictionary defines the term “vulnerable” as “capable of or
susceptible to being wounded or hurt physically or emotionally”; or
“susceptible to temptation or corrupt influence.”36 These two
threads¾susceptibility to physical or emotional harm and susceptibility
to coercion or other external sources of influence¾also sit at the core of
many philosophical, scientific, and legal formulations. Other concepts of
vulnerability, such as those relating to dependence on others or
socially imposed restrictions on freedom, also appear in jurisprudence
relating to childhood. Of course, all persons are, to some extent,
vulnerable under either of the above definitions. Thus, to the extent that
the law requires constitutionally relevant distinctions between children
and adults to justify differential treatment, the Court must consider
whether differences in vulnerability between children and adults exists,
and whether such distinctions permit differential treatment under the
law.
One frequently cited definition of vulnerability focuses on those
factors that predispose one, or heighten the possibility of, deleterious
consequences arising from some exposure or situation: “Vulnerability
refers to an individual’s predisposition to develop[, or the] susceptibility
to negative developmental outcomes that can occur under high-risk
conditions.”37 The potential sources of vulnerability are many, and may
include genetic, temperament, health or disability status, or other factors
that we might view as characteristics of the individual.38 Those factors
need not be unique to the individual. For example, one’s age,
developmental stage, or gender¾characteristics that one shares with
other group members¾may render one vulnerable in some situations.
Feminist philosophers Catriona Mackenzie and colleagues label sources
of vulnerability attributed to such factors as inherent or intrinsic,39 while
behavioral scientists might refer to these sources as endogenous
35. Rick E. Ingram & Joseph M. Price, Understanding Psychopathology: The Role of
Vulnerability, in VULNERABILITY TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: RISK ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 3, 5, 11 (R.E. Ingram
& J.M Price eds., 2d ed. 2010).
36. Vulnerable, THE RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1997).
37. Marc A. Zimmerman & Revathy Arunkumar, Resiliency Research: Implications for Schools
and Policy, 8 SOC. POL’Y REP.: SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD DEV. 1, 2 (1994).
38. Id.
39. Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, & Susan Dodds, Introduction: What is Vulnerability and
Why Does It Matter for Moral Theory?, in VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICS AND FEMINIST
PHILOSOPHY 1, 7 (Catriona Mackenzie et al. eds., 2014).
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factors.40 Yet, “vulnerability processes within the individual are viewed
as being in a dynamic interaction with environmental systems
throughout the lifespan . . . . This dynamic interaction, or transaction, is
reciprocal in nature, allowing vulnerability processes to both influence
and be influenced by environmental conditions.”41 In other words, while
vulnerabilities can be static and enduring, they are also potentially
modifiable as a person continues to grow and develop. And, to the extent
that factors relating to immaturity, youth, and developmental processes
render a person vulnerable, maturation alters the nature and degree of
that person’s vulnerabilities.
Mackenzie and colleagues also speak of situational sources of
vulnerability, such as the “personal, social, political, economic,
environmental situations of individuals or social groups,” and note that
such factors can be short-term, intermittent, or enduring.42 Thus, loss of
a job or health insurance, the experience of penal incarceration, or
enforcement of a discriminatory policy against a minority group are
examples of such sources. Behavioral scientists may also focus on the role
of external or situational sources as risk factors where there are
statistically demonstrated relationships between the existence of such
factors and a predisposition to negative developmental outcomes.43
Recognized developmental risk factors include, for example, exposure to
domestic violence perpetrated against one’s parent, or growing up in
poverty. The term “risk . . . signifies an elevated probability of a negative
outcome,” and “risk factor” is a “measurable characteristic in a group of
individuals or their situation that predicts a negative outcome on a
specific outcome” criterion.44 Thus, both vulnerability and risk factors
can increase the probability of such a negative outcome, and arguably
interact with each other in the developmental process.45 These concepts
lead to identification of the first subtype of vulnerability found in the
40. Endogenous factors are those sources perceived to be residing “within the person,” as
contrasted with external or situational factors. Ingram & Price, supra note 35, at 8, 28.
41. Joseph M. Price & Jennifer Zwolinksi, The Nature of Child and Adolescent Vulnerability:
History and Definitions, in VULNERABILITY TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: RISK ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 18,
28–29 (R.E. Ingram & J.M Price eds., 2d ed. 2010).
42. Mackenzie, Rogers, & Dodds, supra note 39.
43. See, e.g., Margaret O’Dougherty Wright et al., Resilience Processes in Development: Four
Waves of Research on Positive Adaptation in the Context of Adversity, in HANDBOOK OF RESILIENCE
IN CHILDREN 15, 16–17 (S. Goldstein & R. B. Brooks eds., 2013).
44. Id. at 16–18.
45. Ingram & Price, supra note 35, at 11. Carl Coleman points out that vulnerability “is not a
stand-alone concept.” In other words, it is relative to some stress, adversity, influence, or exposure.
Carl H. Coleman, Vulnerability as a Regulatory Category in Human Subject Research, 37 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 12, 14 (2009). The assertion that “children are vulnerable” or are “more vulnerable than
adults,” is only meaningful when we elaborate upon the exposures or experiences in which
vulnerability is triggered or manifested. Thus, while some of the discussion set forth in this Article
speaks in generalities about certain developmental phenomena and trends, it then strives for greater
specificity, focusing on identified contexts and exposures.
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Court’s jurisprudence and elaborated in scientific and theoretical
scholarship: susceptibility to physiological or psychological harm
through exposure to certain stimuli or situations. The first category of
vulnerability is central to many of the Court’s constructions of children
and is grounded in the notion of vulnerability as susceptibility to negative
developmental outcomes under high-risk conditions or in the face of
stressors or other adversity.
The field of bioethics and law has incorporated the concept of
vulnerability into its regulatory and scholarly analyses of and proposals
for policies governing involvement of human participants in research. A
brief review of some of these analyses and proposals provides some
foundation for an elucidation of three additional subtypes of
vulnerability that appear in the Court’s opinions involving children, and
thus are reviewed here: influenced-based vulnerability, capacity-based
vulnerability, and status-based vulnerability.
The emphasis on these vulnerability themes is understandable,
when one considers the history of modern bioethics. The field arose
initially from the need to develop systematic principles, guidelines, and
legal regulation governing participation of human beings in research.
The early efforts at regulating such activities followed the horrific abuses
of Holocaust victims by Nazi physicians in the name of medical research,
and of human research participants in the United States in subsequent
decades.46 With these events in mind, concepts of vulnerability focused
on factors that interfered with one’s ability to exercise autonomous
choice in decisions whether to participate.47 Thus, incorporation of
notions of vulnerability into regulatory proposals and schema sought to
promote free and voluntary choice and to protect against coercive
influences and exploitation of those whose choices were limited due to
incapacity or status.
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research was established by Congress in 1974
under the National Research Act,48 following increasing public
awareness of abuses of human participants in research in the United
States in a series of studies that exposed institutionalized, ill, disabled,
poor, uneducated, and otherwise disadvantaged persons or groups to
substantial risks.49 The National Commission provided guidance in the
46. For an excellent review of historical events influencing the development of the field of
bioethics, see, e.g., ALBERT R. JONSEN, A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 99–120 (2000).
47. As noted below, the risks (or potential harms), of the research endeavor were also factored
into ethical analyses, but as a separate consideration, to be weighed against prospective benefits of
participation. They were not considered relative to prospective participants’ vulnerability. See infra
note 63 and accompanying text.
48. Pub. Law 93-348, Title II, Part A, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
49. For a summary of these studies, see, e.g., CARL H. COLEMAN, JERRY A. MENIKOFF, JESSE A.
GOLDNER, & NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER, THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN
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development of regulations to protect human participants in the U.S. In
its 1979 Belmont Report, the National Commission highlighted the
notion of vulnerability as a consideration relevant to inclusion of, and
protections for, human participants in empirical research studies.50 The
concept was raised in a discussion of the cornerstone requirement of
“voluntariness” of research participation, with the National Commission
noting that “especially vulnerable” prospective participants may be
particularly susceptible to “undue influence” when making the
participation decision.51 The concept appeared again in the discussion of
research studies’ risk-benefit ratios. The National Commission implied
that risks to “vulnerable populations” must be assessed with particular
care, suggesting that persons in such populations may be at greater risk
than are others when exposed to the same stimuli.52 Finally, in
elaborating some of the concerns regarding “justice,” that is, the principle
grounded in “moral requirements” that there be fairness in the selection
of research subjects,53 the Commission noted:
One special instance of injustice results from the involvement of
vulnerable subjects. Certain groups, such as racial minorities, the
economically disadvantaged, the very sick, and the institutionalized
may continually be sought as research subjects, owing to their ready
availability in settings where research is conducted. Given their
dependent status and their frequently compromised capacity for free
consent, they should be protected against the danger of being involved
in research solely for administrative convenience, or because they are
easy to manipulate as a result of their illness or socioeconomic
condition.54

SUBJECTS 31–50 (2005).
50. The Belmont Report, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, (Apr. 18. 1979),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report.
51. Id. The notion of voluntariness is one of the core principles of the doctrine of informed consent
more generally. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOETHICAL ETHICS
77–90 (7th ed. 2013).
52. The Belmont Report, supra note 50.
53. This principle would prohibit unjust distribution of the burdens and benefits of research
participation within society, avoiding unfair burdens on those groups that experience greater
disadvantage in society. Id.
54. Id. The National Commission’s recommendations ultimately led to the exclusion or reduction
of certain groups from research participation. As the years passed, however, this guidance has been
criticized, in part because certain groups were deprived of the benefits of research participation or the
findings of scientific studies. See, e.g., Holly A. Taylor, Implementation of NIH Inclusion Guidelines:
Survey of NIH Study Section Members, 5 CLINICAL TRIALS 140 (2008) (discussing the National
Institutes of Health policy to promote increased inclusion of children in scientific research on
questions important to their welfare); NAT’L INST. OF MED., COMM. ON ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS 1, 113–136 (Lawrence O. Gostin et al., 2007) (proposing guidelines to
allow for increased inclusion of prisoners in certain types of research). But see generally Osagie
Obasogie, Prisoners as Human Subjects: A Closer Look at the Institute of Medicine’s
Recommendations to Loosen Current Restrictions on Using Prisoners in Scientific Research, 6 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 41 (2010) (criticizing the National Institute of Medicine recommendations).
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Thus, although the National Commission never explicitly defined
vulnerability, it implied that vulnerability derives from greater
susceptibility to influence, possibly due to characteristics of the persons
(such as impaired capacities), but perhaps also to situational or
structural factors, such as discrimination, institutionalization, economic
disadvantage, or dependency. The federal regulations ultimately
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services55 refer to
vulnerable groups, but do not provide further elucidation on the meaning
of the term “vulnerability.”56 Several commentators have critiqued the
field of bioethics’ essentialist reliance on arguably over-inclusive and
under-inclusive categories and groups as vulnerable, without conceptual
clarity as to the factors that define vulnerability.57
One of the most thoughtful analyses of vulnerability in the context
of research participation appeared in the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (“NBAC”) Report on Ethical and Policy Issues in Research
Involving Human Participants.58 The Report’s emphasis in addressing
vulnerability in this context is the recognition that some persons may be
less able to protect themselves from inappropriate involvement in
research than are others. Thus, the Report defined vulnerability as
follows: “a condition, either intrinsic or situational, of some individuals
that puts them at greater risk of being used in ethically inappropriate
ways in research.”59 It recognized that vulnerability may be manifested
as “difficulty providing voluntary informed consent arising from
limitations in decisionmaking capacity (as in the case of children) or
situational circumstances (as in the case of prisoners), or because they
are especially at risk for exploitation (as in the case of persons who belong
to undervalued groups in society).”60
The Report identified the following subtypes of vulnerability:
incapacitational vulnerability (that is, limitations in the ability to
55. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2009).
56. See, e.g., Carl H. Coleman, Vulnerability as a Regulatory Category in Human Subject
Research, 37 J.L., MED., & ETHICS 12, 12 (2009) (discussing the federal regulations’ reference to
specific groups as examples of “vulnerable populations,” without defining vulnerability).
57. See, e.g., id. at 14; Carol Levine, Ruth Faden et al., The Limitations of “Vulnerability” as a
Protection for Human Research Participants, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44, 46–48 (2004) (referring to the
concept of vulnerability as both “too broad and too narrow”).
58. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 1 ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 85–92 (2001) [hereinafter NBAC REP. 1]. A more detailed version of the
vulnerability analysis, which was authored by Kenneth Kipnis, was provided in Volume II, which
contained the commissioned papers. Kenneth Kipnis, Vulnerability in Research Subjects: A Bioethical
Taxonomy, in NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 2 ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS G-1 (2001). Kipnis subsequently separately published a slightly
revised version, focusing solely on children as research subjects. Kenneth Kipnis, Seven
Vulnerabilities in the Pediatric Research Subject, 24 THEORETICAL MED. 107 (2003) [hereinafter
Kipnis, Seven Vulnerabilities].
59. NBAC REP. 1, supra note 58, at 85.
60. Id.
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“comprehend information, deliberate, and make decisions regarding
participation in a proposed research study”);61 institutional vulnerability
(that is, being “subject to the formal authority of others who have
independent interests in whether the prospective participant agrees to
enroll in the research study,” as in the case of persons in prisons or the
military, or college students who must take part in a study as part of a
course requirement); deferential vulnerability (that is, like institutional
vulnerability, these persons are situated so as to be subject to the
authority of others with independent interests, but here the influence is
informal rather than the product of formal hierarchies, as when patients
generally defer to their doctors, or in response to inequalities in class,
race, or gender); medical vulnerability (that is, when individuals with
serious health conditions are drawn to research participation because
there are no other satisfactory treatment options, a scenario that can
affect one’s willingness to accept certain risks); economic vulnerability
(that is, when “individuals are disadvantaged in the distribution of social
goods and services such as income, housing, or health care” which may
increase the risk of exploitation through participation); and social
vulnerability (that is, when persons belong to “undervalued social
groups . . . which includes stereotyping and can lead to
discrimination.”).62
As noted above, none of the vulnerability categories cited by the
NBAC incorporate susceptibility to harm. Rather, the focus is on
vulnerability as related primarily to concerns about whether prospective
participants can render voluntary decisions regarding participation, free
from coercion or undue influence. The framework discussed by the
NBAC, which is consistent with that embedded in the current federal
regulations governing human research participation, analyzes potential
for harms to participants as a result of research involvement separately,
focusing on the risks posed by research studies as a distinct
consideration.63 The term vulnerability is not used, however, to address
whether some participants may be more susceptible than others to
experiencing harm when exposed to the risks of research participation.
Consistent with these emphases, the federal regulations impose
duties on Institutional Review Boards (“IRBs”)—local panels empowered
to determine when, and under what conditions, studies can go forward—
61. Id. at 88–90. I chose the term “incapacitational vulnerability,” used by Kipnis in his separate
publication, Kipnis, Seven Vulnerabilities, supra note 58, at 110, rather than the term “cognitive or
communicative vulnerability,” used in NBAC REP. 1, supra.
62. NBAC REP. 1, supra note 58, at 88–90.
63. The federal regulations empower Institutional Review Boards (“IRBs”) with the authority to
determine the ethicality and permissibility of research proposals under the current federal regulatory
structure. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–46.109 (2017). Under that structure, IRBs must consider the risks
posed by the research project, the relationship between the risks and possible benefits, informed
consent procedures, and other factors. 45 CFR § 46.110–46.111.
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relative to groups identified as “vulnerable populations” (specifically
“children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or
economically or educationally disadvantaged persons”).64 IRBs must
ensure that adequate “safeguards have been included in the study to
protect the rights and welfare of these subjects” “[w]hen some or all of
the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence.”65
They also instruct IRBs to “be particularly cognizant of the special
problems of research involving” persons in those groups identified as
vulnerable.66 Three separate subparts of the regulations provide for
special protections for (1) pregnant women, human fetuses, and
neonates, (2) children, and (3) prisoners.67 The specific references to the
reasons for inclusion of these groups focus on vulnerability to “coercion
and undue influence,” and the potential for exploitation through
inequitable selection of participant groups by researchers.
Yet, the inclusion of pregnant women is puzzling here, as pregnant
women do not constitute a group that is regarded¾at least in modern
decades¾as having greater vulnerability to coercion or undue influence.
Nor do they comprise a group that experiences the same social
disadvantage or exploitation in the context of the research enterprise as
have, for example, many economically disadvantaged or incarcerated
groups. Indeed, the characterization of pregnant women as less able to
provide voluntary informed consent for research participation seems
misplaced and patronizing.68 Subsequent guidelines and scholarship
suggest that, when drafting the regulations, the Department of Health
and Human Services (“DHHS”) was concerned with the heightened
physiological sensitivity of pregnant women (and the fetuses they carry)
to certain substances and stimuli when identifying vulnerability as one
basis for a more protective approach toward pregnant women, even
though this definition of vulnerability is not cited explicitly by DHHS in
the regulations. This concern invokes notions of vulnerability as greater
susceptibility to harm. And indeed, vulnerability as greater susceptibility
to harm is one factor in modern thinking about the need for special
safeguards for pregnant women as research participants.69
64. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b).
65. Id.
66. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (addressing equitable selection of research participants). Vulnerable
groups or populations are also mentioned in the regulations in sections dealing with composition of
IRBs. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
67. See Subparts B, C, and D respectively.
68. For a thoughtful analysis and critique of the characterization of pregnant women as
vulnerable research participants, see Verina Wild, How Are Pregnant Women Vulnerable Research
Participants?, 5 INT’L J. FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 82 (2012).
69. See, e.g., AM. C. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY COMM’N ON ETHICS, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
INCLUDING WOMEN AS RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS (2015), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee
-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/co646.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20170312T1821081805; Mary C. Blehar et al.,
Enrolling Pregnant Women: Clinical Issues in Research, 23 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 39 (2013).

WEITHORN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2017]

12/22/17 12:39 AM

JURISPRUDENCE OF CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY

197

Carol Levine and colleagues critique the absence of susceptibility to
harm as a dimension of vulnerability under the federal regulations and
subsequent analyses in an analysis of the use of the concept of
vulnerability in the context of protections for human research
participants.70 They assert that “[w]hile consent is surely a serious
concern, the root of the concept of vulnerability lies in the possibility of
physical harm. . . . In contemporary bioethical discourse, one can be
vulnerable to being harmed or being wronged.”71 Carl Coleman
articulates similar critiques, and suggests that vulnerabilities in the
context of research participation be classified as falling into three
primary
categories:
consent-based
vulnerabilities,
risk-based
vulnerabilities, and justice-based vulnerabilities.72 Here, risk-based
vulnerabilities would consider whether certain characteristics of the
individuals “may enhance the level of risks associated with the subjects’
participation in a study,” which in the research participation context
would require the investigators and IRB to assess potential risks and the
risk-benefit ratio with particular care and attention to those factors.73
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences
(“CIOMS”), in its 2016 revision of International Ethical Guidelines for
Health-Related Research Involving Humans,74 became the first
influential group to incorporate into its concept of vulnerability a harmbased notion. A pertinent portion of the commentary to the relevant
guideline reads:
According to the Declaration of Helsinki, vulnerable groups and
individuals “may have an increased likelihood of being wronged or of

70. Levine et al., supra note 57, at 46–48.
71. Id. at 47. More recently, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethics, in a module
on Vulnerable Populations intended as a resource for instructors and others, adopted much of the
language and the taxonomy set forth by the NBAC. However, it expanded the initial definition of
vulnerability as follows: “Vulnerability means that an individual or groups of individuals lack the
ability to fully and independently protect their own interests and so are vulnerable to being harmed
or wronged.” Vulnerable Populations Background, PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF
BIOETHICAL ISSUES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/node/4035.html
(emphasis added). Yet, even this expansion does not fully envelop the concept of Harm-Based
Vulnerability, in that it focuses on vulnerability as inability to protect one’s own interests rather than
vulnerability as resulting from an organism’s greater susceptibility to harm from the interventions or
exposures that occur during research participation. For further discussion of these problems, as well
as a summary of other definitions in the context of research ethics, see Dearbhail
Bracken-Roche et al., The Concept of “Vulnerability” in Research Ethics: An In-Depth Analysis of
Policies and Guidelines, 15 HEALTH RES. POL’Y & SYS’S 1 (2017).
72. Coleman, supra note 45, at 15.
73. Id.
74. COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCI., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR
HEALTH-RELATED RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMANS 57–59 (2016), https://cioms.ch/wp-content/
uploads/2017/01/WEB-CIOMS-EthicalGuidelines.pdf [hereinafter CIOMS]. This document was
developed in collaboration with the World Health Organization.
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incurring additional harm.” This implies that vulnerability involves
judgments about both the probability and degree of physical,
psychological, or social harm, as well as a greater susceptibility to
deception or having confidentiality breached. It is important to
recognize that vulnerability involves not only the ability to provide
initial consent to participate in research, but also aspects of the ongoing
participation in research studies.75

The 2016 CIOMS report clearly goes beyond vulnerabilities as
relating solely to the consent process, adopting a notion of vulnerability
as greater susceptibility to “physical, psychological, or social harm”
arising both from direct involvement in the ongoing research, and from
concrete and relational effects of breaches of confidentiality by the
research team or exposure to deception as a feature of the experimental
design. These harm-based notions of vulnerability are integrated by the
CIOMS report into a more comprehensive catalog of dimensions of
vulnerability, which encompasses substantially similar principles as the
NBAC, but combines both capacity-related and influence-related
themes:
In some cases, persons are vulnerable because they are relatively (or
absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests. This may occur
when persons have relative or absolute impairments in decisional
capacity, education, resources, strength, or other attributes needed to
protect their own interests. In other cases, persons can also be
vulnerable because some feature of the circumstances (temporary or
permanent) in which they live makes it less likely that others will be
vigilant about, or sensitive to, their interests. This may happen when
people are marginalized, stigmatized, or face social exclusion or
prejudice that increases the likelihood that others place their interests
at risk, whether intentionally or unintentionally . . . .76

Applying the analyses in this Part to the concepts of children’s
vulnerability that appear in the Court’s opinions, three additional
subtypes of vulnerability can be identified: vulnerability as susceptibility
to influence, pressure, or coercion by others (influence-based
vulnerability); vulnerability arising from immature decisional and selfprotective capacities (capacity-based vulnerability); and vulnerability
arising from legal, social, and situational concomitants of minority status
and subordination to the authority and control of others (status-based
vulnerability). I will distinguish and elaborate upon these three subtypes,
and their relationship to the foregoing themes.
Clearly, a predominant theme in bioethical formulations and
regulatory guidelines is a concern about the role of vulnerability in
impairing an individual’s opportunity or ability to make choices. Indeed,
in their classic treatise on Principles of Bioethics, Beauchamp and

75. Id. at 57.
76. CIOMS, supra note 74, at 57.
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Childress characterize the field’s concerns about vulnerable persons as
relating to perceived limitations in such persons’ capacities to “protect[]
their own interests because of sickness, debilitation, mental illness,
immaturity, cognitive impairment, and the like. . . . Those who are easily
susceptible to intimidation, manipulation, coercion, or exploitation are
commonly classified among the vulnerable.”77 One can further
subclassify this set of ideas by distinguishing between impairments of
one’s opportunity or ability to make choices due to the influence or
pressure of others or due to limitations in one’s opportunity or ability to
understand, process, analyze, or exercise judgment about information
(including, but not limited to, the potential risks and benefits of
particular courses of action). While there are unquestionably some
intersections between these concepts, one emphasizes a more influencebased dimension of vulnerability while the other a more capacity-based
dimension of vulnerability.
The legal and ethical doctrines of informed consent, which regulate
health care decisionmaking as well as research participation decisions,
require that a person’s decision be made voluntarily as well as
competently.78 Formulations of voluntariness identify the aspiration that
health care decisionmaking be relatively free from coercion,
manipulation, or unfair inducements.79 Formulations of competence
emphasize the ideal that health care decisions be made with
understanding of the information material to their decision (such as
potential risks, benefits, and probabilities of various outcomes), with the
ability to reason about that information, and with an appropriate degree
of judgment or appreciation of the nuances of the decision for them,
given their situation.80
The second subtype of vulnerability found in the Court’s
jurisprudence and elaborated in scientific and theoretical scholarship
therefore is influence-based vulnerability, which emphasizes children’s
purported susceptibility to influence, pressure, or coercion of others as
a basis for differential constitutional treatment of minors and adults. In
our dictionary definitions above, this form may be defined as
77. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 89 (6th ed.
2009). Beauchamp and Childress caution against the potential for stereotyping and overprotection
with classification of an entire group as vulnerable. Id. at 90. Beauchamp and Childress also recognize
vulnerability as susceptibility to harm. Id. at 89, 254.
78. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 77, at 117–35; see also Alan Meisel, Loren H. Roth,
& Charles W. Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
285 (1977).
79. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 77, at 132–33; Meisel et al., supra note 78, at 286.
80. Several of these concepts are central to modern notions of competence to provide informed
consent. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment,
357 N. ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1835–36 (2007) (as applied to adults); Weithorn, Developmental Factors
and Competence to Make Informed Decisions, supra note 9, at 88–95 (as applied to measurement of
children’s competence).
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“susceptib[ility] to temptation or corrupt influence.”81 It captures notions
of vulnerability as greater susceptibility to influence, pressure, or
coercion by others. This category focuses on influence-based
vulnerability related primarily to inherent or intrinsic factors, as
identified by Mackenzie, above.82 Thus, some individuals, due to age,
stage of development, or other psychological or endogenous
characteristics, may be more susceptible to influence, pressure, or
coercion by others. They may be more likely to conform with the
directives or expectations of others, or be more susceptible to role
modeling by others. In addition, in specific situations, they may defer to
respected, trusted, or powerful others’ preferences, due to any of a range
of relational and interpersonal processes and dynamics. Indeed, this
phenomenon may be analogized to the NBAC’s notion of deferential
vulnerability, which recognizes the subtle impact of relationships,
including hierarchical relationships, on the choices one makes in those
situations when one is provided with the opportunity to elect options.
By contrast, capacity-based vulnerability, or vulnerability arising
from immature decisional and self-protective capacities, focuses
primarily on the ways in which limitations in capacities for effective
decisionmaking render one vulnerable. The CIOMS report
characterization of vulnerability as flowing from incapacity to protect
one’s own interests related to reduced decisional capacities. This notion
is consistent with the concept of incapacitational vulnerability laid out in
the NBAC analysis, embodies a theme present in many of the Court’s
decisions.
It is important here to clarify the relationship between decisional
capacities and vulnerability. Psychological capacity or competence for
decisionmaking is usually a legal prerequisite for authority to make
important decisions, such as those regarding medical treatment. Such
capacity is presumed for adults, whereas incapacity is typically
presumed for minors, subject to certain exceptions.83
As the Court’s language in Bellotti detailing the “three reasons”
justifying differential treatment of children and adults under the
Constitution, reveals,84 the Court views decisional capacity and
vulnerability as distinct factors.85 Yet, as the bioethics formulations by
81. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 9, at 1590 (finding that denying adolescents
the right of self-determination in health care situations is not supported on the basis of a presumption
that they lack the capacity to make meaningful health care decisions).
84. The Court cited “the peculiar vulnerability of children; [children’s] inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing” as
bases for differential treatment of minors and adults under the Constitution. Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
85. Id. In Bellotti, however, the Court did not allow the Massachusetts statute requiring parental
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CIOMS and the NBAC make clear, vulnerability may, in some instances,
arise from reduced decisional capacity. Those whose decisional
capacities are immature may be more prone to make unwise choices, and
therefore, may be less able to protect themselves from potential harms or
dangers present in their lives. Reduced capacity to seek or understand
information, to appreciate its relevance for oneself, to perceive and weigh
risks and benefits, or to exercise self-control and restrain oneself from
acting impulsively, creates a greater risk of making choices that lead to
negative outcomes. Research reveals differences in decisional capacities
based on age, although the patterns are not always linear and do not
always mesh with everyday assumptions or legal presumptions.86
A fourth subtype of vulnerability focuses on the structural realities
of children’s status as legal minors. Status-based vulnerability arises
from legal, social, and situational concomitants of minority status and
subordination to the authority and control of others. In focusing on the
concomitants of legal minority for children, status-based vulnerability
addresses the effects of being in a formal class whose members are
typically subject to the authority of others. The concept draws, in part,
from the NBAC’s notions of institutional vulnerability. As minors,
children are limited by legal, social, economic, and restrictions that
reduce their freedom of choice, movement, and autonomy. Others are
charged with making decisions about their custody (that is, where they
go and with whom they spend time), their education, their religion, their
health care, their discipline, and so on. In most cases, their opportunities
to make choices and exercise freedoms are contingent on the discretion
of others.
Within the legal framework that empowers adults with the
supervision and control of minors in our society, we rely on adults to use
this authority in a manner that is nonexploitative, ideally promoting
children’s welfare and positive socialization. Most adults do not abuse
this power, yet the control by some adults charged with supervision and
decisionmaking regarding children can create a range of risks to children.
Children have limited recourse in such situations. In some instances, the
Court has noted that children’s lesser control over their own lives limits
their choices in ways that are constitutionally relevant.87

consent for minors’ access to abortion to stand without modification. The Court held unconstitutional
parental consent statutes that grant parents exclusive veto power over their minor daughters’ access
to abortion. It concluded that minors’ unique needs, characteristics, and status under the law required
an alternative that balanced the competing interests and concerns. The judicial by-pass procedure
approved by the Court in Bellotti governs in most states, although some jurisdictions, such as
California, allow minors direct access to abortion, independent of parental or court involvement.
See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997).
86. See e.g., sources cited supra note 9.
87. See, e.g., infra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
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The fifth and final subtype of vulnerability—dependency-based
vulnerability—arises from children’s greater dependence or reliance on
others to meet one’s basic needs. Initially, it may appear that this subtype
is similar to status-based vulnerability. Indeed, the law and society have
created structures to formalize children’s dependence on adults with
statuses such as minority and parenthood. Dependency-based
vulnerability focuses on minors’ functional reliance on adults to meet
their needs. Thus, while status-based vulnerability highlights the risks to
minors arising out of the authority of others over them and their
concomitant lack of control over their own lives, dependency-based
vulnerability highlights the risks arising from children’s functional
reliance on adults, particularly caregivers, to meet their essential
physiological and psychological needs.
As discussed in Part II, children’s development occurs in interaction
with their environments. At times, children’s development is acutely
sensitive to environmental experiences. Throughout a child’s life, but
particularly in the early years, adults control whether those experiences
facilitate positive development, neglect essential needs, or introduce
harmful exposures. Children, especially young children, rely almost
exclusively on caregivers, teachers, and, at times, other adults to provide
an environment that facilitates positive developmental trajectories and
protects against environmental risks. With dependence on adults come
risks due to deficits, inadequacies, or dangers presented by the care of
others. It is this dependence and the attendant risks it entails that is
captured by dependency-based vulnerability.
Several writers have addressed the concept of dependency-based
vulnerability. Martha Fineman emphasizes the interrelationships
between dependency and vulnerability more generally.88 Philosopher
Susan Dodds characterizes dependence as a form of vulnerability:
“Dependence is vulnerability that requires . . . care.”89 Mianna Lotz
asserts that children’s unique vulnerability “arises from their particular
dependency on the actions and choices of others, especially their
caregivers, and from their (at least present) lack of the full complement
of skills and capacities that might mitigate such dependency.”90 She
points out further that it is precisely those inputs from caregivers that
help develop the capacities that will ultimately allow children to exercise
autonomy. Thus, the impact caregivers have on a child is lifelong. The
research reviewed in Part II below underscores how important early

88. Martha Albertson Fineman in Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL
FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 13, 17–19 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Greer eds., 2013).
89. Susan Dodds, Dependence, Care, and Vulnerability, in VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICS
AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 181, 182–83 (Catriona Mackenzie et al. eds., 2014).
90. Mianna Lotz, Parental Values and Children’s Vulnerability, in VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS
IN ETHICS AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 242, 243–44 (Catriona Mackenzie et al. eds., 2014).
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inputs are to social, emotional, and medical well-being throughout the
lifespan, consistent with Lotz’s observation that psychological and
emotional relationships with caregivers are necessary for children to
flourish.91 Adults involved in raising children, such as parents, extended
family, teachers, and others, have substantial influence over the course
of a child’s life, through formation of children’s preferences and values
occurring during socialization.92
In addition, because of their undeveloped physical selves, children
are dependent on caregivers for the most basic material sustenance
necessary for their survival, such as food and shelter.93 “To be dependent
is to be in circumstances in which one must rely on other individuals to
access, provide, or secure (one or more of) one’s needs . . . .”94 Small
children may be physically incapable of extricating themselves from
dangerous situations created by acts of omission or commission by their
caregivers. A stark example, highlighted by recent news reports, occurs
when adults leave children unattended in locked cars, with lethal
consequences.95 The statistics on the rates of reported child neglect
reveal that substantial numbers of children in our society may not have
their basic needs for care adequately met. They and others rely on the
legal system to remedy these failures.
B.

CHILDHOOD VULNERABILITY CONSTRUCTS AND THE COURT:
AN INTRODUCTION

In this Section, I apply the typologies developed above, illustrating
the Court’s use of vulnerability constructs, for the purpose of clarifying
the categories and the distinctions among them.
1. Harm-Based Vulnerability
The first typology emphasizes vulnerability as greater
susceptibility to physical or psychological harm from exposure to
certain stimuli or situations. Members of the Court have invoked
91. Id. at 244.
92. See generally HANDBOOK OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (Melanie Killen & Judith G. Smetana eds.,
2d ed. 2014) (noting that the family structure plays a significant role in the way children’s moral
sensitivity and behavior develop); HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH (Joan E.
Grusec & Paul D. Hastings eds., 2d ed. 2015) (finding that young children learn socialization skills
from adult role models).
93. Id.; Dodds, supra note 89, at 183–84.
94. Dodds, supra note 89, at 183.
95. This phenomenon is tragically illustrated by deaths of children in fires after being left alone
by their caregivers, or the all-too-common incidence of children who die after having been left
strapped in a car seat on a hot day. See, e.g., Gene Weingarten, Fatal Distraction: Forgetting a Child
in the Backseat of a Car is a Horrible Mistake. Is it a Crime?, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2009),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/fatal-distraction-forgetting-a-child-intheback
seat-of-a-car-is-a-horrifying-mistake-is-it-a-crime/2014/06/16/8ae0fe3a-f580-11e3-a3a5-42be3596
2a52_story.html.
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constructions of this subtype of vulnerability, for example, in considering
the constitutionality of policies allegedly protecting children from harm,
or in determining whether a classification violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Part III focuses in depth on the Court’s use of vulnerability
constructs in a subset of cases involving the constitutionality of
regulation of child labor, child pornography, modifications of courtroom
procedures to accommodate children as courtroom witnesses against
alleged abusers, and children’s exposure to certain types of speech (such
as speech communicated by peers in school and speech containing sexual
images, “indecent” language, violent content).96 Thus, in this Section, my
illustrations are selected from other cases.
Harm-based vulnerability constructs abound in the adolescent
abortion cases, where the Justices present dueling sets of constructs of
children’s vulnerability. The majority in H.L. v. Matheson, a case
challenging a Utah parental notification provision, asserted that the
“emotional and psychological effects of the pregnancy and abortion
experience are markedly more severe in girls under 18 than in adults”
and that the “medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an
abortion are serious and can be lasting . . . ; particularly . . . when the
patient is immature.”97 By contrast, the dissenters focused more on the
special risks to minors of being forced to continue with an unwanted
pregnancy and childbirth. Justice Marshall’s dissent argued that unwed
adolescents who give birth must face reduced “educational and job
opportunities, as well as the more immediate problems of finding
financial and emotional support for offspring dependent entirely on
[them] . . . . Of course, for minors, the mere fact of pregnancy and the
experience of child-birth can provide psychological upheaval.”98
Images of children as susceptible to harm have also been employed
in Equal Protection cases to emphasize the risks to children of unequal
treatment. One of the most famous references to children’s vulnerability
in Supreme Court jurisprudence appeared in the Court’s unanimous
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.99 The Court cited the
potentially deleterious effects of segregated educational experiences on
adults, as articulated in earlier cases, and then stated that “[s]uch
considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high
schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”100

96. See infra Part III.
97. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412–13 (1981) (citing the “potentially grave emotional and
psychological consequences of [teenagers’] decision[s] to abort”).
98. Id. at 438–39 n.38, 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
100. Id. at 494–95 & n.11.
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While the criticisms and controversies regarding the use of psychologist
Kenneth Clark’s studies to support this conclusion are many,101 the use
illustrates how images of children as more susceptible to potential harms
than adults make their way into the Court’s opinions. The Court
continued its reliance on this vulnerability theme in subsequent school
desegregation cases.102
Race-based decisionmaking was rejected in Palmore v. Sidoti,
where the Court determined that assertions about children’s
vulnerability to “social stigmatization” would not influence its
decision.103 The Court unanimously refused to review a custody decision,
despite a father’s concerns that his child might be socially ostracized if
she remained in her mother’s custody, given that the mother’s marriage
was an interracial one.104 The Court held that race-based factors such as
these were not constitutionally permissible considerations in
determining custody of a child.
More recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges105 and United States
v. Windsor,106 in expanding constitutional protections for the marital
rights of same-sex couples, the Court cited the “harm and humiliate[ion]”
experienced by the children of same-sex couples.107 Referring to the
potentially-painful confusion that the law’s and society’s rejection of
their parents’ relationship may create, the Court observed that children
may have difficulty understanding why their families are treated as “less
worthy” of formal recognition under the law.108 The Court referred as well
to harms to children of uncertainties accompanying nonmarital family
life.109
101. For discussions about the use of social science in this case, in particular, see e.g., DAVID L.
FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 101–06 (1999). Dean Faigman
concludes that “the Court willingly relied on research but with little concern for its validity.” Id. at 105.
“That the factual insight was indispensable to the immediate holding in Brown is plain. Still, serious
doubt attaches to whether the Court truly relied on the social science research for this insight. The
simplest way to determine just how seriously the Court considered the factual showing is to ask
whether the result would have been different if the evidence had shown the contrary.” Id. at 102; see
also Lois A. Weithorn, Professional Responsibility in the Dissemination of Psychological Research in
Legal Contexts, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 253, 261–62 (Gary
B. Melton ed., 1987).
102. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 287–88 (1977).
103. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
104. Id. at 431–43.
105. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
106. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
107. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600–01.
108. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. (“The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children
to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in
their community and in their daily lives.” Id.).
109. The Court also cited the tangible consequences to children if their parents are barred from the
institution of marriage, in that there is a myriad of economic and social benefits of which they could
be deprived. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600–01; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. It is noteworthy to contrast
these formulations with those that had been offered by states for decades as justification for
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These cases, as well as those discussed in Part III, provide examples
of a larger body of cases invoking images of children as particularly
susceptible to physiological or psychological harm. While concerns about
protecting children from such perceived risks are the most common
images of children’s vulnerability appearing in the Court’s constitutional
opinions, the Court also relies on notions of the other four subtypes of
children’s vulnerability.
2. Influence-Based Vulnerability.
The second typology focuses on vulnerability as greater
susceptibility to influence, pressure, or coercion by others. The Court
has invoked (or rejected) this concept in a range of cases, including those
concerning religious exercises in schools, criminal sentencing, and the
Miranda custody inquiry.110 For example, as early as the 1960s, the Court
relied on notions of children as susceptible to the influence of peers,
teachers, and the government in cases involving Establishment Clause
challenges to policies allowing school prayer.
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court
struck down a Pennsylvania school district’s prayer policy, despite an
excusal provision that purportedly rendered participation voluntary.111
The Court cited developmental research to support its conclusion that
children could not be expected to flout social expectations and “peergroup norms” that favored participation in the religious exercises.112 The
Court further distinguished religious exercises in public school from
those in legislative bodies, arguing that, in contrast to school children,
“mature adults . . . may presumably absent themselves . . . without
incurring any penalty, direct or indirect.”113 Even minors on the verge of
adulthood may be susceptible to pressures from peers and authority
figures, according to a 1992 opinion by the Court. In Lee v. Weisman, the

restrictions on same-sex couples to marry. States had frequently argued that childrearing by
heterosexual parents was superior to that offered by same-sex couples, and that therefore, state
sanctioning of marriage by same-sex couples would encourage formation of family types less suitable
for childrearing. In addition, states asserted, and many courts accepted, notions that childrearing by
gays and lesbians could be harmful to children’s development and adjustment. See, e.g., Hernandez v.
Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2D 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2D 1187 (1971). See also Lynn
D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833;
Lofton v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 826 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc
denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
110. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–73 (2011) (holding that the age of a child is
relevant to a determination of whether, as the subject of a police interrogation, he believed he was in
police custody, therefore rendering any statements made prior to Miranda warnings inadmissible,
because, among other factors, children “‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures’
than adults.” (citing to Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).).
111. Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
112. Id. at 290–91 & n.69.
113. Id. at 299–301.
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Court described minors as susceptible to the pressure to conform in the
context of a purportedly nonsectarian prayer offered by a clergy member
at a public high school graduation ceremony, even where participation in
the religious exercise was presented to students as voluntary.114 In
vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia rejected the assertion that older minors,
such as graduating high school seniors, are susceptible to “psychological
coercion” in such situations.115
In Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence highlighted
an aspect of susceptibility to influence that goes to the heart of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: concern about the message sent to
individuals when government appears to endorse religion.116 She
distinguished the impact of prayer in governmental settings involving
adults from school prayer by focusing on children’s and adults’
differential susceptibility to “unwilling religious indoctrination.”117 She
opined: “[There is] a distinction when government-sponsored religious
exercises are directed at impressionable children who are required to
attend school, for then government endorsement is much more likely to
result in coerced religious beliefs.”118 Concerns about children’s
impressionability and susceptibility to peer pressure were also cited by
the Court in striking down a Louisiana statute requiring the teaching of
“creation science” whenever evolution is taught.119
In a series of decisions concerning the constitutionality of imposing
the harshest criminal penalties on juvenile offenders, the Court has relied
on developmental science to support a number of constructs relating to
children’s vulnerability.120 Although many of the decisions on these
issues were published in earlier decades,121 the Court’s 2005 decision in
Roper v. Simmons122 enthusiastically embraced psychological and
neuroscientific research when applying Eighth Amendment
proportionality doctrine.
In Roper, which held that imposition of the death penalty was
categorically unconstitutional for persons who committed their crimes as
minors, the Court cited distinctions between minors and adults in three
114. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 578 (1992).
115. Id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 77 (1985).
117. Id. at 81 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
120. Psychological research and policy analyses appeared very influential in the Court’s decisions.
For example, the Court heavily cited articles developed as part of the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, e.g.,
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 9, as well as briefs submitted by amici curiae. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 471–72 & n.5 (2012).
121. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
122. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
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areas of human functioning, one of which focused on vulnerability. The
Court concluded that “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”123
The Court reinforced this conclusion five years later, in Graham
v. Florida, extending Roper’s reasoning to hold unconstitutional statutes
that permit sentences of life without parole to be imposed on minors.124
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court extended this line of precedent one step
further, striking as unconstitutional statutes that impose mandatory life
sentences without parole on those who were minors at the time of
commission of homicide offenses.125
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, decided after Roper and Graham,
addressed the question of whether the age of a minor at the time of police
questioning can inform a court’s determination of whether a reasonable
person in the defendant’s position would appreciate his freedom to
terminate questioning and leave.126 The Court relied heavily in J.D.B. on
images of children as susceptible to the influence of others, noting that
even adults may confess to crimes they did not commit under the
“pressure of custodial interrogation.”127 Indeed, in the context of police
interrogation, which is recognized to be inherently coercive, and where
waivers of one’s rights must be voluntary as well as informed and
intelligent, the Court considers whether “the suspect’s free choice” or his
“will to resist” have been undermined.128 The Court in J.D.B. relied on
constructs of children as more susceptible to influence and pressure to
support its conclusion that a child’s age could affect how a reasonable
person perceived the freedom to leave: “That is, a reasonable child
subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit
when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.”129 J.D.B. and the
sentencing cases are also rich with language asserting constitutionally
relevant notions of capacity-based vulnerability and status-based
vulnerability, discussed in the two subsections that follow.

123. Id. at 569.
124. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
125. Miller, 562 U.S. at 460.
126. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
127. Id. at 269–71.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 271–72. The Court also observed that a child’s perception of the coercive elements of
situations with adults may be influenced by the reality that, children’s lives are generally controlled by
adults. Thus, to some extent, the default perception is that one’s freedom of choice is limited by
authority figures.
A student¾whose presence at school is compulsory and whose disobedience at school is
cause for disciplinary action¾is in a far different position than, say, a parent volunteer on
school grounds to chaperone an event, or an adult from the community on school grounds
to attend a basketball game. Without asking whether the person ‘questioned in school’ is a
‘minor,’ . . . the coercive effect of the schoolhouse setting is unknowable.
Id. at 276.
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3. Capacity-Based Vulnerability.
The concept of capacity-based vulnerability focuses on the risks to
one’s welfare that may accompany limitations of one’s decisional
capacities. Those with immature decisional capacities may be less able to
protect themselves from potential harms or dangers. They may be less
likely to perceive and understand relevant information, to weigh risks
and benefits, to exercise planning, to employ forethought and
deliberative decisionmaking, and to use self-restraint against impulsive
action. Indeed, these are the characteristics identified by the Court in
J.D.B. and the recent sentencing cases cited above.130
In J.D.B., the Court summarized centuries of common law
assumptions about children’s nature: “children characteristically lack the
capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete
ability to understand the world around them.”131 The Court has made this
type of observation previously. In Parham v. J.R., a case considering
what Due Process protections are required before children are
“voluntarily” admitted to psychiatric hospitals with parental consent,
Justice Burger cited the law’s presumption that children are less capable
of making decisions due to developmental immaturity: “Most children,
even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments
concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or
treatment.”132 In the context of abortion, the Supreme Court’s majority
opined that minors “often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”133 The
extent to which these assumptions reflect reality across these settings,
and across all minors faced with decisionmaking in these contexts, is an
empirical question that has been challenged by social scientists.134
Focusing on minors who engage in criminal offending, the Court in
Roper asserted that minors lacked maturity and were more likely than
adults to engage in “impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions.”135 It cited developmental research for the proposition that
“adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category
of reckless behavior.”136 In Miller, the Court went further, noting the

130. See supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text.
131. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273.
132. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
133. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
134. Full analysis of the research addressing minors’ decisional competencies across legal settings
is beyond the scope of this Article. It is noteworthy, however, that depending on the specific legal
capacities of relevance and the ages of the children whose capacities are at issue, minors’ may in some
instances perform in a manner comparable to adults, while in other instances, may differ significantly
from adult standards. See infra notes 220–222 and accompanying text.
135. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
136. Id. at 569 (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective, 12 DEV. REV. 339, 339 (1992)).
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neuroscientific basis for many of its conclusions.137 In citing an amicus
brief authored by the American Medical Association for Graham v.
Florida, the Court emphasized “fundamental differences between
juvenile and adult minds” “in parts of the brain involved in behavior
control,”138 noting “adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions
and systems related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse
control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance.”139 It concluded that
“transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess
consequences” rendered children less morally culpable for the criminal
acts in which they may engage.140
In a totally different context¾choices minors make about use of
tobacco products¾the Court in Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly,141 noted that
“it is understandable for the States to attempt to prevent minors from
using tobacco products before they reach an age where they are capable
of weighing for themselves the risks and potential benefits of tobacco
use . . . .”142 In Lorillard, however, the Court struck down most of the
Massachusetts regulations restricting advertising of tobacco products.
Despite the recognized harms of tobacco use by children and the
acknowledged vulnerability of children to the influence of advertisers,
the Court decided that First Amendment considerations limited the
state’s authority to regulate in the manner laid out by the challenged
statutes. The framing of the issue in Lorillard, however, demonstrates
the possible interplay of decisional capacity and vulnerability. In the
opinion, the Court acknowledged the special risks to youth of immature
choices to use tobacco products, which may then lead to long-term
addiction with lifelong consequences.
4. Status-Based Vulnerability.
Status-based vulnerability arises from legal, social, and situational
concomitants of minority status and subordination to the authority and
control of others. In focusing on the concomitants of the minority status
for children, this form of vulnerability addresses the structural effects of
being subject to the authority of others. As such, it draws from the
NBAC’s concept of institutional vulnerability. At its extreme,
institutional vulnerability considers the limits on a person’s freedom
when, like a prisoner, one is captive in a total institution. Most children’s
137. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012).
138. Id. at 471–72 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (referring to Brief for the
American Medical Association and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 16–24, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)
(Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) (2009 WL 2247127, at *16–24).).
139. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, n.5.
140. Id. at 472.
141. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
142. Id. at 570–71.
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lives are, fortunately, not as confining as is institutionalization, but the
restrictions on many of their choices are real.
The law governing family relations, and our society, is structured on
parental discretion in most areas of children’s upbringing—with some
limited state involvement—an arrangement that usually serves minors’
interests.143 Ideally, adults with such authority act to promote the child’s
and society’s interests, as well as the child’s developing autonomy and
self-direction, and grants of minors’ freedom are somewhat
commensurate with minors’ acquisition of developmental capacities.
One of the implications of this legally- and socially-mandated
allocation of power over minors’ lives is that minors typically cannot
choose where and with whom to live, and with whom to associate. In
Troxel v. Granville, the Court reinforced parental discretion to
determine the parameters of court-ordered third-party visitation of their
children by grandparents. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that just as
parents have fundamental due process rights that protect their
relationships with their children, children’s relationships with adults
deserve constitutional protection.144 In particular, he observed that the
majority’s decision did not recognize a child’s liberty interest in
preserving particular family or family-like bonds, such as with
grandparents. As such, he recognized the vulnerability of children to
emotional losses from the severing of such bonds.
In his dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a case in which the Court
recognized the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Amish parents
to remove their teenaged children from public school earlier than the
statutorily determined age of school exit, Justice Douglas bemoaned the
losses to the children of irreplaceable educational opportunities, as a
result of their lack of freedom to choose whether to remain in school.145
He argued that the Court’s prior cases, recognizing that the Constitution
applies to children as well as adults, mandated that the court should have
solicited the children’s choice on a matter so seriously affecting their
welfare. Noting that the early termination of a child’s education may have
dramatic repercussions for the child’s future, he impliedly emphasized
the vulnerabilities inherent in certain exercises of parental discretion.146

143.
144.
145.
146.

See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Id. at 88–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245–46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas opined:
If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will
be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have
today. . . . If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him
and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed.

Id.
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In Roper, the Court characterized minors as more vulnerable than
adults “in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less
control, or less experience with control, over their own environment.”147
Children are less able to extricate themselves from homes and
communities in which socialization patterns and role models promote
criminal conduct. In Miller, the Court addressed not only the
constitutionality of Alabama’s policy of mandating life sentences for
homicide offenders, but also the appropriateness of a life sentence for
youth who had been fourteen years old at the time of the offense. In so
doing, it highlighted the powerlessness of the offenders to escape the
violent home situations in which they were living.148
In an ironic characterization of minors’ lack of day-to-day control
over their lives as a form of captivity, the U.S. Supreme Court in Schall v.
Martin defended less stringent due process protections in the context of
pretrial preventive detention for minors versus adults, Justice Burger
stated starkly that “juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of
custody.”149 While most of us would not liken the limitations of most
minors’ freedom to incarceration in a state detention facility (where one
is held in locked quarters, separated from loved ones, and is vulnerable
to physical and sexual assaults) the analogy provides a poignant
depiction of the vulnerability potentially accompanying minority status,
much like a form of institutional vulnerability.
The Court’s conclusion in Ingraham v. Wright was also ironic.150
The Court held that the Constitution does not protect minors from
exposure to exceptionally harsh corporal punishment, even though it
acknowledged that such treatment could not legally be meted out to
adults, including prison inmates.151 In Ingraham, one child had been
“paddled” so harshly that he suffered a “hematoma requiring medical
attention and keeping him out of school for several days” and another
“was struck on his arms, once depriving him of the full use of his arm for
a week.”152 Justice White’s dissent criticized the majority for its
unwillingness to treat school children committing minor disciplinary
infractions with the same protective instincts that it applied to adult
prisoners.153 The limited recourse available to minors against adults who
control their lives underscores the potential vulnerability of children if

147. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
148. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012).
149. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
150. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
151. Id. at 671, 680 (holding that due process safeguards, such as informal hearings, were
unnecessary and unduly burdensome prior to the administration of corporal punishment in the
schools).
152. Id. at 657.
153. Id. at 683–92 (White, J., dissenting).
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adults fail to exercise their authority in a manner that is wise, fair, and
nonexploitative.
Finally, the Court in J.D.B. concluded that failure to consider the age
of a minor in the Miranda custody inquiry ignores the pervasiveness of
adult control over minors and the way such control is likely to shape a
child’s world view.154 Calling such failure “nonsensical” and “absurd,” the
Court recognized the structures of adult control and attendant
consequences for children’s noncompliance that are a part of the child’s
daily experience. In other words, according to the Court, children see the
world differently relative to questions of whether they are or are not in
police custody and are or are not “free to go,” not only because of the
actual features of the situation or not-yet-fully-developed psychological
capacities, but also because most facets of their lives are subject to the
authority of adults. Therefore, in the language of Schall, they are likely to
experience themselves as always in some form of custody.
5. Dependency-Based Vulnerability.
Minors of different ages manifest varying levels of capacity to meet
their own basic needs. While an infant is incapable of even the most basic
self-care, teens can feed, clothe, and bathe themselves, even if some may
be thought not to make the best choices in executing those tasks. As noted
above, dependency-based vulnerability recognizes the implicit reliance of
children upon others to meet their most basic needs. Needs for material
sustenance are, of course, fundamental to survival. Needs for protection
from dangers¾such as knives, poisons, traffic, loaded firearms¾are also
fundamental to survival. Yet, as decades of developmental research
confirms, children also have psychological needs to be nurtured and
loved, to be educated and intellectually stimulated, and to be protected
from a range of abusive or brutal practices detrimental to adaptive
human development.
As noted above, there are some overlaps between status-based
vulnerability and dependency-based vulnerability. The inherent
dependency of many minors is one of the central reasons that society has
created legally recognized status differentials between minors and adults.
At the same time, the status-based authority of parents and other adults
over minors renders minors more dependent upon the decisions of adults
for their welfare. The two forms of vulnerability differ in that statusbased analyses focus on vulnerabilities due primarily to the structural
status relationships, while dependency-based analyses focus on
children’s developmental needs and vulnerabilities arising out of their
functional biological and psychological reliance on others to meet those
needs.
154. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275–76 (2011).
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An illustration of dependency-based vulnerability analyses can be
found in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services.155 The Justices’ opinions in DeShaney underscore the risks to
children arising from their dependence on adults. Evidence that Joshua
DeShaney was being brutally abused by his father was substantial.
Concerned parties reported suspicions of abuse to the Department of
Social Service (“DSS”), which repeatedly failed to protect Joshua. After
his father’s beatings led to permanent severe brain damage, Joshua’s
mother sued DSS under § 1983, alleging that DSS had deprived Joshua
of liberty without due process by failing to protect him.156 Although
acknowledging the “grievous harm” Joshua suffered, the Court’s majority
held that Wisconsin did not have an actionable duty under the federal
Constitution to protect Joshua. It emphasized that the harm inflicted
upon Joshua “was inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua’s
father.”157
In this case, the Court’s majority and dissent disagreed as to whether
DSS had a duty to protect a young child from the brutal violence of his
father. None of the Justices appears to dispute the general premise,
implicit in their opinions, that a young child is totally dependent upon
the quality of care provided by those entrusted with protecting his
welfare. The majority and dissent diverged on the question of who owed
four year old Joshua DeShaney a duty of care in light of his total
dependence on adults. Concluding that “nothing in the language of the
Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasions by private citizens,”158 Justice
Rehnquist’s decision indicates that, at least under the federal
Constitution, dependents such as Joshua are owed no duties of care and
protection by the state. Rather, duties of care and protection are born
solely by the family as a private entity.
The dissent painted a different picture. It argued that duties owed to
children in response to their dependence-based vulnerability are
multifaceted.159 While our societal default imposes primary duties on
155. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
156. Id. at 193.
157. Id. at 203.
158. Id. at 195.
159. Joshua’s vulnerability inhered first in his dependence on his father, who subjected him to
repeated assaults. The majority characterized Joshua’s devastating injuries as a private matter for
which the state bore no responsibility. Id. at 201–02. In contrast, Justice Brennan emphasized that
“Wisconsin has established a child-welfare system specifically designed to help children like Joshua”
to which it channels all reports by private persons and governmental agencies regarding suspicions of
child abuse or neglect. Id. at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By assuming this purportedly protective
role, but failing to act, “Wisconsin’s child-protection program . . . effectively confined Joshua DeShaney
within the walls of Randy DeShaney’s violent home until such time as [it] took such action to remove him.
Conceivably, then, children like Joshua are made worse off by the existence of this program when the
persons and entities charged with carrying it out fail to do their jobs.” Id. at 210. In the dissenters’ view,

WEITHORN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2017]

12/22/17 12:39 AM

JURISPRUDENCE OF CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY

215

parents or guardians for care and protection of their children’s welfare,
Justice Brennan’s dissent implicitly characterized children such as
Joshua as dependents of the state when the state has set up a child
protection apparatus, and has begun to rescue after reliance on the
private family fails.160
Dependency-based vulnerability constructs do not appear
frequently in the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional cases. The
majority’s analysis and resolution of DeShaney may explain why. Our
Constitution is generally viewed as protecting individuals from
government action, rather than bestowing positive rights to
governmental assistance or services. Constitutional challenges,
particularly after DeShaney, are less likely to characterize matters
addressing government’s role in meeting the needs of dependent persons
as falling within the purview of the Constitution.
C.

GENERATIVITY, PLASTICITY, AND RESILIENCE: VULNERABILITY AS
CAPACITY FOR POSITIVE GROWTH, ADAPTATION, AND RECOVERY

There is a somewhat paradoxical feature of vulnerability. Martha
Fineman¾whose important work on human vulnerability and the law
has stimulated substantial commentary¾observes that vulnerability is
frequently viewed negatively, characterized solely in terms of
susceptibility to harm, introducing stigmatizing effects when used to
speak about various population subgroups or individuals.161 Yet, as
Fineman’s work suggests, while vulnerability can be associated with
negative outcomes, it is a constant in the human experience, and can be
“generative”:

[O]ur vulnerability presents opportunities for innovation and growth,
creativity, and fulfillment. It makes us reach out to others, form
relationships, and build institutions. Human beings are vulnerable
because as embodied beings we have physical and emotional needs for

the state had enhanced Joshua’s vulnerability to the dangers of his father’s actions by impliedly
representing to emergency room physicians and others reporting the abuse that it would step in. Id. By
failing to carry out its self-appointed role as protector for endangered children, according to the dissent,
DSS substantially exacerbated Joshua’s vulnerability to his father’s brutality. Id.
160. This view of the state’s relationship to individuals’ and groups’ vulnerability is a focus of the
important work on vulnerability theory by Martha Fineman. Fineman, supra note 88, at 13. Fineman’s
normative analysis recognizes the role of state policies as responses to those vulnerabilities inherent
in the human condition and argues “for a responsive state¾a state built around recognition of the
vulnerable subject.” Id. This view is echoed in Dodds, supra note 89, at 189 and ROBERT E. GOODIN,
PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1985).
161. Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable, supra note 33; Fineman, Equality and Difference, supra
note 33.
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love, respect, challenge, amusement, and desire. This vulnerability can
bring positive or negative results . . .”162

This perspective is of particular relevance to notions of children’s
vulnerability because a central and defining dimension of childhood is
that children are constantly growing and developing. Arguably, this is
true of all human beings. Yet, the nature, trajectory, and rapid pace of
children’s development distinguish childhood from other stages of life163
and heighten myriad potential vulnerabilities: positive and negative.
Modern discussions about vulnerability in the behavioral sciences
generally incorporate and are intimately interrelated with analyses of
concepts of resilience. While behavioral science formulations of
vulnerability often emphasize persons’ susceptibility to negative
outcomes when confronted with certain stressors or adverse
circumstances, concepts of “resilience” focus on the potential for and
processes of healthy development and outcomes in the face of such
stressors or circumstances: “Resilience is a dynamic developmental
process [referring to] an individual’s attainment of positive adaptation
and competent functioning despite having experienced chronic stress or
detrimental circumstances, or following exposure to prolonged or severe
trauma.”164 A somewhat broader definition of resilience focuses on “[t]he
capacity of a dynamic system to withstand or recover from significant
challenges that threaten its stability, viability, or development.”165
Research has identified a range of “protective factors”: variables that bear
a demonstrated empirical relationship to prediction of better outcomes,
162. Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable, supra note 33, at 96.
163. “There is general recognition that the developing nervous system is qualitatively different
from the adult nervous system.” Deborah Rice and Stan Barone, Jr., Critical Periods of Vulnerability
for the Developing Nervous System: Evidence from Humans and Animal Models, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 511 (2000) (emphasis added).
164. Dante Cicchetti & Jennifer A. Blender, A Multiple-Levels-of-Analysis Perspective on
Resilience: Implications for the Developing Brain, Neural Plasticity, and Preventive Interventions,
in RESILIENCE IN CHILDREN 248, 249 (Barry M. Lester et al. eds., 2006).
165. Ann S. Masten, Resilience in Children Threatened by Extreme Adversity: Frameworks for
Research, Practice, and Translational Synergy, 23 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 493, 494 (2011). For
further discussion of the topic, see ANN S. MASTEN, ORDINARY MAGIC: RESILIENCE IN DEVELOPMENT
(2014); RESILIENCE IN CHILDREN (Barry M. Lester et al. eds., 2006); Michael Rutter, Implications of
Resilience Concepts for Scientific Understanding, in RESILIENCE IN CHILDREN 1–2 (Barry M. Lester et
al. eds., 2006); RISK AND RESILIENCE IN CHILDHOOD: AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Mark W. Fraser ed.,
2d ed. 2004); Suniya Luthar et al., The Construct of Resilience: A Critical Evaluation and Guidelines
for Future Work, 71 CHILD DEV. 543 (2000). While an early phase of empirical work focused on the
role of children’s own characteristics in promoting resilience, and subsequent research examined
“protective” factors in children’s family environments and broader social worlds (such as close,
positive relationship with adult caregivers), the most recent generation of science has been
investigating the processes and mechanisms of resilience. See e.g., Luther et al., supra at 545,
554–555; Ann S. Masten & Jelena Obradović, Competence and Resilience in Development, in
RESILIENCE IN CHILDREN 13–14, 21–22 (Barry M. Lester et al. eds., 2006); Mark F. Fraser et al., Risk
and Resilience in Childhood, in RISK AND RESILIENCE IN CHILDHOOD: AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 13,
27–31 (Mark W. Fraser ed., 2d ed. 2004) (discussing concepts of “protective” factors).
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particularly in situations of risk or adversity.166 Protective factors can
help explain manifestations of greater resilience observed in the face of
stressors or adversity. Research reveals, for example, that the existence
of strong, stable, and supportive relationships between parents or other
adult caregivers and children serves as a protective factor that can help
children cope with stressful, and even traumatic, life events and achieve
more adaptive outcomes.167
Although many of the Court’s constructs of children’s vulnerability
focus on the potentially negative concomitants of the perceived
differences between children and adults, the Court also observes that the
developmental vulnerabilities of childhood offer constitutionallyrelevant potential for positive change. The view of children as malleable
helped a majority of the Court justify why sentences not constitutionally
prohibited for adult offenders¾such as the death penalty,168 life without
parole for non-homicide offenses in Graham,169 and mandatory life
without parole for homicide,170€should be held unconstitutional for
minors.171 The Court concluded that minors have a “greater ‘capacity for
change’” and that “a child’s character is not as ‘well-formed’ as an adults’;
his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of
irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”172 The Court rejected the idea, implicit in the
justification for sentences such as death and life without parole, that one
can easily determine whether or not a young person is “incorrigible” (that
is, unable to change), and noted that most children have the potential to
outgrow the tendencies that led to the serious criminal offending.173 In
Montgomery v. Louisiana, considering the retroactivity of Miller, the
Court noted that “Miller drew a line between children whose crimes
reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect
irreparable corruption.”174
Thus, while much of the discussion by the Court, and therefore in
this Article, focuses on vulnerability as creating risks and potential
challenges to children’s well-being, these vulnerability themes are
conceptually intertwined with those addressing children’s plasticity

166. Wright et al., supra note 43, at 17.
167. Id. at 20.
168. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
169. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 49 (2010).
170. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012) (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60–61 and Roper,
543 U.S. at 569).
171. For further discussion of these cases and this perspective on children’s vulnerability,
see supra notes 122–125, 135–140, 147–148 and accompanying text.
172. Id.
173. Miller, 567 U.S. at 473.
174. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
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more broadly¾that is their capacity to change in response to
experience175¾and therefore their potential for positive growth as well.

II. CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY IN CONTEXT
This Part seeks to place our examination of judicial constructs of
children’s vulnerability in context. Subpart A recognizes that societal
concerns about children’s vulnerability are not of recent origin. Indeed,
they have been present in our society’s discourse about children for some
time. Over time, the sources of the harms and deleterious influences
purported to endanger children have changed. Yet, concerns about
children’s vulnerability are nothing new. Subpart A provides a brief
analysis of some of the historical and social trends. Subpart B touches on
some of the insights that developmental science may bring to bear on
inquiries about children’s vulnerability. It identifies some of the general
principles relevant to thinking about vulnerability, as well as some of the
challenges inherent in studying vulnerability and applying scientific
findings to judicial decisions.
A. SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF MODERN
CONSTRUCTS OF CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY
Historians suggest that Americans became increasingly concerned
about the welfare of our nation’s children in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Barbara Finkelstein noted that, although prior generations “were aware
of childhood vulnerabilities and believed that children required
protection and supervision,” social developments¾such as immigration
and industrialization¾and new ways of thinking about childhood
combined with other forces to lead to a more self-conscious approach to
socializing and protecting the nation’s youth.176 Those new ways of
thinking “reflected a growing consciousness of children as learners,
vulnerable to the force of circumstance.”177 A range of social innovations,
such as compulsory school attendance and institutions for the care and
control of children, developed to facilitate the socialization process.178
Michael Grossberg noted a “fundamental tension in American
beliefs and policies toward the young,” as we are “torn between a fear for
children and a fear of children.”179 Many of our societal efforts to affect

175. DAVID R. SHAFFER, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 620 (6th ed. 2002).
176. Barbara Finkelstein, Casting Networks of Good Influence: The Reconstruction of Childhood
in the United States, 1790–1870, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL
HANDBOOK 111, 117 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985).
177. Id.
178. Lois A. Weithorn Second-Order Change in America’s Responses to Troubled and
Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1437–42 (2005).
179. Michael Grossberg, Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United States, 1820–1935,
in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
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children’s lives reflect our dual, and often inextricably intertwined, goals
of promoting children’s welfare for children’s own benefit (that is, parens
patriae goals) and for the benefit of society at large (that is, police power
goals). The convergence of parens patriae and police power180
justifications for the most influential policies for governing childhood,
such as compulsory school attendance and prohibitions on child labor,
reveals this relationship between altruistic benevolence on the one hand,
and social control and engineering, on the other, that our society’s legal
regulation of children typically entails. In the 19th century, social leaders
began to structure policies to “immerse [children] in networks of good
influence,” while eliminating what they perceived to be noxious or
debasing influences.181 These trends persist today, as demonstrated by
many of the statutes at issue in the cases reviewed within this Article.
The Progressive Era introduced a variety of new perspectives about
children’s capacities, development, and the ways in which parents,
educators, and society could promote and enhance children’s functioning
and well-being.182 Philosophers, scientists, physicians, psychologists,
educators, and penologists offered theories, many of which remain with
us today. The most influential themes of this era emphasized stage-based
notions of child and adolescent development and a robust debate pitting
the roles of genetics and experience in determining the type of person
one becomes.183
Indeed, child psychology emerged as a discipline in the Progressive
Era, and with it, clearer notions of childhood and adolescence as stages
of life distinct from adulthood.184 Psychologist G. Stanley Hall had a
significant impact on Progressive thinking, particularly with the

180. As discussed in greater detail below, parens patriae and police power interests are the most
common justifications for state authority to regulate the lives of children or the lives of others for the
benefit of children. See infra notes 244–254 and accompanying text. In particular, parens patriae
justifications focus on regulatory goals targeting benefits to the group regulated (for example,
compulsory school attendance promotes children’s own well-being), while police power justifications
emphasize benefits to the general welfare (for example, compulsory school attendance by children
benefits society as a whole).
181. Finkelstein, supra note 176, at 117.
182. Hamilton Cravens, Child Saving in Modern America 1870s–1990s, in CHILDREN AT RISK IN
AMERICA: HISTORY, CONCEPTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (Roberta Wollons ed., 1993). Cravens referred to
“[o]rganized child saving” as “institutionalized concern for children as members of, and participants
in, the social order.” Id.
183. For a discussion of the history of the “nature-nurture” debate in psychology, see Gregory A.
Kimble, Evolution of the Nature-Nurture Issue in the History of Psychology, in NATURE, NURTURE, &
PSYCHOLOGY 3–15 (Robert Plomin & Gerald E. McClearn eds., 1993); see also Ronald D. Cohen,
Child-Saving and Progressivism, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL
HANDBOOK 273, 290–91 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985); Hamilton Cravens, ChildSaving in the Age of Professionalism, 1915–1930, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND
HISTORICAL HANDBOOK 417–18 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985).
184. William Kessen, The American Child and Other Cultural Inventions, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
815, 816 (1979); see also Cravens, supra note 183, at 415, 423.
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publication of his two-volume work on adolescence.185 Hall’s work was
heavily influenced by the writings of Charles Darwin and, like Darwin, he
viewed behavior as the “joint result of pressures of the environment and
events occurring within the organism itself.”186 Hall’s theories also
reflected the perspective that human development progressed in
sequential and biologically predetermined stages, during each of which
the organism confronts distinct physiological and psychological tasks,
with environmental inputs critically affecting developmental
outcomes.187 He characterized adolescence as the period during which
individuals prepare for adulthood, and identified some of the
developmental changes.188 Other influential writers, such as John
Dewey,189 and Arnold Gesell,190 asserted that children’s intellectual,
social, and moral development progressed in a stage-based fashion and
could be highly influenced by appropriate environmental inputs at these
stages.191 At one end of the nature-nurture continuum, behaviorists like
John Watson went so far as to imply that humans are, to a significant
extent, no more than the sum total of their life experiences.192
These new ideas raised the stakes for those concerned with
promoting the welfare of children for the benefit of the children and for
the welfare of society. The more receptive children were to exposures and
influences, the more vulnerable they were as well. As John Dewey
suggested in his 1916 book, Democracy and Education, children can be
said to have an inherent “plasticity” and the “power to grow . . . and to

185. G. STANLEY HALL, 2 ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY,
ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION (1904). For discussions of Hall’s
influence, see, for example, Cohen, supra note 183, at 291–292; Cravens, supra note 183, at 423–26;
JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 93–
96, 105, 107 (1986); John Modell & Madeline Goodman, Historical Perspectives, in AT THE THRESHOLD:
THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 93, 101–102 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds., 1990).
186. HOWARD GARDNER, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 148–149 (2d ed. 1978).
187. Cravens, supra note 183, at 424.
188. Modell & Goodman, supra note 185, at 102. Writers frequently attribute to Hall a significant
role in the delineation of adolescence as a discrete stage in child development. Cohen, supra note 183,
at 290–92.
189. JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY: THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM (1899).
190. ARNOLD GESELL, THE NORMAL CHILD AND PRIMARY EDUCATION (1912).
191. Cravens, supra note 183, at 429. See, e.g., David Bakan, Adolescence in America: From Idea
to Social Fact, 100 DAEDALUS 979, 979 (1971); Hugh Cunningham, The History of Childhood, in
IMAGES OF CHILDHOOD 27–35 (C. Philip Hwang, Michael E. Lamb, & Irving E. Sigel, eds., 1996); Arlene
Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 38, 45–46 (1975).
192. JOHN WATSON, BEHAVIORISM 124 (1924):
Give me a dozen healthy infants and my own specified world to bring them up in, and I’ll
guarantee to take anyone at random and train him to become any kind of specialist I might
select¾doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggar and thief, regardless of
his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations and race of his ancestors.
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learn from experience.”193 Thus, the importance of providing the proper
experiences and reducing potentially deleterious ones became
paramount. Progressive Era criminologists drew connections between
the deleterious conditions of urban environments and the development
of criminal behavior.194 Optimism about our ability to prevent, interrupt,
and repair “damage” caused by inadequate, improper, and destructive
life experiences provided an important foundation for 20th century
policies governing children and families.195
Thus, despite our nation’s historical cautiousness about broadbased state authority over citizens’ lives, there was a sense of urgency that
propelled increasing governmental regulation of the lives of children and
families, which picked up dramatically during the Progressive Era.196
Some historians suggest that social reforms of this era were motivated by
a kind of “moral panic,” that is, fear “that urbanization, industrial
capitalism, and massive immigration were undermining the nation’s
homes and thus, the republic itself.”197 “Adults worried about
children¾everyone’s children, not just their own¾for their own sake
and also out of fear for the country’s future.”198 The efforts of reformers
focused initially on those children viewed as more vulnerable, and
therefore at greatest risk: children who were orphaned, ill, or
impoverished; children of immigrants or other underclasses; and
children viewed as inadequately supervised or poorly socialized.199

193. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 44–46, 52–53 (1916).
194. Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency 41 (2d ed. 1977).
195. “Nativis[tic]” assumptions about differences among individuals and societal subgroups,
supported by “scientific” theories such as biological determinism also prevailed during this period, as
did notions that certain racial and ethnic groups were superior to others. See, e.g., Cravens, supra note
183, at 421; Cohen, supra note 183, at 289–291. Thus, whereas some Progressives might attribute
perceived differences among population subgroups to environmental causes, such as “poverty, poor
health, inadequate nutrition, or insufficient education . . . others employed the language of
contemporary natural science and attributed conduct to Mendelian unit characters, racial traits,
instincts, and other evidences of original human nature.” Cravens, supra note 183, at 418–19. Reliance
on notions of inherent differences also fit neatly within Progressive intervention strategies, which
often targeted different approaches to different subgroups within society. Thus, for example,
lower-class, impoverished, and immigrant youth would be more likely than middle- and upper-class
and nonminority youth to fall under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system, with its attendant
discretion over all facets of the lives of its charges, its substitution for parental authority, and its
institutional settings. For the rest of society’s children, compulsory schooling served as the primary
socialization strategy.
196. Historians have generally referred to the period of time between 1885 and 1915 as the
Progressive Era. During these years, “reformers” expressed pervasive concerns about social and
economic conditions in the United States, particularly those that affected children, and sought
comprehensive social and legal change. For a thoughtful and balanced historical analysis of this era,
see Cohen, supra note 183, at 273; Cravens, supra note 182, at 3–31.
197. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family
Law, 1890–1900, 28 IND. L. REV. 273, 275 (1995).
198. Cohen, supra note 183, at 274.
199. In the early 20th century, the establishment of the juvenile court was the most dramatic
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Eventually, however, the policies reached all of the nation’s children.200
The ideology of this era and the language of humanitarianism made it
almost impossible to disentangle the myriad of functions served by the
expanding governmental regulation of children’s lives.
Concerns about dangers to America’s children persisted throughout
the 20th century, and of course continue today. Over time, society has
changed its perception about many of the identified sources of danger as
our images of childhood change and our experience with and knowledge
about certain phenomena thought to affect children evolve as well.201 Yet,
just as in the Progressive Era, the social goals and functions served by
images of children as vulnerable today are plentiful and diverse. It can be
difficult to disentangle these goals and functions when constructs of
children’s vulnerability appear in the Court’s opinions as well. Evaluation
of those constructs, however, against what we know about children from
existing developmental science helps discern whether the constructs
relied upon by the Court bear any relation to empirically verifiable facts
in the real world. To the extent that these concepts are inconsistent with
existing knowledge, greater skepticism as to their uses by the Court may
be warranted.
B.

DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE AND CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY:
THE BASICS
1. Generality and Specificity in Child Development

Developmental science generally supports the notion that exposures
or experiences during childhood can have profound and enduring effects
on an individual’s development, often to a greater degree than during

developments in social policy targeting a subgroup of youth. As Weithorn observed:
While the establishment of the juvenile court was an extension of the organized child
welfare and child reform interventions commenced in the prior century, it was, in many
ways, more far-reaching. The child welfare movement, with its proliferation of orphanages,
was the product of private, nonprofit organizations and societies, which operated with tacit
legal approval. By contrast, the juvenile court at once consolidated legal authority over all
children perceived to be in need of some extrafamilial intervention in one state agency.
Beginning with the initiation of the first juvenile court in Illinois in 1899, the juvenile
justice movement formalized state intervention in the lives of troubled and troublesome
youth and their families. . . . The numbers of children institutionalized in child welfare and
juvenile justice facilities under the authority of the juvenile court mushroomed during the
twentieth century.
Weithorn, supra note 178, at 1441–42.
200. See generally Finkelstein, supra note 176.
201. See, e.g., VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF
CHILDREN (1994); CHILDREN AT RISK IN AMERICA: HISTORY, CONCEPTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Roberta
Wollons ed., 1993); Gary B. Melton, The Clashing of Symbols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 345 (1987); STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND
THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992).
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adulthood.202
Yet, while statements about children’s greater
vulnerability than adults may be true in some instances, such broad
generalizations tell us nothing about how children and adults differ with
regard to each of the countless variables related to children’s
vulnerability on which such distinctions may be of interest. These
statements also do not tell us about the nature and quality of differences
between children and adults or about the role that age (within childhood)
and a host of individual, environmental and other factors play in
determining one’s vulnerability. The concept of vulnerability is, in the
real world, only meaningful when we focus the inquiry and ask, for
example, “vulnerability to what, by whom, and under what
circumstances”? In Part III, I examine the Court’s use of more specific
notions of children’s vulnerability as relevant to certain constitutional
questions. In this Section, however, I step back and examine two more
general themes related to children’s development that provide some
context for examining these more focused questions.
Before proceeding, I make some observations on the distinction
between generality and specificity as relevant to this inquiry. First, as
noted above, in order to be relevant to legal policy, constructs about
children’s vulnerability must move from general assertions such as
“children are more vulnerable than adults” to greater specificity as to the
particular exposures, experiences, or stimuli viewed as creating special
risks (for example, the asserted coerciveness of prayer in schools or, the
purported messages of inferiority sent to African-American children
through state-mandated school desegregation). Second, greater
specificity is required as to the child “outcomes” sought to be avoided (for
example, predictions that a child may feel coerced to comply with prayer
exercises in the school setting or that African-American children will
develop poorer senses of self-worth as a result of messages of racial
inferiority conveyed through state-mandated school desegregation
policies). To the extent empirical research can inform questions about
children’s vulnerability relevant to legal questions, those questions must
be framed with some degree of specificity.
Even where scientific findings are not introduced in court and
subject to the rules of evidence, the findings must relevant to the question
at hand203 and obtained through methods and principles consistent with
202. See, e.g., Jianghong Liu & Gary Lewis, Environmental Toxicity and Poor Cognitive Outcomes
in Children and Adults, 76 J. ENVTL.. HEALTH 130, 133 (2014) (“Due to the fact that children are
continuously undergoing neurological and physical changes, they may be more susceptible to the
harmful effects of toxins. This is in contrast to adults, whose nervous systems are more mature and
developed, and therefore more resistant to injury.”).
203. See David L. Faigman, John Monahan, & Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i) Inference
in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 428 (2014) [hereinafter Faigman et al., Group to
Individual] (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (emphasizing the
importance of the “fit” between the proffered evidence and the factual question at issue)).
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the field of scientific inquiry in order to be meaningful in informing the
courts.204 A MacArthur Foundation-sponsored group has been devoting
substantial attention to systematic analysis of a problem that has plagued
the application of scientific findings in the courts for decades: The
challenges of applying research findings about general group trends to
cases concerned with factual questions about individuals.205 The authors
refer to this type of inference as “group to individual,” or “G2i.”206 While
the constitutional cases described in this Article do not require the Court
to adjudicate issues relating to the vulnerability of a particular individual,
the general framework still holds conceptual relevance.
Legislative facts about childhood used in the adjudication of
constitutional issues necessarily constitute generalizations about
childhood. The generalizations may not hold true for all children, and
may also be true for adults who are, under the policy in question, treated
differently than children. The Court can fashion general rules, requiring
for example, age-based distinctions that are necessarily over- and
under-inclusive, as in Roper v. Simmons, in holding unconstitutional
statutes that permit imposition of the death penalty on persons who
committed offenses as minors. Or, the Court can uphold age-based bright
lines in the legislative or regulatory provisions it reviews.207
Alternatively, the Court can require case-by-case determinations of a
child’s vulnerability by decisionmakers below in individualized hearings.
This approach was taken by the Court in Miller v. Alabama, which struck
down mandated life without parole sentences for persons who committed
homicide offenses as minors, opting instead for judicial discretion in
sentencing.208 In Craig v. Maryland, the Court approved
case-by-case determinations of the need for certain modifications of the
traditional courtroom confrontation of witnesses when children testify
against their alleged abusers.209 The rationales for choosing bright-line
age-based per se rules versus case-by-case application of discretionary
standards by decisionmakers are many.210 In the context of constitutional

204. Id. at 428–31. For more in depth analyses of the issues and debates regarding the use of
scientific evidence in the courts, see, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW
(7th ed. 2010); DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY 1–129 (2013–2014 ed.).
205. See Faigman et al., Group to Individual, supra note 203; David L. Faigman, Christopher
Slobogin, & John Monahan, Gatekeeping Science: Using the Structure of Scientific Research to
Distinguish Between Admissibility and Weight in Expert Testimony, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (2016)
[hereinafter Faigman et al., Gatekeeping Science].
206. Faigman et al., Gatekeeping Science, supra note 205, at 419.
207. See, for example, infra notes 324–334 and accompanying text for discussion of Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
208. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
209. See infra notes 18–27 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Michael N. Tennison & Amanda C. Pustilnik, And If Your Friends Jumped Off a
Bridge, Would You Do It Too?: How Developmental Neuroscience Can Inform Legal Regimes

WEITHORN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2017]

12/22/17 12:39 AM

JURISPRUDENCE OF CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY

225

adjudication of questions that appear to turn, at least in part, on notions
of children’s vulnerability, the choice between these legal mechanisms
for addressing the asserted differences between children and adults may
reflect the challenges of generalizations about children in the particular
context or the Court’s interpretation of how it must apply the
constitutional standard of review in the case before it.211 These themes of
generality versus specificity resurface in Part III, in the analysis of the
Court’s use of vulnerability constructions in select cases.
The subsections immediately below address two key aspects of
children’s vulnerability: (1) the reality that, on some dimensions,
children are not yet fully developed and (2) that children’s physiological
and psychological systems are continually undergoing major
developmental shifts. In other words, I observe that children’s present
state of immaturity as children, and the nature of the dynamic
developmental process of human maturation each create inherent
vulnerabilities.212 As noted above, however, these vulnerabilities, while
creating potential risks to children also create potential opportunities.213
In addition, these vulnerabilities have led to the formation of social and
legal structures, such as the authority of parents and institutions (for
example, schools, the child welfare system, the juvenile justice system)
Governing Adolescents, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 533, 535–42 (2015); Annette R. Appell, The Child
Question, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1137, 1143–71 (2013); Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should
Not) Learn from Developmental Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 37–41 (2009); Emily Buss,
Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
895, 919–20 (1999).
Developmental psychology does not offer what lawyers would most like: definitive, fixed
information upon which to ground simple, age-based rules. What the discipline does offer
is a general picture of how we change as we grow up. We then can use this general picture
to assess what we might reasonably expect of children and how we might enhance certain
valued capacities in specific contexts for specific children. It is then our place as lawyers to
determine when bright-line rules are justified despite the lack of developmental clarity,
when society is better off with discretionary standards that defer to the decision maker’s
assessment of an individual child’s capacity, and to what extent extradevelopmental
considerations also should be given weight.
Id.
211. To the extent that the Justices perceive individual and situational variables to be more
significant in determining a person’s vulnerability than the dichotomous distinction between juveniles
and adults, case-by-case inquiries may best satisfy the requirements of the standard of constitutional
review applied in the case. On the other hand, where the Justices have concerns about the fairness or
administrability of discretionary determinations, age-based bright-lines may best promote those
goals.
212. Philosophers Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds identify “inherent vulnerability,” or “ontological
vulnerability that is inherent in the human condition,” as one source of vulnerability. Mackensie et al.,
supra note 39, at 7. These authors suggest that “extremes of age exaggerate the everyday
vulnerabilities of embodiment in proportion to the capacity of the individual to meet her everyday
physical needs. Inherent vulnerability also varies depending on a person’s resilience and capacity to
cope.” Id. Furthermore, other limitations, such as disability, ill health, or other factors may also
increase an individual’s inherent vulnerability. Id.
213. See supra Part I.C.
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over children’s lives, generating situational vulnerabilities, as well as
myriad protective factors.214
The general trends summarized in this Section do not speak to the
accuracy of assumptions by members of the Court as to whether children
are more vulnerable than adults to specific asserted harms or influences
related to the contexts or fact patterns presented by cases before it.
Rather, the scientific concepts and findings presented below indicate
that, as a general proposition, children may be more vulnerable than
adults with respect to one or more of the typologies in the face of certain
exposures. Focused investigations of carefully tailored research
questions are necessary to determine, however, the effects of specific
experiences on particular subsets of children under particular
circumstances.215
2. Children as Not-Yet-Fully-Developed Persons
Children are in the formative or early stages of development in the
human life cycle.216 “Development refers to systematic continuities and
changes in the individual that occur between conception . . . and death.
By describing the changes as ‘systematic,’ we imply that they are orderly,
patterned, and relatively enduring.”217 As such, their capacities in a wide
range of areas of functioning have not reached adult levels of maturity.
Although all human beings continue the developmental process
throughout their lives, children have not yet achieved certain target levels
of functioning we think of as “adult-like.”218 Many disciplines, such as
psychology, neuroscience, and a range of specialties of the biological and
health sciences are devoted to studying the developmental trajectories of
human beings, and seek to expand our knowledge about the
vulnerabilities and capacities that characterize various ages and phases
of development.
Many of dimensions of physical or psychological development on
which children have not yet reached species-typical adult levels are
relevant to the vulnerability typology proposed in Part I. At the most

214. Mackenzie et al. contrast inherent vulnerability with “situational vulnerability,” that is,
“context specific” vulnerability “caused or exacerbated by the personal, social, political, economic, or
environmental situations of individuals or groups.” Mackenzie et al., supra note 39. Mackenzie et al.’s
concept of “context specific” vulnerability overlaps with status-based vulnerability arising from the
legal, social, and situational concomitants of minority status (including risks resulting from restriction
of movement and choices, and other limitations of subordinate status), and dependency-based
vulnerability (which recognizes children’s dependence on others, and the impact that the conduct of
others has upon the child’s life).
215. I address certain relevant empirical debates in Part III of this Article.
216. SHAFFER, supra note 175.
217. Id. at 2.
218. Of course, depending upon the particular aspect of development in question, persons may
reach adult-like developmental levels at different ages.
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basic level, an infant’s physical and psychological immaturity creates
dependency-based vulnerabilities, as she is unable to feed herself or meet
any of her own basic survival needs. Indeed, the complete “helplessness”
of human infants sets them apart from newborns of many other
species.219 Without care from others, a newborn infant will die. Children
continue to develop and grow during minority, and many of the
capacities that allow individuals to become more self-sufficient mature
over time. Depending on the aspect of human anatomy or functioning,
the age-related patterns of development will vary.220 Age eighteen is a
relatively crude and often inaccurate point of demarcation for the
acquisition of the legal and social status of adulthood. Yet, differences
exist, and the Court’s analyses in the cases described in Parts I and III of
this Article reveal just how puzzling it can be to try to apply the general
concept of “children are different” to the specific questions about
children’s development and functioning relevant to the cases.
Increasingly in the past several decades, researchers have attempted
to study some of the developmental phenomena of interest to the Court,
or to apply existing research findings to the narrower legal issues.
Research has indicated that on many cognitive tasks, including some
relevant to health care decisions, teens may exhibit decisionmaking
capacities on a par with adults.221 By contrast, adolescents often
demonstrate immaturities “in situations that elicit impulsivity, that are
typically characterized by high levels of emotional arousal and social
coercion. . . .”222 In an attempt to integrate a broad range of seemingly
contradictory findings, Steinberg and colleagues observed that the
answer to the questions about whether adolescents are as mature as
adults depends on the aspects of maturity under consideration. By age
sixteen, adolescents’ general cognitive abilities are essentially
indistinguishable from those of adults, but adolescents’ psychosocial
functioning, even at the age of eighteen, is significantly less mature than
that of individuals in their mid-twenties. In this regard, it is neither
inconsistent nor disingenuous for scientists to argue that studies of
psychological development indicate that the boundary between
adolescence and adulthood should be drawn at a particular chronological
age for one policy purpose and at a different age for another.223
The answer to the question of whether and how children and adults
differ will vary dramatically depending upon the particular aspects of
functioning of interest. At a minimum, we can observe that differences

219. See, e.g., Kate Wong, Why Humans Give Birth to Helpless Babies, SCI. AM. (Aug. 28, 2012),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/why-humans-give-birth-to-helpless-babies/.
220. See supra note 218.
221. See, e.g., Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 9; Steinberg et al., supra note 9.
222. Steinberg et al., supra note 9, at 592.
223. Id.
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do exist, while the specifics as to their nature and degree raise empirical
questions. While this subsection touched on how the particular state of a
child’s development at a particular point in time may contribute to her
vulnerabilities, I briefly examine below how the process of development
contributes to the vulnerabilities of relevance to the law.
3. Children as Organisms Engaged in Rapid Maturational
Process
Children are engaged in a biologically driven, environmentally
responsive, and exceedingly rapid process of maturation, and
experiences that occur throughout this process can have
highly significant and potentially lifelong effects on their functioning.224
From the moment of birth, a baby is in the process of extraordinarily
rapid growth and development. As they grow up, children develop
cognitive, physical, social, emotional and moral capacities, the
acquisition of which influences communication, decisionmaking,
exercise of judgment, absorbing and evaluating information, selfdirected action, autonomous decisionmaking, extending empathy,
awareness of others and foresight. While people continue to develop
throughout life, all societies acknowledge a period of childhood during
which children’s capacities are perceived as evolving rather than
evolved . . . .225

This factor may render children both more vulnerable to potential
harm, while also presenting them with substantial opportunities for
positive growth. Indeed, several decades of theoretical and empirical
research have provided insights as to a wide range of factors that place
children at serious risk, that foster healthy development, and that help
build resilience that promotes positive adaptation in the face of
adversity.226
The timing of exposures can be very influential. “Developmental
processes occur in phases, setting the stage of potential periods of
vulnerability.”227 Notions of “critical periods” and “sensitive periods”
recognize that the process of normal development presents certain
windows of opportunity, during which the organism is particularly
susceptible to the effects of a wide range of experiences or inputs. For
example, focusing on brain development, neuroscientist Eric Knudsen
explains:
The term ‘‘sensitive period’’ is a broad term that applies whenever the
effects of experience on the brain are unusually strong during a limited

224. See, e.g., SEBASTIAN J. LIPINA & JORGE A. COLOMBO, POVERTY AND BRAIN DEVELOPMENT DURING
CHILDHOOD: AN APPROACH FROM COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE 32–38 (2009) (noting
stages in brain development and windows of vulnerability).
225. GERISON LANSDOWN, UNICEF, THE EVOLVING CAPACITIES OF THE CHILD xiii (2005).
226. See infra notes 164–167 and accompanying text.
227. Lipina & Colombo, supra note 224, at 33.
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period in development. Sensitive periods are of interest to scientists and
educators because they represent periods in development during which
certain capacities are readily shaped or altered by experience. Critical
periods are a special class of sensitive periods that result in irreversible
changes in brain function. The identification of critical periods is of
particular importance to clinicians, because the adverse effects of
atypical experience throughout a critical period cannot be remediated by
restoring typical experience later in life.228

The organism is especially sensitive to influences and exposures,
positive and negative, during such periods.229 Interferences with the
normal developmental process at these times can have serious or
permanent effects on the individual’s ability to achieve important
developmental goals. Because childhood is chock-full of such
challenges¾to a much greater extent than is adulthood¾vulnerability is
greatly enhanced. Influences or exposures that might be neutral, positive,
or only mildly harmful at one point in a person’s life may cause long-term
difficulties if experienced at another stage of development. At the same
time, other influences or exposures may have powerful positive impacts.
Children’s developmental vulnerability presents heightened receptivity,
creating unparalleled growth opportunities for the organism. The nature
and rapidity of the developmental processes that children undergo in the
first two decades of life, and the heightened sensitivity accompanying
these processes, clearly enhance children’s vulnerability as contrasted
with that of adults in a range of situations and contexts.
The last decades have provided scientists with extraordinary
insights as to the long-term impacts of certain early childhood
experiences. For example, it is now widely recognized in the scientific
community that early adverse life experiences can have a profound effect
on health throughout the lifespan. In a 2009 article in the Journal of the
American Medical Association, Shonkoff, Boyce and McEwen observed
that “[a] scientific consensus is emerging that the origins of adult disease
are often found among developmental and biological disruptions
occurring during the early years of life. These early experiences can affect
adults in [two] ways¾either by cumulative damage over time or by the
biological embedding of adversities during sensitive developmental

228. Eric I. Knudsen, Sensitive Periods in the Development of the Brain and Behavior,
16 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1412 (2004).
229. See Robert Siegler, Judy DeLoache & Nancy Eisenberg, HOW CHILDREN DEVELOP 110–114
(Peter Deane et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006); Lipina & Columbo, supra note 224, at 31–49.
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periods.”230 Research on the impact of the “toxic stress”231 engendered by
adverse childhood experiences reveals that a wide array of physical and
mental health disorders can follow traumatic childhood exposures.232
Such exposures, for example, can lead to an increased risk of serious
health conditions (such as heart disease, cancer, chronic bronchitis, and
emphysema), premature death in adulthood, as well as problems relating
to learning and educational achievement, vocational success, mental
health functioning, substance abuse, and criminal justice system
involvement.233 In recent years, scientists have been learning as well
about the ways in which certain deprivations, such as those that
230. Jack P. Shonkoff, W. Thomas Boyce & Bruce S. McEwen, Neuroscience, Molecular Biology,
and the Childhood Roots of Health Disparities: Building a New Framework for Health Promotion
and Disease Prevention, 301 JAMA 2252, 2252, 2257 (2009) (“[T]he origins of many adult diseases
can be found among adversities in the early years of life that establish biological ‘memories’ that
weaken physiological systems and produce latent vulnerabilities to problems that emerge well into the
later adult years.”).
231. The National Scientific Council on the Developing Child [hereinafter Council] and the
American Academy of Pediatrics distinguish among the possible effects of different levels of stress.
Comm’n on Psychosocial Aspects of Child & Family Health et al., Policy Statement: Early Childhood
Adversity, Toxic Stress, and the Role of the Pediatrician: Translating Developmental Science into
Lifelong Health, 129 PEDIATRICS e224, e227–29 (2012) [hereinafter AAP, Policy Statement]; Jack P.
Shonkoff et al., The Lifelong Effects of Early Childhood Adversity and Toxic Stress: Technical Report,
129 PEDIATRICS e232, e234 (2011); Council, Excessive Stress Disrupts the Architecture of the
Developing Brain, 1 (Harvard Univ. Ctr. on the Developing Brain, Working Paper No. 3, 2005),
http://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/reports_and_working_papers/working_papers/wp3/.
The Council defined “toxic stress” as “strong, frequent or prolonged activation of the body’s stress
management system.” Id. at 2. “[S]tressful events that are likewise chronic, uncontrollable, and/or
experienced without the child having access to support from caring adults tend to provoke these types
of toxic stress responses.” Id. Consistent with this definition, the American Academy of Pediatrics
defines “toxic stress” as “the excessive or prolonged activation of the physiologic stress response
systems in the absence of the buffering protection afforded by stable, responsive relationships.” AAP,
Policy Statement, supra, at e225.
232. Robert F. Anda et al., The Enduring Effects of Abuse and Related Adverse Experiences in
Childhood: A Convergence of Evidence from Neurobiology and Epidemiology, 256 EUR. ARCHIVES
PSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 174 (2006) (“The organization and functional capacity of the
human brain depends upon an extraordinary set and sequence of developmental and environmental
experiences that influence [genetic expression]. Unfortunately, this elegant sequence is vulnerable
to . . . patterns of stress that can impair, often permanently, the activity of major neuroregulatory
systems, with profound and lasting neurobehavioral consequences.”).
233. See, e.g., L.K. Gilbert et al., Childhood Adversity and Adult Chronic Disease: An Update from
Ten States and the District of Columbia, 2010, 48 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 345 (2015); Xiangming
Fang et al., The Economic Burden of Child Maltreatment in the United States and Implications for
Prevention, 36 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 156, 162 (2012); David W. Brown et al., Adverse Childhood
Experiences and the Risk of Premature Mortality, 37 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 389, 394 (2009);
Vincent J. Felitti, Adverse Childhood Experiences and Adult Health, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 131 (2009);
Robert F. Anda et al., supra note 232, at 174; Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse
and Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse
Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 245, 250 (1998). For a review and
analysis of the research on the effects of child maltreatment on the brain, see Lois A. Weithorn,
Developmental Neuroscience, Children’s Relationships with Primary Caregivers, and Child
Protection Policy Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1487, 1508–37 (2012) [hereinafter Weithorn,
Developmental Neuroscience].
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accompany neglect and poverty, affect children throughout their
lifespan.234 Children’s biological blueprints offer them tremendous
potential for positive growth and development, but often that potential
cannot be achieved without the presence of particular environmental
experiences, opportunities, and stimulation.
There are bright spots among the scientific findings. Exposure to
risks can have different effects, even among children who are at similar
points in development. One of the factors that distinguishes how children
cope with potentially deleterious impacts is the phenomenon referred to
as resilience.235 Despite exposure to severe, prolonged, or chronic
stressors or traumas, many children “withstand or recover from” these
experiences, emerging with developmentally appropriate “positive
adaptation and competent functioning.”236 As scholars continue to refine
conceptual and methodological approaches, studies of resilience remind
us that development of the detrimental outcomes associated with “a
range of potentially harmful childhood experiences “are neither universal
nor inevitable.”237
In sum, not only are children different from adults in that they
function in ways manifesting an earlier point in maturation across a wide
range of domains, but they differ as well because of the nature of the
developmental process. As the developmental process unfolds, children’s
minds and bodies are characterized by a heightened sensitivity to
environmental inputs and experiences. That heightened sensitivity to
inputs and exposure that accompanies the rapid developmental
processes of childhood, however, not only magnify susceptibility to harm,
but also foster a degree of plasticity or malleability that generates
opportunities for positive development. In other words, childhood
represents a point in a human being’s development when he or she is
unusually responsive to a range of experiences, both positive and
negative.
III. JUSTIFYING CHILD-PROTECTIVE POLICIES: CHILDREN
AS VULNERABLE TO PHYSIOLOGICAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM
In this Part, I consider the Court’s constructions of children’s
vulnerability as susceptibility to physiological or psychological harm.
While subsequent writings will examine the Court’s jurisprudence
relating to the other four vulnerability subtypes, this Part focuses on

234. See generally Lipina & Colombo, supra note 224; Stanford Center for the Study of Poverty
and Inequality, Does Poverty Get Under the Skin?: The Effects of Deprivation on Blood, the Brain,
and the Body, PATHWAYS: A MAGAZINE ON POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND SOCIAL POLICY, Winter 2011.
235. See supra notes 164–165 and accompanying text.
236. Masten, supra note 165, at 494; Cicchetti & Blender, supra note 164, at 249.
237. Weithorn, Developmental Neuroscience, supra note 233, at 1512; see also Cicchetti
& Blender, supra note 164, at 250, 254–57; Masten & Obradović, supra note 165, at 23–24.
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notions of children’s vulnerability articulated in a selection of cases
invoking the first subtype. Specifically, I focus on concepts of
vulnerability present in the Court’s opinions in the context of regulations
relating to child labor, child abuse, and children’s exposure to certain
types of speech. These cases are but a subset of the larger body of
constitutional cases that fall within this first subtype of children’s
vulnerability. The cases below are analyzed to explore, in greater depth,
the Court’s use of constructs of children’s vulnerability. This Part
examines, as well, the nature and sources of the “facts” about children’s
vulnerability upon which the Justices rely.238
In these cases, the Court either adopts or rejects assertions about
children’s susceptibility to physiological or psychological harm in
determining whether the state’s cited regulatory purpose, which is
allegedly child-protective, passes constitutional muster. The specific
standard of review applied by the Court depends on the precise
constitutional question at issue. When the state seeks to limit a
fundamental right, as it does when restricting traditional realms of
parental discretion, and the Court applies strict scrutiny, the asserted
state interest must be compelling.239 This characterization is an
important¾although not always dispositive¾factor in the analysis of the
constitutionality of a statute or its application, in that the means used by
the state to achieve the interest must also be necessary, or most
narrowly tailored.240 Sometimes the Court applies a rational basis test,
which requires the state to demonstrate that its goals are legitimate or
permissible, and that its means are reasonable in relation to those goals.
In other instances, the Court may apply a different mode of analysis, such
as a balancing test,241 or any of a myriad of tests relevant to the specific

238. I chose harm-based vulnerability for this first article, however, because of the centrality of this
notion of vulnerability to the Court’s formulations in a broad range of cases involving children. The
specific cases were selected because, as a group, they allow for some fascinating contrasts across cases,
particularly in the sources on which the Justices’ purportedly rely in citing concepts of children’s
vulnerability.
239. Under modern jurisprudential standards, if the constitutional interest restricted by the state
rises to the level of a fundamental right, strict judicial scrutiny is often applied, placing the burden on
the state to demonstrate that its regulation seeks to achieve a compelling state interest, and that the
means used to achieve this interest are most narrowly tailored. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 794–98 (3d ed. 2006).
240. Id.
241. Yet, strict scrutiny may not be applied in all such cases where fundamental rights are at issue.
“For example, although one might initially expect that strict scrutiny would be applied when state laws
interfere with parental authority over their children’s lives, the Supreme Court has typically applied
alternative modes of analysis, such as balancing tests, customized to the particular issues and
constellation of parties and interests.” Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the
Childhood Vaccination Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine
Refusal, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 908–09 (2015) [hereinafter Reiss & Weithorn, Childhood Vaccination
Crisis]. For instance, the Court applied a balancing test to its consideration of the respective interests
of parents, minors, and the state in some cases, such as in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) and
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constitutional challenges raised in a case.242 Over time, as well, the
standards of review have evolved.243 Unfortunately, the Court is at times
unclear or inconsistent in its identification and application of a standard
of review, leading to a confused jurisprudence that is difficult to
interpret. Its cases involving children’s welfare often reflect these
inconsistencies.
A. PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM HARM AS A STATE INTEREST
Characterizations of children’s vulnerability to physical or
psychological harm play an essential jurisprudential role in justifying or
restricting state action that may limit or expand the constitutional rights
of others, such as parents, guardians, or the children themselves. At the
heart of state authority to regulate children are its parens patriae and
police power interests. Prince v. Massachusetts, decided almost threequarters of a century ago, remains one of the best sources for
understanding those dual goals. 244
In Prince, the Court upheld an application of a provision of the
Massachusetts child labor statute over the objection of a nine year old’s
legal guardian. The guardian¾the child’s aunt¾claimed that the
statute’s application violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to authorize her ward to sell religious materials on the streets.245
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Rutledge, appeared to apply

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), which considered minors’ challenges to state statutes governing
consent to abortion and psychiatric hospitalization, respectively.
242. For example, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court determined that
Congress had exceeded its authority in passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, holding that
the regulated activity did not substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 559–68. This Act created
federal criminal liability for certain gun possession offenses within a school zone. Constructs of
children’s vulnerability were therefore only relevant to the constitutional analysis to the extent they
informed the relationship between gun possession in school zones and interstate commerce. While the
majority did not even discuss whether this association created sufficiently substantial effects, the
dissent relied on a litany of empirical studies. Justice Breyer and three colleagues cited evidence of
harms to children’s well-being to bolster their argument that Congress could have concluded that gun
violence near schools has significant effects on interstate commerce. Id. at 619–26 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). The dissent cited the impact of gun violence on the physical and psychological welfare of
children, which it concluded “significantly interferes with the quality of education in . . . schools,”
leading to higher dropout rates and difficulties in teaching and learning. Id. at 619–20. Given the
relationship between education, the welfare of society, and the country’s economy, Justice Breyer
opined that these effects on the educational system creates a sufficient nexus between the statute and
interstate commerce to provide Congress with authority to legislate, and to conclude that the presence
of guns near schools is inextricably intertwined with the Nation’s economy. Id.
243. Most constitutional scholars cite the Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), as the beginning of differential levels of scrutiny for legislation affecting
various classes of rights. Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 14 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 475 (2016); Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE
L.J. 3094, 3127 (2015).
244. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
245. Id. at 164.
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a balancing test, considering the rights of parents and guardians on the
one hand, and the state’s parens patriae and police power goals on the
other.246 The Court rejected a more stringent test, as would be applied
when children’s welfare is not a focus of the regulation, emphasizing that:
“The state’s authority over children’s activities is broader than over like
actions of adults.”247 It then proceeded to enunciate the parens patriae
and police power interests that justify the state’s greater regulatory
authority over children, and distinguish the state’s relationship with
children versus adults.248
The state’s parens patriae power is asserted to justify protective
state regulation for the benefit of those regulated, and is most frequently
invoked relative to those perceived as vulnerable, immature, dependent,
or disabled, in that such persons arguably require the heightened
concern of the state as benevolent protector.249 In a case such as Prince,
where the legal guardian’s decisions were viewed as endangering the
minor, children’s heightened vulnerability is cited to justify limitation of
the traditional and constitutionally protected decisional discretion
typically accorded parents and legal guardians.250 At the core of the
Court’s analysis in Prince and other cases citing parens patriae
justifications for child protective regulation, is the premise that children
require greater protection from harm than do adults. In Prince, the Court
used terms such as “crippling” in describing the possible effects of the
child’s activities, referring to myriad “harms,” noting that the “streets
afford dangers for [children] not affecting adults,” and that this
“difference may be magnified” under some circumstances.251 It observed
further that the child’s activities:

246. Citing the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of parents and guardians, the Court stated:
“Against these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to protect
the welfare of children, and the state’s assertion of authority to that end . . . .” Id. at 165.
247. Id. at 168.
248. Throughout the decades following Prince, the Court has repeatedly recognized governmental
power to regulate the lives of children far exceeding its parallel authority relative to adults. See
Weithorn, supra note 178, at 1401–07.
249. “Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may
restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor
and in many other ways.” Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67. For a discussion of the origins of, and for judicial
and scholarly commentary regarding, the concept of parens patriae power, see Weithorn, supra note
178, at 1388–89; see also Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the TwentyFirst Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381
(2000); Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The State and the Parent/Child
Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51 (2007).
250. “[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child’s welfare.” Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67.
251. Id. at 169.
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may and at times [do] create situations difficult enough for adults to
cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially of tender
years, to face. Other harmful possibilities could be stated, of emotional
excitement and psychological or physical injury.252

The state’s police power interests also justify greater regulation of
children’s lives and intervention in parental decisions, although for the
purpose of promoting the general welfare. Children are regulated under
this theory, not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of society. The
end results of children’s upbringing and socialization are consequential
not only for the children, but for the future of society as a whole.253 In the
frequently quoted words of the Prince Court: “A democratic society rests,
for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young
people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure
this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of
selection.”254
Prince has been criticized as overly intrusive in parental authority to
make decisions regarding their children’s welfare more generally, and
about religious matters specifically. One wonders if the case might have
turned out differently if the people in question were not members of an
unpopular religious minority group. Yet, the result is entirely
understandable, and was arguably essential, at a time when the allocation
of authority between parents and the state around matters relating to
compulsory education and child labor were still undergoing negotiation
and refinement. Twenty years after the Court made clear in Meyer
v. Nebraska255 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters256 that the Progressive
Movement’s increasing regulation of the family must give way to some
level of parental discretion, Prince underscored that the state’s interests
in protecting and helping to socialize children provide limits on that
discretion. While recognizing a “private realm of family life within which
the state cannot enter,” and that “the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor

252. Id. at 169–70.
253. See Weithorn, supra note 178, at 1403–04 (distinguishing between two subtypes of police
power state interests concerning children: a public-safety oriented interest, justifying state regulation
of children’s lives in order to protect society from dangers presented by the children (such as,
protection from exposure to a disease that might be transmitted by an unvaccinated child or protection
from a lawbreaking minor’s offending behavior), and a socialization-oriented interest, justifying state
regulation of children’s lives “to further the common good by promoting the child’s healthy
development into well-educated, productive, . . . well-adjusted,” and healthy adults). See, e.g., Clark,
supra note 249, at 392 (“[C]hildren may be special objects of governmental coercion, not because they
need the state but because they are needed by the state [as future citizens].”).
254. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168–69 (citations and footnotes omitted).
255. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
256. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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hinder,” the Court emphasized that “the family itself is not beyond
regulation.”257
Prince’s legacy is enduring, and its impact magnified by the
virtually-universal reliance upon it as precedent for the assertion of state
interests in protecting children from physical or psychological harm in a
wide range of constitutional cases, and for the concomitant broader state
authority over children versus adults. That said, Prince can easily be
criticized for what some might view as a possibly exaggerated, and
perhaps alarmist, characterization of the risks facing a child in the
position of Ms. Prince’s ward. Indeed, given that the challenge was to an
application of the statute, the Court could have considered the fact that
the child was accompanied by her guardian when engaging in the
prohibited activities, potentially mitigating any risks she might have
faced.258
Not surprisingly, no sources were offered in Prince to support the
many assertions about children’s vulnerability. Arguably, however, the
fields of psychology and psychiatry, and particularly developmental
science, were in their infancy in 1944 when Prince was decided, and thus
little scientific support would have been available, nor could the
assertions made by the Court be easily studied. Yet, the tendency for the
Court to rely on unsubstantiated assumptions about children’s
vulnerability as susceptibility to greater psychological or physiological
harm than adults as justification for paternalistic regulation has not
changed.
Commentators have observed that, in many cases, the Court fails to
scrutinize an asserted legislative purpose and focuses its meaningful
review on the means used to achieve the goal.259 For example, Richard
Fallon has noted that in applying strict scrutiny, “the Supreme Court
[has] frequently adopted an astonishingly casual approach to identifying
compelling interests.”260
At the time Prince was decided, tiered constitutional review and
strict scrutiny were not yet staples of constitutional analysis.261 Thus,
Prince did not apply strict scrutiny, and therefore did not require that the
state’s interests to be compelling. Subsequent cases, however, have relied
on Prince as precedent to support the proposition that certain child
257. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
258. The Court explicitly rejected this opportunity. Id. at 169 n.18.
259. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1997)
[hereinafter Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny]; Ashutosh Bhagwat, What if I Want My Kids to Watch
Pornography?: Protecting Children from “Indecent” Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 671 (2003)
[hereinafter Bhagwat, Protecting Children]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1267, 1321–23 (2007).
260. Fallon, Jr., supra note 259, at 1321.
261. For a brief historical summary of the development of tiered scrutiny, see, for example,
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny, supra note 259, at 306–11.
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protective interests are compelling.262 This reliance suggests that, if
decided more recently, the Court might have characterized the state’s
interests in Prince as compelling.263
Fallon’s point is made more broadly, however, by Ashutosh
Bhagwat, regarding “purpose scrutiny” across the tiers, noting a
tendency of the Court to defer to the validity of the state’s articulated
goals, while more carefully scrutinizing the means used to achieve those
goals.264 The Court’s reluctance to second-guess whether the
government’s asserted interests for a challenged regulation rise to the
level required by the applicable constitutional standard of review is
particularly flagrant where those interests are characterized as child
protective: “Sometimes . . . the Supreme Court labels interests as
compelling on the basis of little or no textual inquiry. Examples include
cases in which the Court has found a compelling interest in protecting
children from one or another purported injury . . . .”265 Bhagwat observes
that, in particular, in cases related to restrictions on sexual speech
“imposed in the name of protecting children,” the Court generally accepts
the “government’s asserted justifications with little skepticism,” focusing
instead on the adequacy of the tailoring of the means used.266 Also of
importance is the level of generality with which the government’s interest
is defined. After all, who can argue with the assertion, at the highest level
of generality, that the government has a compelling interest in protecting
children from harm and promoting children’s well-being? By contrast,
somewhat less consensus may exist on the strength and potency of the
government’s interest in protecting children from specific sexual or
violent content.267
Constructs of children as vulnerable become relevant, of course,
when and if the state must justify its restriction of someone’s rights in
order to protect children’s welfare. To the extent that the government can
demonstrate that children need the state’s protection to avoid serious
injury, the case for justification is more likely. The more carefully and

262. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (“It is evident beyond the need for
elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’
is ‘compelling.’”) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) and
introducing discussion of Prince).
263. I have argued elsewhere that, in those cases in which the state’s parens patriae and police
power interests concerning children’s welfare converge¾as they are portrayed as converging in
Prince¾the state’s authority to intervene in the family to regulate children’s lives is frequently treated
as particularly potent. Reiss & Weithorn, Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 241, at 912.
264. Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny, supra note 259, at 301, 319–25. Professor Bhagwat’s article
examines, however, the Court’s “renewed interest in the previously forbidden terrain of purpose
scrutiny, including a new willingness to examine, and pass independent judgment on, the reasons why
the state has chosen to burden individual rights.” Id. at 312.
265. Fallon, Jr., supra note 259, at 1322.
266. Bhagwat, Protecting Children, supra note 259, at 676.
267. See infra Part III.
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specifically articulated the state’s asserted interest, the more focused can
be the inquiry into whether the government’s help is needed, and then,
of course, whether the manner of regulation meets the “means” portion
of the standard of review. The failure to carefully articulate or scrutinize
the governmental purpose creates a wide berth for similarly general and
vague assertions about children as vulnerable. This gap opens the door
wider for the armchair psychological assumptions about children’s
nature attributed to common sense or common knowledge that the
Justices so often rely upon, as observed in several of the cases below.
B.

CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY AS VICTIMS OF ABUSE

The Court has considered the vulnerability of children who are
abused in several types of cases. I focus here on two such instances: when
children are used in the production of child pornography, and when
children must provide courtroom testimony against alleged abusers.268
While generally agreeing that protecting children from abuse or
subsequent emotional trauma is a state interest of great importance, the
Justices have disagreed on the question of when the potential harms to
children justify certain restrictions of the constitutional rights of others.
1. Children as Subjects of Pornography
The members of the Court were virtually unanimous in agreeing that
involving actual children as models in the creation of child pornography
is a form of child abuse and exploitation that is “harmful to the
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.”269 In New York
v. Ferber, citing the state’s compelling interest in “safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being” of minors, “an objective of
surpassing importance,” the Court easily upheld a New York statute that
criminalized production, direction, or promotion of “a sexual
performance by a child . . . , knowing the content and character thereof
. . . ”270 Justice Brennan’s concurrence explicitly invoked the “particular
vulnerability of children” a theme implicit throughout the majority
opinion.271 Under the statute, the definition of “promotion” included sale,
268. Other cases involving abuse of children are not included in this discussion because they relate
most directly to an alternate subtype of vulnerability, as in the case of DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), where dependency-based vulnerability predominates (see
supra notes 155–159 and accompanying text). In other cases involving child abuse, vulnerability
constructs do not play a central role in the Court’s analyses. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.
407 (2008) (holding unconstitutional the application of the death penalty in a crime of rape of a child
which did not result, and was not intended to result, in the death of the child); Stogner v. California,
539 U.S. 607 (2003) (holding unconstitutional application of California statute that allowed
prosecution of previously time-barred sex-related child abuse claims).
269. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 750 (1982).
270. Id. at 751, 756–57.
271. Id. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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transfer, distribution, exhibition, as well as several other means of
dissemination.272 In rejecting the First Amendment claims of the
defendant bookstore owner, the Court distinguished the concerns
underlying the New York statute at issue in Ferber (that is, protecting
children from sexual victimization and exploitation) from those
regulating obscenity more generally (that is, “protecting the ‘sensibilities
of unwilling recipients’ from exposure to pornographic material”).273 As
such, it noted that the states were entitled to “greater leeway in the
regulation of pornographic depictions of children.”274 In Ferber, the
Court cited a range of psychological and medical sources, as well as
legislative reports, emphasizing the detrimental impact such
participation has on children’s development.275
It further stated that the harms to children exceed those experienced
during the performance of the sexual activities that are depicted. It
observed that the creation of a permanent record of the children’s
participation, and the subsequent circulation of the pornographic
materials, exacerbate the harm.276 The majority also invoked the invasion
of individual privacy as a factor further compounding the potential
dangers to children’s well-being.277 The Ferber Court’s analysis has been
criticized for relying on relatively weak studies, and for drawing
conclusions that exceeded the studies’ findings.278 In addition, there
exists substantial criticism today as to the breadth of the net in which
alleged offenders may be caught, including, for example, youth who may
distribute “sexted” images of themselves.279
272. Id. at 751.
273. Id. at 756–61.
274. Id. at 756.
275. Id. at 758–59 n.9 & 10. Among the potential harms cited were the possibility that “sexually
exploited” children may be unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships later in life, tend to
become sexual abusers as adults, and are predisposed to self-destructive behavior such as drug abuse,
alcohol abuse, and prostitution. Id. at 758 n.9.
276. Furthermore, the Court noted that the “permanent record” made of the children’s
participation perpetuates the harm: “the pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the
original misdeed took place. A child who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the
recording is circulating within the mass distribution system.” Id. at 759 n.10 (citing David P. Shouvlin,
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545
(1981)). In addition, the Court quoted with approval: “The victim’s knowledge of publication of the
visual material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at
760 n.10 (citing Mary Annette Horan, Note, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward
Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 295, 301 (1979)). It cited also
potential harms resulting from the “‘fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the act secret.” Ferber,
458 U.S. at 759 n.10.
277. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758–59 n.9 & 10.
278. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1981 Term: E. Child Pornography and Unprotected Speech,
96 HARV. L. REV. 141–150 (1982).
279. See, e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Sexting or Self-Produced Child Pornography? The Dialog
Continues—Structure Prosecutorial Discretion Within a Multidisciplinary Response, 17 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 486, 551 (2010).
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Yet, to the extent that the definition of child pornography focuses on
“sexual conduct” involving persons under the age of sixteen, as in Ferber,
the production of such images involves conduct that will often fall within
the purview of sexual abuse.280 Decades of research studying children
who have experienced sexual abuse reveal that the victims are at a greater
risk than non-abused children for a range of psychological, health, and
social difficulties, many of which persist into adulthood.281 In addition,
more generally, developmental neuroscientific findings reveal that
various forms of child maltreatment can have serious, long-term, and
potentially devastating effects on the brain, the nervous system, and
overall health that, depending upon their nature, intensity, and duration,
may be experienced throughout the life span.282
No members of the Court dissented in Ferber. Concurring Justices
differed from the majority primarily with respect to their concerns that
certain future applications of the statute not before the Court might
infringe protected First Amendment interests. Subsequent cases
reinforced this split within the Court. For example, despite clear
agreement that “the coercive enlistment, both overt and subtle, of
children in the production of pornography is a grave and widespread
evil,” the Justices disagreed in Massachusetts v. Oakes about where the
lines should be drawn between protected and unprotected speech,283 and
in Osbourne v. Ohio about whether individuals who merely possess child
pornography bear a sufficiently attenuated relationship to the harm to
children to claim First Amendment protection.284
280. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1165.1 (2016) (providing definition and examples of child sexual
abuse subject to mandatory reporting requirements in California).
281. See, e.g., Lucy Berliner, Child Sexual Abuse: Definitions, Prevalence, and Consequences, in
THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 215, 221–26 (John E.B. Myers ed., 3d ed. 2011); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES
108–12 (2012); CINDY L. MILLER-PERRIN & ROBIN D. PERRIN, CHILD MALTREATMENT: AN INTRODUCTION
127–39 (Kassie Graves ed., 2d ed. 2007); EVA J. KLAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING CHILD., CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY: THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE-SYSTEM RESPONSE 10–11 (2001). As in the case of other
exposures to harm, the effects vary across those exposed. Children who have experienced exposure to
multiple forms of abuse, or other adverse childhood experiences, may be more likely to demonstrate
negative effects, or may experience more serious consequences. Berliner, supra, at 221–222; see also
supra notes 230–233 and accompanying text. Furthermore, as noted above, children’s resilience in
particular situations may also affect the long- and short-term impact of negative exposures. See supra
notes 164, 230–233. The additive effect of “recurrent victimization through existence of images” has
not be subjected to substantial empirical investigation and consists primarily of the opinions of experts
and reports by victims. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra, at 112–114.
282. Weithorn, Developmental Neuroscience, supra note 233.
283. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 591–93 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that
while Ferber’s restriction clearly permitted criminalization of involvement of persons under age
eighteen in “live sexual performance” or acts “for the purpose of visual representation or
reproduction,” certain other visual depictions reached by the statute might not harm minors, and
therefore deserve First Amendment protection).
284. In Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110–11 (1990), the Court held that the state’s attempts to
“stamp out [child pornography] at all levels in the distribution chain” was constitutionally permissible
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Twenty years after Ferber, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the
Court drew a clear line between what it viewed as the unequivocal and
direct harms to children from participation in the creation of
pornography and the potential, and arguably more speculative and
indirect, harms to children related to production or distribution of
materials that “appear to be” or “convey the impression of” depictions of
a “minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” but which do not use
children in their creation.285 The production and distribution of the latter
types of materials were proscribed by the federal Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”).286 Congress defined these materials as
including computer-generated images (that is, virtual child
pornography) or images using youthful-looking adult models.287
In striking down the CPPA as unconstitutionally overbroad, the
Court clarified that its prohibitions against child pornography are
grounded on the law’s condemnation of the criminal sexual abuse of
children by using real children in the production of the materials.288 The
Court rejected Congressional justifications for the restriction of speech
under the CPPA. Congress had asserted that virtual child pornography
and other pornographic materials that appear to picture children (even
though no real children are used in their creation) can be used by
pedophiles to “encourage” children to participate in sexual activity, or to
“‘whet their own sexual appetites,’” thereby increasing the likelihood that
actual children will be abused and exploited.289 The Court held that the
“[g]overnment may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress
unlawful speech.”290 In a separate opinion, Justice O’Connor, joined by
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, indicated that she viewed the scope of the
CPPA as constitutional, in light of the asserted dangers to children of
“being molested with the aid of child sex pictures.”291 Six years later, in
given the asserted harms to children of the child pornography industry. The dissenters, while
concurring in the assessment of harm, concluded that the “panoply of laws prohibiting creation, sale,
and distribution of child pornography and obscenity involving minors” was an appropriate response,
while criminalizing possession infringed on First Amendment rights to view such materials in the
privacy of one’s own home pursuant to Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Osborne, 495 U.S. at
141–44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
285. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240–41 (2002).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 244–45.
289. Id. at 241–42, 255. For a summary of empirical research on the claims of these more
attenuated effects of pornographic images of children on future molestation of children, see, for
example, Emily Weissler, Note, Head Versus Heart: Applying Empirical Evidence About the
Connection Between Child Pornography and Child Molestation to Probable Cause Analyses,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487 (2013); Erik Faust et al., Child Pornography Possessors and Child Contact
Offenders: A Multilevel Comparison of Demographic Characteristics and Rates of Recidivism,
27 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 460 (2015).
290. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255.
291. Id. at 267 (O’Connor, J., partially concurring and partially dissenting).
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United States v. Williams, the Court upheld Congress’ replacement for
the CPPA, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, because of the narrowing
provisions added by Congress.292 In so doing, the Court observed that
“[c]hild pornography harms and debases the most defenseless of our
citizens,”293 a point about which none of the Justices appears to disagree.
While observers may disagree as to many of the elements of regulatory
approaches to child pornography, the jurisprudence appears relatively
consistent with the current state of scientific knowledge to the extent that
it recognizes children’s susceptibility to experience physiological and
psychological harm if involved in the production of materials depicting
sexual conduct.
2. Children as Courtroom Witnesses Against Alleged Abusers
The Supreme Court has also considered two distinct constitutional
questions relating to courtroom testimony by alleged victims of child
abuse. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, it determined the
constitutionality of excluding the press and public from a courtroom
during the testimony of such a victim.294 In Globe, a trial judge presiding
over the prosecution of a defendant charged with raping three girls, who
were minors at the time of the trial, closed the courtroom during the girls’
testimony pursuant to a governing Massachusetts statute.295
Emphasizing the important role that press and public access to criminal
trials play in our democracy under the First Amendment, the Court noted
that in order to limit that right, “it must be shown that the denial is
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.”296 It held that “safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being of a minor” is such an interest, consistent
with the Massachusetts’s legislature’s concern about “protecting minor

292. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). Specifically, the Act criminalizes “knowing”
promotion or distribution of materials “in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause
another to believe” that the material is or contains either “an obscene visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct” or “a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.” Id. at 289–90. As such, the statute “prohibits offers to provide and requests to obtain
child pornography” without requiring the “actual existence of child pornography.” Id. at 293. The
Court rejected the claim that the statute criminalizes substantial protected activity by noting “[o]ffers
to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection” and
both types of transactions prohibited by the statute are illegal. Id. at 297. For further analysis of this
exception to First Amendment protection for communications soliciting a crime and its treatment of
Williams, see Eugene Vokohl, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 981, 993–98 (2016).
293. Williams, 553 U.S. at 307.
294. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
295. Id. at 598–600.
296. Id. at 606–07.
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victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment.”297 Yet, it
struck down the statute’s mandatory closure requirement as
insufficiently narrowly tailored. The Court held that to pass
constitutional muster, a First Amendment restriction of this type
requires judges to make individual findings as to the necessity for closure
on a case-by-case basis, considering factors such as “the minor victim’s
age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime,
the desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives.”298
In dissent, Justice Burger indicated that he would have upheld the
statute, and in support of that position, he elaborated extensively on the
state’s interest in protecting children from “the severe¾possibly
permanent¾psychological damage,” of having his or her victimization
publicized.299 In so doing, he focused on children’s special vulnerability
to “significant trauma, embarrassment, or humiliation” by noting that
the “ordeal could be difficult for an adult; to a child the experience can be
devastating and leave permanent scars.”300
The Justices therefore agreed that protecting children from the
harms that might accompany testifying in open court justifies restriction
of First Amendment rights under certain circumstances. While the
majority required individualized showings of harm from press and public
presence, the dissent would permit a generalized presumption of risk of
harm to trigger closure for all minors. Indeed, there may be support for
both positions. On the one hand, children respond and cope differently
with victimization due to a range and interaction of factors, arguing for
individualized determinations.301 Furthermore, while in general,
testifying in court following such trauma can indeed enhance the
detrimental psychological effects, some children tolerate this experience
better than others, and some might even perceive their “day in court” as
empowering or cathartic.302 Finally, it is not clear what roles an open
courtroom and press coverage play in moderating or contributing to the
more general impact of testifying on children’s welfare. The Globe
Newspaper majority placed reliance on trial judges’ assessments
regarding the needs of individual victims, seeking to minimize First
Amendment restrictions.

297. Id. at 607–08.
298. Id. at 608.
299. Id. at 612–20 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 617–18. Justice Burger further cited several authorities to support his contention that
the courtroom experience can be “almost as traumatic as the crime itself.” Id. at 619.
301. Children’s ability to process and cope with traumatic experiences such as abuse varies
significantly, depending upon the nature and circumstances of the abuse, other traumas the child may
have experienced, the child’s own characteristics, and the existence of family and environmental
supports in the child’s life. See infra notes 315–316 and accompanying text.
302. Id.
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By contrast, the dissenters would have avoided risking the
possibility that a given judge would fail to be sufficiently protective of any
given victim. The empirical database on the effects of testifying on
children suggest that child witnesses’ responses to the prospect and
experience of testifying vary across children and situations. 303 Thus, the
model of case by case determinations regarding children’s needs is not
inconsistent with what we know of children’s vulnerability in this
context. That said, as noted below, it is unclear whether trial court judges
have the expertise to make those case by case determinations, and
whether, with the aid of mental health specialists, prediction of the
effects can be reliably made. 304
In Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig, the Court considered the
constitutionality of state statutes that permitted modifications of the
face-to-face courtroom testimony typically required to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.305 In Coy, the Court held that a
statute allowing child abuse victims to testify via either closed-circuit
television or behind a screen in the courtroom violated the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment rights.306 Emphasizing the importance of face-to-face
confrontation, it held unconstitutional the state’s “legislatively imposed
presumption of trauma,” and failure to require individualized findings of
the necessity of modified procedures for the protection of particular
victims.307 While Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did not elaborate upon
child abuse victims’ vulnerability in the courtroom setting, Justice
Blackmun, in dissent, cited to research suggesting that courtroom
testimony can magnify the traumatic effects of abuse on child victims.308

303. Id.
304. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
305. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
306. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014–15, 1021.
307. Id. at 1021.
308. Id. at 1031–33. Some of the work cited is scientific, while other sources are grounded on
clinical observations. For example, the work of Gail Goodman and colleagues typically employs
rigorous empirical methods and is careful and conservative in its interpretations. While the specific
source referred to in the opinion has been difficult to obtain, Professor Goodman’s work is well-known.
For a summary of some of the research in the article referred to by Justice Blackmun, see, for example,
Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault
Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD DEV. v (1992). By contrast, Suzanne Sgroi’s
methods are grounded primarily on clinical observations and many of the assessment strategies she
employs do not satisfy scientific standards. See SUZANNE M. SGROI, HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL
INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1982).
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He stated that:
[T]he fear and trauma associated with a child’s testimony in front of
the defendant have two serious identifiable consequences: They may
cause psychological injury to the child, and they may so overwhelm the
child as to prevent the possibility of effective testimony, thereby
undermining the truth-finding function of the trial itself.309

He thus concluded “that a State properly may consider the
protection of child witnesses to be an important public policy” allowing
use of the modifications permitted by the statute.310
Two years later, Justice O’Connor wrote for a divided court in
Maryland v. Craig. At issue in Craig was the constitutionality of allowing
child abuse victims to testify via one-way closed-circuit television rather
than in the presence of the defendant, after the trial judge makes an
individualized determination that requiring in-courtroom testimony by
the child would cause “serious emotional distress such that the child
cannot reasonably communicate.”311 In Craig, the state presented expert
testimony to inform the court’s deliberations regarding the child’s need
for the alternative procedure. The majority held that the modifications
permitted by the statute were necessary to further an important state
interest, that is, the protection of the physical and psychological
well-being of child abuse victims.312 It relied both on its prior decisions
(for example, Prince, Ferber, Globe Newspaper) and additional scientific
authority on the “psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims
who must testify in court” to uphold the Maryland statute.313 Justice
Scalia, in dissent, was unpersuaded that Maryland’s asserted interests
outweighed the defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation.314 The
majority opinion closely tracks many of the conclusions of an amicus
brief submitted by the American Psychological Association, relying on a
compilation of the best empirical work available at that time.315
309. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1032.
310. Id.
311. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840–41 (1990).
312. Id. at 852–53.
313. Id. at 852–57.
314. Id. at 866–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association Supporting Neither
Party, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89-478), 1990 WL 10013093; see also Gail S.
Goodman et al., Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause: The American Psychological
Association Brief in Maryland v. Craig, 15 L. & HUM. BEH. 13 (1991). Justice Scalia, in dissent, was
more impressed with empirical research suggesting that “children are more vulnerable to suggestion
than adults,” thus impairing the reliability of their courtroom testimony. Maryland, 497 U.S. at 868.
Such vulnerability would fall within the second subtype identified in Part I, supra: (susceptibility to)
influenced-based vulnerability. In Justice Scalia’s view, face-to-face confrontation reduced the
likelihood of children’s proffering of false testimony that could result in erroneous convictions. Id. at
869–70. Justice Scalia emphasized what he saw as the “value of the confrontation right in guarding
against a child’s distorted or coerced recollections.” Id. at 869. Research conducted contemporaneous
with Craig and subsequent to the decision does not bear out Justice Scalia’s concerns. NATALIE R.
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The scientific database identified by Justice O’Connor cited in Craig
as a “growing body of academic literature” has continued to develop. The
findings, however, while generally tracking the majority’s conclusion, are
complex, with a range of situation-specific and child-specific variables
affecting the impact of participation in criminal courtroom proceedings
on children. Thus, while the Court’s holdings that individualized findings
of necessity are constitutionally required in each case, trial court judges
may find the array of considerations that inform the needs of each child
victim to be challenging to apply on a case-by-case basis.316
The Court’s constructs of children as needing the state’s protection
because of greater susceptibility to experiencing psychological or
physiological harm in the cases reviewed in this Part appear to loosely
track, albeit with some deviations and variability, the general state of
knowledge about the phenomena addressed. Consistent with the
observations of the constitutional scholars cited above, the Court
requires little supplementary support to accept the state’s justification
for its asserted child protective purpose. Substantially more scrutiny
attends its review of the means employed, particularly in the cases

TROXEL ET AL., CHILD WITNESSES IN CRIMINAL COURT, IN CHILDREN AS VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND
OFFENDERS: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 150, 160–62 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2009).
316. In a comprehensive review of the literature, Quas and Goodman summarize the data:
As mentioned, the links between testifying and adverse outcomes are complex and often
depend on additional factors, including not only how many times children testify, but also
such factors as corroborative evidence, maternal support, and severity of the
abuse. . . . [C]hildren who testified in cases that lacked corroborative evidence and testifiers
who lacked maternal support during the case were at greatest risk for adverse mental health
outcomes, and . . . testifying repeatedly in cases involving particularly severe child sexual
abuse was related to higher levels of subsequent problems. . . . Without caregiver support,
the stress of testifying may simply overwhelm children’s coping resources. Finally, severe
abuse cases typically involved a closely related perpetrator and abuse that occurred over a
long period of time. Pressures from the perpetrator or family members and conflictual
feelings about the perpetrator are likely greatest in these circumstances, making it especially
challenging for children to face the perpetrator repeatedly and answer pointed questions on
the stand about their experiences.
Jodi A. Quas & Gail S. Goodman, Consequences of Criminal Court Involvement for Child Victims,
18 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 392, 400 (2012) (citations omitted). The researchers also note that, for
some children, testifying may be helpful to the healing process, particularly in less severe cases. They
hypothesize that “[p]erhaps some children need clear acknowledgment that the abuse occurred and
was sufficiently wrong as to warrant public intervention. This acknowledgement may come from
taking the stand.” Id. at 400–01. Although more study of this phenomenon is needed, the authors
conclude that the findings emphasize the importance of refraining from “overly simplistic”
generalizations about the effects of testifying in all cases. Id. at 401. Finally, the research indicates that,
in addition to the variables mentioned above, the age of the child may relate to the child’s vulnerability
to negative concomitants of providing testimony in abuse cases: “Models of development and
risk . . . suggest that traumas occurring early rather than later in childhood have particularly
deleterious effects on psychological functioning. Insofar as legal involvement represents a trauma” the
negative impact on younger children may be more pronounced. Id. at 401–02. Yet, the authors note,
sometimes older children are treated more harshly in the courtroom, a factor that may lead to more
adverse outcomes. Id.
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relating to courtroom testimony. The cases discussed below, invoking
notions of children as vulnerable recipients of certain types of speech,
demonstrate substantially less correlation between the Court’s
endorsement of vulnerability constructs and existing scientific
understandings. Indeed, the dominant constructions of children’s
vulnerability in the speech cases bear little relationship to what we
actually know about children.
C.

CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY AS RECIPIENTS OF SPEECH

Governmental regulation of speech based on content is typically
premised on the assumption that the speech will cause some form of
harm.317 The Court has decided a range of cases that consider the
constitutionality of regulations developed, at least in part, with the goal
of protecting children from exposure to speech that has been asserted by
the state to be harmful to children.318 This Subpart focuses on the Court’s
use of vulnerability constructs to address the alleged harms to children
of challenged speech.
The cases involving alleged harm to children from exposure to
speech vary on many dimensions, such as the setting in which the speech
is communicated, the medium by which it is communicated, the extent
to which the category of speech regulated is protected by the First
Amendment, whether the regulation is content-based, and importantly,
whether a restriction on speech aimed at protecting children would also
impair the rights of adults. For example, the government retains greater
leeway in regulating the speech of minors in the school setting, even
when the exposure occurs off school grounds at a school-supervised
event, than it does with respect to speech occurring in a setting not falling
within the purview of school authorities.319 The Court has underscored
that student speech can be limited in ways “in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment.”320
The government’s authority to regulate speech sometimes varies
with the medium through which the speech is communicated.321 Thus,

317. David S. Han, The Mechanics of First Amendment Audience Analysis, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1647, 1647 (2014). Yet, constitutional commentators have observed that First Amendment doctrine
gives relatively little attention to the question of how the regulated speech is thought to cause the harm
in question. Id. at 1657; see also Bhagwat, Protecting Children, supra note 259; Catherine Ross,
Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial Speech,
53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 501–07 (2000).
318. This Part examines regulations and vulnerability constructs that focus on children as
recipients of speech, rather than as speakers. In some of these cases, however, children are also
speakers. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Distr. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393 (2007).
319. See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–97.
320. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
321. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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the government’s reach is greater in regulating broadcast media than
many other mediums because of the “uniquely pervasive presence” of
material broadcast over the “airwaves” in Americans’ lives, and because
“broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to
read.”322
Furthermore, certain types of speech receive greater protection than
others. For example, the Court has held that speech characterized as
“obscenity,” “incitement,” or “fighting words[]” is not protected by the
First Amendment.323 In addition, the Court permits legislatures greater
flexibility in determining what is obscene “from the perspective of a
child,” thus expanding the category of what constitutes obscenity when
children are the audience.324 “Indecent” speech that is not obscene is
protected by the First Amendment, but is subject to greater regulation
than many other forms of speech for the purpose of shielding children
from exposure.325
The standard of review applied to speech regulation differs, as well,
depending on whether the regulation is content-based or contentneutral, since the government is expected to remain neutral in the
“marketplace of ideas.”326 Thus strict scrutiny is applied to content-based
regulations, while intermediate scrutiny is applied to content-neutral
regulations.327 Because of the stringency of constitutional review of
content-based regulations, the determination that a particular content
category of speech (for example, obscenity) does not merit First
Amendment protection provides the government with substantial
authority over regulation of that type of speech, where governmental
reach would otherwise be quite constrained.328 In a widely criticized
decision discussed below,329 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants’
Association, the Court recently determined that because the violent
content of certain video games did not fall within one of those categories
of speech excluded from First Amendment protection, the content-based
nature of the regulation mandated strict scrutiny review of a California

322. Id. at 749. The state, for example, has greater leeway in regulating the speech of minors than adults.
323. Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
324. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968).
325. James F.X. Petrich, Constitutionality of Sexually Oriented Speech: Obscenity, Indecency,
and Child Pornography, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 81, 87 (2015). Indecent speech, as defined by Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 732, is “intimately connected to the exposure of
children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs . . . .”
326. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716–17 (2012); David S. Han, Transparency in First
Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 368 (2015); Petrich, supra note 325, at 82–83.
327. Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal Drifts: Paying the Price
in First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of Avoidance, Minimalism & Partisanship,
24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 943, 979–80 (2016).
328. Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Speech, 115 MICH. L. REV. 439, 451 n.85 (2017).
329. See infra Part III.C.4.
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statute that would have restricted minors’ independent ability to
purchase or rent violent video games.330
Finally, the impact that regulations aimed at protecting children
have on adults’ access to such speech plays an important role in the
constitutional analysis, in light of the Court’s unwillingness to reduce the
level of discourse in society to what might be viewed as appropriate for
children’s consumption.331 Because the government has greater reach in
regulating minors, regulations affecting only children’s access to speech
may be more restrictive than regulations also limiting adults’ access to
the regulated speech.332 Indeed, as discussed within, it appears that, at
least with respect to minors’ access to sexually explicit speech, rational
basis review may be all that is required where a restriction leaves adults’
access unaffected.333
1. Children’s Exposure to Sexual Images
Ginsberg v. New York334 was one of the earliest cases concerning
children’s access to allegedly indecent materials. A merchant who had
sold two “girlie” magazines to a sixteen year old boy appealed his
conviction under a New York statute forbidding sales to minors under the
age of seventeen of magazines “depict[ing] [] ‘nudity’” and “which [are]
harmful to minors.”335 Although the magazines would not have been
considered “obscene” under the definition applied to adults, New York
argued that a child-specific definition of obscenity was appropriate to
serve its child-protective goals.336 Highlighting the state’s authority to
promote children’s well-being, the Court relied on two sets of
justifications for such regulation. First, it opined, the state has an interest
in supporting parental decisionmaking authority regarding their
children’s welfare, including children’s access to sexually explicit
330. Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786, 798–99 (2011); Kozel, supra note 328, at 451.
331. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1983)) (“‘[R]egardless of the strength of the government’s interest’
in protecting children, ‘the level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which
would be suitable for a sandbox.’”).
332. Martin Guggenheim distinguishes the types of regulations restricting materials for the alleged
benefit of children. Martin Guggenheim, Violent Video Games and the Rights of Children and
Parents: A Critique of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 707,
710–28 (2014). Guggenheim sorts the cases as follows: Category A (regulations that completely ban
dissemination of particular materials on the ground that the materials are inappropriate for everyone);
Category B (regulations that completely ban dissemination of particular materials on the ground that
it is inappropriate for children); Category C (regulations that attempt to “restrict the time, place, or
manner in which adults may have access to [particular] materials in order to reduce the risk that
children will also be able to gain access”); Category D (regulations that seek to reduce children’s access
to particular materials without interfering in adults’ access). Id. at 710.
333. See infra notes 339–340 and accompanying text.
334. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
335. Id. at 632.
336. Id. at 634, 638.
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materials. A statute that bars minors from accessing such materials
independently, but allows parents to access such materials for their
children if they so choose, could be viewed as supporting such parental
discretion according to the Court.337 Second, the Court cited the state’s
parens patriae and police power interests in promoting children’s
well-being as additional, but distinct, bases for regulations of sexually
explicit materials.
The Court applied rational basis review in Ginsberg.338 The Court
did not discuss its choice of rational basis review, an anomaly given that
content-based restrictions on speech are typically strictly scrutinized.
Perhaps this choice relates to the fact that the restrictions in Ginsberg
only affected minors’ access to the speech in question.339 Even when a
particular type of restriction affecting adults would warrant heightened
scrutiny, the Court sometimes applies rational basis when the
constitutional rights of minors are at issue because the state has greater
leeway in regulating minors’ lives and activities. This approach may
explain the standard of review in Ginsberg.340
The Court held that the New York legislature could rationally have
decided that the statute in question was necessary to safeguard minors
from harm.341 The opinion did not explicate precisely what harms were
expected to follow from minors’ exposure to these materials, referring
vaguely to impairment of the “ethical and moral development” of
youth.342 Only in a footnote did the Court suggest that its concern focused
on the possibility that exposure to these materials will “create a danger
of antisocial conduct.”343 The Court acknowledged that the collective
findings of scientific studies concerning the alleged harmfulness to
children of exposure to obscene materials were ambiguous, at best.344
Indeed, it stated: “It is very doubtful that [the New York legislature’s]

337. Id. at 639.
338. Id. at 643.
339. See Bhagwat, Protecting Children, supra note 259, at 676. The limited effect of the regulation
would place it in Guggenheim’s Category D, see supra note 332.
340. See Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty., 329 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2003)
(attributing the lower standard of review in Ginsberg to the category of speech regulated—that is,
speech falling within the modified definition of obscenity specific to minors).
341. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 643. As Monahan and Walker indicate, where no adequate empirical
support exists for a factual proposition relevant to evaluation of statutory purpose or means, the
statute is likely to be sustained under rational basis review. Monahan & Walker, supra note 20, at 586.
This standard of review grants substantial deference to legislative findings or its empirical
assumptions, rejecting them only sufficient data are marshalled to demonstrate the inaccuracy of those
assumptions. Id.
342. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642 n. 10.
343. Id. at 642.
344. Id. at 641–42.

WEITHORN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2017]

12/22/17 12:39 AM

JURISPRUDENCE OF CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY

251

finding [of purported harm to the ethical and moral development of
youth] expresses an accepted scientific fact.”345
In addition, the allusion to antisocial behavior implies the need to
restrict minors’ access as a means of social control. Invoking capacitybased vulnerability constructs, Justice Stewart, in his Ginsberg
concurrence, suggested that children are like those in a “captive
audience” upon whom obscene material is forced, because children are
“not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”346 This formulation of
minors’ vulnerability illustrates the synergistic effect of heightened
sensitivity to harm and more limited capacities for self-protection
attendant to immature decisionmaking skills characterized by
susceptibility to harm-based and capacity-based vulnerability. Notably,
in the Court’s discussions in the “obscenity” cases, children and
unconsenting adults have been frequently grouped together and
differentiated from consenting adults with respect to the states’ interests
in regulating obscene material.347
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Ginsberg, rejected the majority’s
fears about harms to children. He implied that the Court adopted the
image of childhood put forward by Comstock in the late 1800’s (that is,
that people have an “inborn tendency toward wrongdoing”).348 While
reserving judgment on whether sexually explicit literature is harmful in
general, he argued that there is no evidence that the materials are more
harmful to children than to adults: “The ‘juvenile delinquents’ I have
known are mostly over 50 years of age. If rationality is the measure of
validity of this law, then I can see how modern Anthony Comstocks could
make out a case for ‘protecting’ many groups in our society, not merely
children.”349 Ultimately, he condemned what he characterized as the role
of the Court as a “censor” as well as the entire exercise of trying to judge
what is obscene or harmful to others.350 Justice Douglas referred to
children’s interest in reading materials of the type regulated in Ginsberg
as the “fresh, evanescent, natural blossoming of sex,” an interest Justice
Douglas asserted should not be confused with “sin.”351
The Justices’ concerns about the link between sexual themes and
antisocial behavior were raised in subsequent cases concerning adults’
access to such materials. For example, the next year, in Stanley v.
Georgia, in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall, the Court rejected

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 641.
Id. at 649–50 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1973).
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 651 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 654–55.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 650.
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Georgia’s claim that “exposure to obscene materials may lead to deviant
sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence,” citing several scientific
sources and concluding that there was “little empirical basis” for
Georgia’s claim.352 Yet, the Court was quick to assert that where there is
the danger that obscene materials will “fall into the hands of children,”
the issues are quite different.353
The Court reiterated the theme that exposure to obscene material
may “exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial
behavior” or may have a “dominant tendency [to] ‘deprave or corrupt’ a
reader” in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, where it considered the
constitutionality of a state restriction on theatres showing obscene
films.354 It held that a state could reasonably conclude that a causal
connection exists between exposure to obscene material and antisocial
conduct, absent conclusive scientific evidence or empirical data.355 Even
Justice Brennan, who vigorously objected to restrictions approved by the
majority as they affected consenting adults, endorsed the view that
juveniles needed greater protection.356 He stated that exposure to
obscene material may be “an intense emotional experience” of the nature
of a “physical assault” if forced upon an unwilling person.357
Today, almost fifty years after the Court issued its decision in
Ginsberg, there remains little evidence that the types of materials
restricted in Ginsberg are psychologically or physically harmful to
minors.358 Existing studies on the impact of sexual content in media on
children reveal, unsurprisingly, that the effects that such exposures on
children vary, depending upon characteristics of the materials, the
children, and the context. For example, research suggests that materials
that incorporate violence or depict behavior or attitudes that are
demeaning or degrading to women or others can have negative
impacts.359 On the other hand, media can serve as positive teaching tools,
educating about contraception, sexually transmitted diseases, and

352. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
353. Id. at 567.
354. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54–55, 63 (1973); Id. at 79 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
355. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 63.
356. Id. at 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenters took this position despite their view that,
in general, “the effort to suppress obscenity is predicated on unprovable, although strongly held,
assumptions about human behavior, morality, sex, and religion.” Id. at 109.
357. Id. at 106–07.
358. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY & THE INTERNET (D.
Thornburgh & H. S. Lin eds. 2002) [hereinafter NAS, Pornography]; S. Liliana Escobar-Chaves et al.,
Impact of the Media on Adolescent Sexual Attitudes and Behaviors, 116 PEDIATRICS 303 (2005);
ALTHEA C. HUSTON ET AL., MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF SEXUAL CONTENT IN THE MEDIA: A REPORT TO THE
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (1998), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED445363.pdf.
359. NAS, Pornography, supra note 358, at 149–55.
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positive sexual behaviors.360 The limited research available is
contradictory on questions such as whether viewing media with sexual
content promotes earlier initiation of sexual activity or other
behaviors.361 Conclusions from the existing data, particularly
attributions of causality, must be cautious because of methodological
limitations imposed by ethical constraints.362 Overall, however, there is
little support for the notion that depictions of nudity without more and
exposure to many types of materials with sexual images or themes have
harmful effects on a youthful audience. Critically, most relevant to the
effects on children are the nature of the materials, the messages
contained in them, and the context in which they are portrayed. When
sexual materials incorporate violence, abuse, degradation, or other
disturbing themes, the effects may be detrimental.
How important is empirical substantiation of the risks of harm to
minors in Ginsberg and cases like it? To the extent that the state relies
on factual assertions about the impact of certain experiences, exposures,
or stimuli on children’s development, scientific investigation of the
phenomena reflects the most likely avenue to the determination of their
veracity. Yet, as noted above, the Ginsberg Court endorsed dual
justifications for state regulation of sexually explicit materials. As is often
the case when multiple justifications for a law are advanced, it is not
readily apparent whether either basis is analytically necessary and/or
sufficient. In Ginsberg, are governmental regulations that enhance
parental discretion regarding children’s access to the regulated materials
constitutional even if there is insufficient evidence that the restriction
also furthers the state’s independent interest in protecting children’s
welfare? If the answer is yes, then substantiation of assumptions about
the dangers to children of exposure to the materials is unnecessary. All
that must be demonstrated is that the regulation furthers parental
choice.363 Thus, unanswered questions include whether promotion of
parental discretion is the weightier of the goals and whether our
constitutional doctrine regulating children and the family permits or
requires such an approach.364

360. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement—Sexuality, Contraception, and the Media, 126
PEDIATRICS 576, 578–79 (2010).
361. See, e.g., NAS, supra note 358, at 154.
362. Id. at 155–60.
363. This role of regulations restricting minors’ access to speech in promoting parental choice is
revisited below, in the context of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants’ Association. See infra notes
452–457 and accompanying text.
364. For an excellent analysis of free speech doctrine and children, within the context of constitutional
jurisprudence of the family more generally, see Guggenheim, supra note 332, at 729–65.
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2. Children’s Exposure to “Indecent” Speech
Over a decade after Ginsberg, in Federal Communications
Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court upheld Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) restrictions on the broadcast of a
satiric George Carlin monologue entitled “Filthy Words.”365 A man who
heard the broadcast while driving in his car with his “young son” (whose
age was not specified) complained to the FCC about the airing. The FCC
objected to the broadcasting of the monologue during hours when
children might be listening because it viewed the broadcast as “indecent,”
containing words referring to “excretory or sexual activities or organs.”366
The FCC’s authority to license permits it to regulate broadcasts
determined to be “obscene, indecent, or profane.” Here, the Court upheld
the FCC’s action, although it did not specify what it viewed as harmful to
children about such exposure beyond mentioning that “Pacifica’s
broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant.”367 The
Court did not indicate how such enlargement might have harmed
children, although we can assume that it would have likely greatly
annoyed the children’s parents and other adults within earshot of any
subsequent mimicry by the children. The Court did not assert that
hearing the broadcast would incline children toward performing
antisocial acts beyond reciting the offensive words, nor did it argue that
the speech would otherwise harm the children emotionally.
In concurrence in Pacifica, Justice Powell suggested that children’s
lessened capacity for choice may hinder their ability to “protect
themselves from speech which, although shocking to most adults,
generally may be avoided by the unwilling through the exercise of choice.
At the same time, such speech may have a deeper and more lasting
negative effect on a child than on an adult.”368 Justice Powell referred to
the language in the monologue “as potentially degrading and harmful to
children as representations of many erotic acts.”369 By contrast, Justice
Brennan, in dissent, asserted that, because the monologue was not erotic,
it was not obscene, and therefore was protected speech, even with respect
to children.370 He opined that “‘[s]peech that is [not] obscene as to
youths . . . cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas
or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.’”371
365. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
366. Id. at 739.
367. Id. at 749.
368. Id. at 757–58.
369. Id. at 758. Ironically, the point of Carlin’s monologue was to poke fun at society’s inhibitions
and fears about the ramifications of saying and hearing the more commonly used “dirty words.” His
position was that, contrary to popular myth, no harm would follow such exposures.
370. Id. at 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10
(1975) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971))).
371. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 768 (quoting Ernoznik, 422 U.S. at 213–14).
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The Court had the opportunity in subsequent cases to consider other
challenges to the constitutionality of restrictions on broadcast media
regarding sexually explicit or allegedly indecent speech alleged to be
harmful to children. Most recently, the Court considered the same FCC
provision at issue in Pacifica in Federal Communications Commission v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc. The case was decided by the Court first in
2009 (Fox I),372 and then again after remand in 2012 (Fox II).373 The
provision, under which Congress authorizes the FCC to sanction those
who “utter[] any obscene, indecent, or profane language” over radio or
television, had been interpreted relatively narrowly after Pacifica, with
few enforcement actions in subsequent years.374 The FCC, in addition,
issued policy guidelines for broadcasters, seeking to specify what
constitutes indecent material and noting that for nonliteral expletives,
“deliberate and repetitive use” rather than “passing or fleeting”
references would be considered indecent.375 Yet, in responding to
complaints regarding an expletive used by one award recipient at the
2002 Billboard Music Awards broadcast by Fox, and two expletives used
by another award recipient at the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, the FCC
determined that the language was indecent, and sanctioned the
network.376 Ultimately, the case was remanded, and the FCC’s actions
were held unconstitutional in Fox II on the ground that the networks did
not have fair notice of the change in FCC policy.377 The First Amendment
issues were not reached.378 Yet, for our purposes, language in the
majority opinion in Fox I, authored by Justice Scalia in response to the
Court of Appeals decision below challenging the lack of evidence of harm
to children from the sanctioned language, is noteworthy in its concerns
about children:
There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be
marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on children is
one of them. One cannot demand a multiyear controlled study, in
which some children are intentionally exposed to indecent broadcasts
(and insulated from all other indecency), and others are shielded from
all indecency. It is one thing to set aside agency action . . . because of
failure to adduce empirical data that can readily be obtained. (Citation
omitted.) It is something else to insist upon obtaining the
unobtainable. Here it suffices to know that children mimic the behavior
they observe¾or at least the behavior that is presented to them as
normal and appropriate. Programming replete with one-word indecent
expletives will tend to produce children who use (at least) one-word

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (Fox I).
Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (Fox II).
Id. at 2313–14.
Fox I, 556 U.S. at 508.
Id. at 510–511.
Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2317.
Id. at 2320.
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indecent expletives. Congress has made the determination that
indecent material is harmful to children . . . . If enforcement had to be
supported by empirical data, the ban would effectively be a nullity.379

Thus, not much had changed in the Court’s view of what types of
speech could be restricted on broadcast media in the three decades
between Pacifica and Fox I, in that bare assertions of harm to minors did
not require empirical support. In addition, however, Justice Scalia’s
articulation of the mechanisms of harm¾“that children mimic the
behavior they observe”¾is eerily pertinent to the Court’s later decision
in Brown, penned by Justice Scalia, and will be discussed below.380
3. Children’s Exposure to Speech in School Settings
In four cases reviewing the constitutionality of children’s freedom of
expression in schools, the Court has revealed substantial inconsistency
and doctrinal confusion. In 1969, in a landmark case extolling the virtues
of free speech as “the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans,” the Court upheld the right of high
school and junior high school students to express a political opinion by
wearing a black armband reflecting their opposition to the Vietnam
War.381 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, the Court reinforced the authority of schools to regulate the
conduct of students, including restriction of student speech, where there
is a “showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school.’”382 While the case is most
frequently cited for its holdings that “[s]tudents in school as well as out
of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution,” and that “[n]either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”383 I focus now on the Court’s
views of students as audience members.
The Court was not concerned that the junior high and high school
audience observing the silent antiwar protest would be harmed by the
possibility of “discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompan[ies]
an unpopular viewpoint,” or the minor interruption of the status quo
(that is, the discussion among students).384 Justice Stewart, in
concurrence, citing Ginsberg, reminded the Court that, in some cases,
although seemingly not under the circumstances of this case, “[a s]tate
may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Fox I, 556 U.S. at 519.
See infra notes 441–445 and accompanying text.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969).
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, 506.
Id. at 509, 514.
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areas, a child¾like someone in a captive audience¾is not possessed of
that full capacity or individual choice which is the presupposition of First
Amendment guarantees.”385 Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker is perhaps
one of the most interesting of the several opinions filed. While
acknowledging that no substantial disruption occurred as a result of the
student’s silent protest, he expressed deep concern about the effects on
students from the implicit permission this case provides for defiance of
“orders of school officials to keep their minds on their own
schoolwork.”386 He hailed the decision as “the beginning of a new
revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the
judiciary.”387 He continued:
Uncontrolled and uncontrollable liberty is an enemy to domestic peace.
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that some of the country’s greatest
problems are crimes committed by the youth, too many of school age.
School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and important
part of training our children to be good citizens . . . . Here a very small
number of students have crisply and summarily refused to obey a
school order designed to give pupils who want to learn the opportunity
to do so. . . . [A]fter the Court’s holding today some students in Iowa
schools and indeed in all schools will be ready, able, and willing to defy
their teachers on practically all orders. This is the more unfortunate for
the schools since groups of students all over the land are already
running loose, conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins, and smash-ins.
Many of these student groups . . . have already engaged in rioting,
property seizures, and destruction. They have picketed schools . . . and
have too often violently attacked earnest but frightened students who
wanted an education . . . . Students engaged in such activities are
apparently confident that they know far more about how to operate
public school systems than do their parents, teachers, and elected
school officials. . . . [I]t is nothing but wishful thinking to imagine that
young, immature students will not soon believe it is their right to
control the schools . . . .388

According to Justice Black, children are at risk of dangerous losses
of self-control and flagrant disrespect for others when those supervising
them are not sufficiently authoritarian in regulating expressions of
individuality or independence¾a risk posited as deleterious to them and
to their communities. Both Justice Black, and in a separate dissent,
Justice Harlan,389 argued that the state’s authority to exercise discretion
in “maintaining discipline and good order in their institutions,” was

385. Id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649–50 (1968)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
386. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515, 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 515, 518.
388. Id. at 524–25.
389. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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given short shrift by the majority. As noted below, in subsequent cases,
the Court’s majority did not explicitly reject the Tinker test, which
grounded the constitutionality of restrictions of student speech on a
“showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school’”390 for a test that favors relatively unchecked
deference in the hands of school personnel on matters of student free
expression. But there is little evidence of Tinker’s influence in those latter
cases.
In 1988, the Court, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,
considered the constitutionality of a school district’s decision to
discipline a student for giving a sexually suggestive speech in a high
school assembly.391 Justice Burger’s majority opinion described the
speech as “obscene,” “vulgar,” and “offensively lewd,” and suggested that
it was “plainly offensive,” “acutely insulting to teenage girl students,” and
likely to be “seriously damaging” to the youngest in the audience, who
were “14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human
sexuality.”392 Yet, the majority offered no support for these asserted
harms, although it reported that some students felt “bewildered or
embarrassed by the speech[]”, others “hooted and yelled” (and therefore
may have been disruptive to peers), and students lost lesson time in one
class because a teacher “found it necessary to forgo a portion of the
scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the class.”393
Without articulating a particular test or standard of review, the
Court cited Ginsberg and Pacifica Foundation as support in holding that
the “School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in
imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response to his offensively lewd and
indecent speech.”394 Concurring in the Court’s decision to defer to the
judgment of the school district, Justice Brennan disputed the majority’s
characterization of the speech, finding it substantially more benign. In

390. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
391. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986). The speech read as follows:
I know a man who is firm¾he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is
firm¾but, most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue
and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts¾he drives hard, pushing and
pushing until finally¾he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end¾even the climax, for each and every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president¾he’ll never come between you and the best our
high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
392. Id. at 683–84.
393. Id. at 678. One might argue that the use of class lesson time to discuss the issues raised by the
speech is as valuable, or more valuable, than following the predetermined lesson plan.
394. Id. at 685.
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particular, he challenged the notion that this type of speech is harmful to
younger students,395 concluding that the speech was no more “‘obscene,’
‘lewd,’ or ‘sexually explicit,’ than the bulk of programs currently
appearing on prime time television,” and that “the language . . . used does
not even approach the sexually explicit speech regulated in [Ginsberg],
or the indecent speech banned in [Pacifica].”396 Justice Stevens, in
dissent, argued that the assembly speaker, “an outstanding young man
with a fine academic record . . . was probably in a better position to
determine whether an audience composed of 600 of his contemporaries
would be offended by the use of . . . a sexual metaphor¾than is a group
of judges who are at least two generations and 3,000 miles away from the
scene of the crime.”397
Yet, Fraser went farther, in indicating that a school need not tolerate
speech inconsistent with its “basic educational mission,” even where such
speech is permissible outside of school. Without more, it is not fully clear
what types of speech are inconsistent with that mission. Indeed, Fraser’s
rationale was not well-explicated by the Court and has been criticized on
that basis.398 The assertions that hearing the sexual allusions might be
“seriously damaging” to the students is not particularly persuasive, and
conveys a vision of children as highly susceptible to a range of unspecified
harms from such exposures. The Court used the vulnerability images to
assert that Fraser’s speech was inconsistent with the school’s mission, in
light of its arguably exaggerated allegations of harms and disruption,
since allowing speech that is harmful to students undercuts that mission.
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court upheld a high
school principal’s decision to delete two pages of a student-authored
school newspaper issue that contained stories about three students’
experiences with pregnancy and an article on the impact of divorce on
students.399 Although the students had used pseudonyms to protect the
confidentiality of the persons who were the subjects of the stories, the
principal had concerns about identifiability. The principal “believed that
the article’s references to sexual activity and birth control were
inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school.”400 The
Court relied in part on Fraser’s holding that a school need not tolerate
student speech inconsistent with its educational mission, and in part on
the concept that even when a school tolerates student speech, it need not
395. Id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
396. Id. at 677–78.
397. Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
398. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007). In Morse, Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, observed the lack of clarity as to what test the Fraser majority applied; see also Mark
Strasser, Tinker Remorse: On Threats, Boobies, Bullying, and Parodies, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 11
(2017).
399. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
400. Id.
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affirmatively promote such speech through, for example, publication in
a school-sponsored paper publication.401 The Court reinforced its
message in Fraser that certain material may be inappropriate for the
level of emotional maturity possessed by some students, and assigned to
the school the authority to determine whether “student speech on
potentially sensitive topics” such as teenage sexuality was
inappropriate.402 In dissent, Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun
reminded the majority of the Tinker test, and emphasized the
pedagogical, social, and political value of encouraging free speech in the
school environment.403 The dissenters implied that the majority’s
position risked strangling youth’s free minds, hindering tolerance and
consideration of diverse ideas and perspectives.404
The Court expressed concerns about speech of a different nature
when holding constitutional a school district’s confiscation of a banner
unfurled by a student at an off-campus school-supervised function, and
subsequent suspension of the student in Morse v. Frederick.405 In this
case, a high school senior, Joseph Frederick, participated with his class
in the Olympic Torch Relay as it passed through their community in
Juneau, Alaska.406 As torchbearers and camera crews passed, he unfurled
a large banner reading “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” which was seen by school
authorities as “encouraging illegal drug use, in violation of school
policy.”407 Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts drew on prior
precedents to emphasize that children’s rights in schools are not
coextensive with the rights of adults, or with the rights of children outside
of the school context.408 The Court devoted substantial discussion to the
harms of drug use by children, justifying the restriction on Frederick’s
speech by highlighting the importance of deterring and discouraging
drug use in the mission of public schools.409 It observed that “[d]rug
abuse can cause severe and permanent damage to the health and well-

401. Id. at 266–67, 270–71.
402. Id. at 272.
403. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
404. Id. at 285–86 (“Tinker teaches us that the state educator’s undeniable, and undeniably vital,
mandate to inculcate moral and political values is not a general warrant to act as ‘thought-police’
stifling discussion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the official
position. . . . Otherwise educators could transform students into ‘closed-circuit recipients of only that
which the State chooses to communicate.’”). In Tinker, the Court observed that because schools are
“educating the young for citizenship,” their failure to protect “Constitutional freedoms” could “strangle
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
405. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
406. Id. at 397–98.
407. Id. at 398.
408. Id. at 406.
409. Id. at 407–08.
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being of young people,” and citing its own prior decision in a case
involving drug testing in the schools, it emphasized:
School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive
effects of drugs are most severe. Maturing nervous systems are more
critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are; childhood losses
in learning are lifelong and profound; children grow chemically dependent
more quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is depressingly poor.
And of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon
the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational
process is disrupted.410

The Court cited data from the National Institutes of Health detailing
the prevalence and some of the potential harms of illicit drug use by
teens, and further noted that “Congress has declared that part of a
school’s job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use,”
backed by “billions of dollars to support state and local drug-prevention
programs.”411 It then concluded that “[s]tudent speech celebrating illegal
drug use at a school event, in the presence of school administrators and
teachers, thus poses a particular challenge for school officials working to
protect those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse.”412
Yet, the Court failed miserably in demonstrating a relationship
between the state’s purpose and the means used to achieve that purpose.
Without explicitly indicating what role such a relationship plays in the
constitutional analysis, the Court’s majority relied on constructs of
children as susceptible to the physiological and psychological harms of
drug abuse, and to influence or pressure from others, to provide the
nexus between Frederick’s speech and the harms of drug abuse. The
Court asserts that “peer pressure is perhaps ‘the single most important
factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs,’” and that “students are more
likely to use drugs when the norms of school tolerate such behavior.”413
The Court desperately needed an analytic device of this type to try to
demonstrate that children are specifically vulnerable to influence from
messages such as those of Frederick, or from the school’s lack of formal
condemnation of Frederick’s speech.
In dissent, however, Justice Stevens was not persuaded that the
Court had connected the dots between Frederick’s speech and the harms
to children to be avoided.414 He questioned that Frederick’s classmates
were as susceptible to influence by him as the majority suggested.
Indeed, Justice Stevens suggested that students would likely see
Frederick’s message as “dumb” and that it is highly “implausible” that the
410. Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia School Dist. 473 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661–62 (1995)).
411. Id. at 407–08.
412. Id. at 408.
413. Id. at 408.
414. Id. at 441 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that it is necessary to show that the speech by
Frederick “stands a meaningful chance of making otherwise-abstemious students try marijuana”).
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message on the banner would persuade a student to change behavior
regarding drug use.415
Justice Alito, in concurrence, suggested an alternative test for the
Court in these school speech cases. In so doing, he made even more
explicit the reliance on vulnerability constructs as the centerpiece of the
analysis. He proposed that the authority of the school to censor speech
derived from some “special characteristic” of the school setting, which
here is “the threat to the physical safety of students.”416 He characterized
schools as “places of special danger,” where students are expected to
remain “at close quarters with other students who may do them harm.”417
In this case, that special danger was posed by “[s]peech advocating illegal
drug use,” he concluded, which in turn justified the ban of such speech in
schools. This dark image of students in captivity with dangerous others
while in the custody of schools focuses on dangers inherent in the status
of minority, including being subject to the authority and custody of
others (that is, status-based vulnerability).
The test emerging from the school speech cases permits limitations
on student’s speech when the restricted speech is determined to interfere
with an aspect of the school’s educational mission. Any alleged harm that
is asserted to emanate from the restricted speech is treated as sufficient
to limit student speech. It is difficult to argue with the Court’s statement
in Frederick that deterrence of drug use by school children is “‘an
important¾indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest,”418 and that children
are especially vulnerable to the harms attending drug use. Justice
Roberts observed that children are more likely to become addicted, and
that their nervous systems are more likely than adults’ to be harmed by
use of drugs¾perhaps permanently¾because of the ongoing
developmental processes that characterize the maturational trajectory.
Yet, the employment of this construct as a justification for restricting
Frederick’s silly sign bears all of the indicia of a pretextual reliance on
constructions of children’s vulnerability to avoid articulating the Court’s
true rationale.
Although the Court employs multiple vulnerability constructs to
justify restricting student speech in the school setting, the assertions ring
hollow. The likelihood of actual harms to students arising from the
challenged speech across these cases seems de minimus at best,
supported only by highly speculative causal assumptions about the
relationship between the speech and the alleged harms. At the heart of
the Court’s concerns, by contrast, is the reinforcement of the authority of
the school administration to regulate student conduct perceived to be
415.
416.
417.
418.

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 444 (2007).
Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 407.
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inappropriate, particularly when students challenge such authority in as
public a manner as did Fraser and Frederick.419 Yet, in light of the
remaining vestiges of Tinker’s precedential influence, the Justices may
assume that a test grounded primarily on deference to school
administrators’ discretion regarding student speech would not pass
constitutional muster. By contrast, couching restrictions in concerns
about the welfare of allegedly vulnerable students invokes both parens
patriae and police power interests in preventing objectionable student
speech from interfering with the state’s mission to create a safe
environment to educate and socialize the nation’s youth.420
The message underlying the Court’s rulings in Fraser and Frederick
are reminiscent of the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Harlan
in Tinker, and ring truer to the themes expressed in those dissents than
with the need to protect children from the articulated dangers. In his
Tinker dissent, Justice Black emphasized the importance of “school
discipline” in “training our children to be good citizens . . .”421 He
expressed the concern that student protests and the disregard for
authority that they reflect is the first step in loss of control by the school
administration.422 Justice Harlan opined that “school officials should be
accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good order
in their institutions.”423 Although the Court does not formally adopt these
positions, their rulings in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Frederick conform to
this view, in that they rely on the asserted vulnerability of children to the
cited harms in response to the suppressed speech. Whether the
Constitution permits school administrators greater discretion in
restricting student speech than Tinker appeared to suggest, perhaps for
the reasons cited by Justices Black and Harlan, is a question worthy of
debate. Yet, the Court’s misplaced focus on concerns about the
vulnerability of the student audience sidetracks such an analysis. The
Court’s asserted justifications, grounded in vulnerability constructions,
are ultimately unpersuasive.
Thus far, the cases discussed in this Part reveal images advanced by
the Court of children as vulnerable to a range of harms affecting physical
419. Id. at 408.
420. Indeed, the Court cites language in Tinker warning that “schools may not prohibit student
speech because of ‘undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance,’” or a “‘mere desire to avoid
the discomfort or unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,’” Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508–09 (1969) and stating that “[t]he danger here is far more serious and palpable.”).
421. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
422. Id. at 524–26.
423. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In conclusion, he offered a purported “workable
constitutional rule”: that those complaining of a school action in student speech cases bear “the burden
of showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other than legitimate school
concerns¾for example, a desire to prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of view, while
permitting expression of the dominant option.”
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or psychological well-being¾some clearly specified and some not¾from
exposure to certain types of speech. Departing dramatically from this
protective approach, the Court rendered its 2011 decision in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association.424
4. Children’s Exposure to Violent Content
In 2005, California passed a statute that restricted the sale or rental
of violent video games to persons age eighteen or older, and required that
the products be labeled “18” to signify that they are not to be sold or
rented to persons under that age.425 Parents or other adults would not be
restricted in purchasing or renting these products, either for their own or
their children’s use. “The Act covers games ‘in which the range of options
available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or
sexually assaulting an image of a human being.’”426 The law was
challenged by associations of companies that create and distribute the
computer programs as an unconstitutional restriction of their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Researchers had been studying the effects of these types of video
games on children for over a decade preceding the Court’s decision in
Brown. Yet, for many decades prior to the Brown decision, psychologists
had studied the effects of children’s exposure to violent media, such as
films and television programs.427 Although, as the opinions in Brown
reveal, there is ongoing debate in the relevant research communities as
to the effects of video games with violent content,428 none of the
prominent scientific associations considers the question of whether these
products have detrimental effects on children to be a close call.
For example, the American Psychological Association’s recent
report by its Task Force on Violent Media concluded: “The research

424. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
425. Id. at 789.
426. Id.
427. See, e.g., L. Rowell Huesmann, The Impact of Electronic Media Violence: Scientific Theory
and Research, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S6 (2007); L. Rowell Huesmann et al., Longitudinal
Relations Between Children’s Exposure to TV Violence and Their Aggressive and Violent Behavior in
Young Adulthood: 1977–1992, 39 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 201 (2003); NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL
HEALTH, TELEVISION AND BEHAVIOR: TEN YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
EIGHTIES 36–44 (1982).
428. See, e.g., Barbara J. Wilson, Media Violence and Aggression in Youth, in HANDBOOK OF
CHILDREN, MEDIA, AND DEVELOPMENT 237 (Sandra Calvert & Barbara Wilson eds., 2011); Craig A.
Anderson & Wayne A. Warburton, The Impact of Violent Video Games: An Overview, in GROWING UP
FAST AND FURIOUS 56 (Wayne Warburton & Danya Braunstein eds., 2012); Mark Coulson &
Christopher J. Ferguson, The Influence of Digital Games on Aggression and Violent Crime, in THE
VIDEO GAME DEBATE: UNRAVELING THE PHYSICAL, SOCIAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF DIGITAL
GAMES 54 (Rachel Kowert & Thorsten Quandt eds., 2016); see also What’s in a Game? Regulation of
Violent Video Games and the First Amendment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006).
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demonstrates a consistent relation between violent video game use and
increases in aggressive behavior, aggressive cognitions, and aggressive
affect and decreases in prosocial behavior, empathy, and sensitivity to
aggression.”429 In 2015, the American Psychological Association issued a
Resolution in which it adopted the Task Force’s findings, noting among
its conclusions that “all existing quantitative reviews of the violent video
game literature have found a direct association between violent video
game use and aggressive outcomes,” and that “[t]he link between violent
video games exposure and aggressive behavior is one of the most studied
and best established.”430 While acknowledging the areas of need for
continuing research, both the Task Report and the Resolution emphasize
the strength and consistency of the data base revealing negative impacts
on children from use of these games.
The American Academy of Pediatrics has also concluded that the
scientific literature demonstrates that “[e]xposure to violence in media,
including television, movies, music, and video games, represents a
significant risk to the health of children and adolescents. Extensive
research evidence indicates that media violence can contribute to
aggressive behavior, desensitization to violence, nightmares, and fear of
being harmed.”431 The American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry likewise concurred.432
Although ethical restrictions limit the methodologies that can be
employed to demonstrate causation between violent media and such
efforts, the evidence for the links between these games and negative
effects on children appears to be stronger than is the relationship
between negative effects and any of the other types of speech that the
Court has determined can be permissibly limited where minors are
concerned.
The most recent positions taken by these scientific and professional
associations based on the empirical research followed Brown, and were

429. See, e.g., APA TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT MEDIA, TECHNICAL REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE
VIOLENT VIDEO GAME LITERATURE 11 (2015), http://www.apa.org/pi/families/violent-media.aspx.
430. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, RESOLUTION ON VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES (2015),
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/violent-video-games.aspx.
431. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement—Media Violence, 124 PEDIATRICS 1495, 1495
(2009); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement on Virtual Violence, 138 PEDIATRICS 1298
(2016).
432. Video Games and Children: Playing with Violence, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY
(2015)
https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_Families/
FFF-Guide/Children-and-Video-Games-Playing-with-Violence-091.aspx (noting that “[s]tudies of
children exposed to violent media have shown that they may become numb to violence, imitate the
violence, and show more aggressive behavior”); see also TV Violence and Children, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (2014) https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_
Families/FFF-Guide/Children-And-TV-Violence-013.aspx (noting that watching violent content on
television can lead children to become numb or “immune” to the horrors of violence, to accept violence
as a way to solve problems, and to imitate some of what they watch on television).
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not available to the Justices when deciding the case. Yet, earlier versions
of these organizations’ statements were available, as was much of the
research that guided those associations’ positions, and were cited by
Justice Breyer in his Brown dissent.433 The Court’s majority, however, in
an opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Kagan, Kennedy, and Sotomayor, struck down the California statute. It
held that only three areas of speech were not protected by the First
Amendment¾obscenity, incitement, and fighting words¾and that
because the violent content of the games fell outside of these categories,
it constituted protected speech.434 Determining that the games fell within
the gamut of the First Amendment, it characterized the California statute
as a content-based regulation (that is, limiting distribution of these
games to minors because of the games’ violent content), requiring strict
scrutiny review.435 Against this standard, Justice Scalia assessed the
evidence advanced by California to demonstrate that the statute was
justified by a compelling state interest, and that the regulation was
necessary to achieve that interest. He concluded that the evidence was
insufficient absent proof of a direct causal link between violent video
games and harm to minors.436 Indeed, the burden the majority placed on
California’s shoulders for marshalling definitive and unequivocal proof
that “violent video games cause minors to act aggressively” was
unusually rigorous, even in the context of strict scrutiny.437
One critique of the majority’s decision is its departure from applying
a more deferential standard of review when regulating minors’ exposure
to allegedly harmful speech when there is no concomitant restriction on
adults’ access to that speech.438 California analogized the restriction of
sales and rentals to minors of violent video games in Brown to Ginsberg’s
restrictions on access to sexually explicit magazines to minors. As
contrasted with cases in which adults’ access would be restricted by a
regulation justified by the impact of the speech on minors,439 the statutes

433. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 851–55, 858–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Justice Breyer included two appendices of scientific articles¾those “supporting the
hypothesis that violent video games are harmful . . . and those not supporting/rejecting the hypothesis
that violent video games are harmful.” Id. at 858.
434. Id. at 786.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 798.
437. Id. at 800.
438. See supra notes 339–340 and accompanying text.
439. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). In this case, the Court struck as
unconstitutional a Michigan statute that criminalized the possession, publication, sale, or other
distribution of any materials that contained certain sexual or other language or images “tending to the
corruption of the morals of youth …” with respect to adults and minors alike. Id. at 381–82. It held
that the legislation was not sufficiently narrow, stating that the law would “reduce the adult population
of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.” Id. at 383; see also Sable Commc’ns of California,
Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 126–29 (1989).
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in both Brown and Ginsberg left adults’ access to the restricted materials
unaffected. The analogy to Ginsberg would have led to a rational basis
analysis of the restriction on minors’ access to materials asserted to be
harmful to them. Justice Scalia relied instead on a narrow interpretation
of Ginsberg as limited solely to obscenity. He rejected the analogy to the
government’s interest in protecting minors from speech that might be
harmful to children, even when the Constitution doesn’t permit
restricting adults’ access.440 He stated:
No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from
harm, . . . but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the
ideas to which children may be exposed. “Speech that is neither
obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription
cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images
that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”441

The Court’s decision to distinguish Brown from Ginsberg may have
been determinative of the outcome. Once the rigors of strict scrutiny were
applied to the state’s regulation, the burden was difficult to overcome.
Arguably, no database could have satisfied Justice Scalia. Yet, the
rejection of Ginsberg and reliance instead on United States v. Stevens, a
case decided the prior year that involved restriction of minors’ and
adults’ access to materials that depicted animal cruelty for commercial
gain,442 was not required, and has been criticized by scholars.443
Although Justice Scalia’s opinion in Fox I applied a different
standard than Brown¾because Fox I addressed regulation of broadcast
media444¾Justice Scalia’s views about how children are affected by what
they watch, and about the role of empirical studies to support regulatory
choices, provide a stark contrast with Brown. In Fox I, he had concluded
that in the case of “propositions for which scant empirical evidence can
be marshaled,” such as “the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on
children,” governmental action should not be struck down “because of
failure to adduce empirical data that [is] unobtainable.”445 He continued

440. Brown, 564 U.S. at 794–95.
441. Id. (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1975)).
442. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
443. See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 332; Martha Minow, The Big Picture: Justice Breyer’s
Dissent in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, in Essays in Honor of Justice Stephen G.
Breyer, 128 HARV. L. REV. 416, 469 (2014). But see Erick D. Reitz, Children and Categorization:
Maintaining A Standard for Recognizing Speech Categories in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), 91 NEB. L. REV. 998 (2013).
444. The government is permitted substantially greater leeway in regulating broadcast media to
shield children and others from allegedly inappropriate content. “The justification for this
differentiation is that publicly available broadcast media is easily transmitted into the private realm of
the home and has the potential to be consumed by unsupervised children with access to radios and
televisions, as well as to offend non-consenting adults who have not been warned about the indecent
content of the programming.” Petrich, supra note 325, at 92–93.
445. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (Fox I).
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in Fox I: “Here it suffices to know that children mimic the behavior they
observe¾or at least the behavior that is presented to them as normal
and appropriate. Programming replete with one-word indecent
expletives will tend to produce children who use (at least) one-word
indecent expletives.”446 To the extent that Justice Scalia’s reasoning in
Fox I has merit, one might speculate as to the possible impact of repeated
perpetration of virtual violence against others via the video games
regulated by California.
In Fox I, Justice Scalia described minors as highly suggestible. He
implied that they are vulnerable because of their tendency to learn
through imitation, making them susceptible to the influence of whatever
they view on television, including repetition of indecent or lewd
language. In Fox I, Justice Scalia suggested that this phenomenon was so
fundamental and obvious to the Court that it need not look to social
science for confirmation. His opinion for the majority in Brown rejected
the premise that minors are particularly vulnerable to media influences
in the form of violent video games. This conclusion persisted, even in the
face of an empirical research base demonstrating a strong relationship
between violent video games and undesirable effects on minors.447 This
juxtaposition casts substantial doubt on the sincerity of Justice Scalia’s
rhetoric about the role of science in testing legislative and regulatory
assumptions about children’s development, and on the fairness of his
assessment of the research presented by both sides in Brown.
In his Brown concurrence, Justice Alito indicated he would strike
the statute as impermissibly vague, yet criticized the majority’s reliance
on Stevens rather than Ginsberg.448 He bemoaned the result of the
majority’s decision, which he observed allows a state to “prohibit the sale
to minors of what Ginsberg described as ‘girlie magazines,’” while tying
the state’s hands in preventing “children from purchasing the most
violent and depraved video games imaginable.”449 To illustrate the
horrors depicted in the videos, he explained:

In some of these games, the violence is astounding. Victims by the
dozens are killed with every imaginable implement, including machine
guns, shotguns, clubs, hammers, axes, swords, and chainsaws. Victims

446. Id. (emphasis added).
447. See supra notes 428–432 and accompanying text. Arguably, in Brown, the Court imposed
unrealistic standards on the body of scientific data, and gave inappropriate weight to contradictory
studies. For a critical analysis of the scientific data provided in the amicus curiae briefs submitted in
this case, see Deanne Pollard Sacks, Do Violent Video Games Harm Children? Comparing the
Scientific Amicus Curiae “Experts” in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1 (2011).
448. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 813 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
449. Id. at 814.
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are dismembered, decapitated, disemboweled, set on fire, and chopped
into little pieces. They cry out in agony and beg for mercy. Blood
gushes, splatters, and pools. Severed body parts and gobs of human
remains are graphically shown. In some games, points are awarded
based, not only on the number of victims killed, but on the killing
technique employed.
It also appears that there is no antisocial theme too base for some in
the video-game industry to exploit. There are games in which a player
can take on the identity and reenact the killings carried out by the
perpetrators of the murders at Columbine High School and Virginia
Tech. The objective of one game is to rape a mother and her daughters;
in another, the goal is to rape Native American women. There is a game
in which players engage in “ethnic cleansing” and can choose to gun
down African-Americans, Latinos, or Jews. In still another game,
players attempt to fire a rifle shot into the head of President Kennedy
as his motorcade passes by the Texas School Book Depository.450

In a powerful dissent, Justice Breyer alone made several points. For
example, he referred to the restriction of free speech under the California
statute as “modest”:
The statute prevents no one from playing a video game, it prevents no
adult from buying a video game, and it prevents no child or adolescent
from obtaining a game provided a parent is willing to help. All it
prevents is a child or adolescent from buying, without a parent’s
assistance, a gruesomely violent video game of a kind that the
industry itself tells us it wants to keep out of the hands of those under
the age of 17.451

This point is critical. As Guggenheim emphasizes, Brown, like
Ginsberg, was all about restricting minors’ access to certain materials
while leaving adults’ access unaffected, and while allowing¾perhaps
even facilitating¾parental decisions to exercise discretion in whether to
make the materials accessible to their children as they so choose.452 As
such, Ginsberg, not Stevens, was the proper precedent to which to the
regulation at issue in Brown should be analogized.453 While some may
disagree that children’s access to either sexually explicit or violent
materials should be limited in this way, to the extent that regulations of
children’s access to allegedly harmful speech do not affect adults’ access
to speech, application of rational basis rather than strict scrutiny is in
accord with the state’s greater reach in regulating the lives and conduct
of minors and its deference to parental choice.

450. Id. at 818–19.
451. Id. at 847–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This latter point is important. One could, as
Guggenheim does, propose a statute that avoids the vagueness problems identified by Justice Alito, by
limiting minors’ access to those video games that the industry voluntarily labels as inappropriate for
minors. See Guggenheim, supra note 332, at 772–73.
452. Guggenheim, supra note 332, at 748–49.
453. Id.
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The Court has traditionally respected parental authority and
supervisory roles in the lives of minors. While departures from this
default rule do and should exist, the majority’s opinion that there is
justification for dispensing with such supervision in the case of violent
video games is unpersuasive.454 Justice Breyer correctly emphasized that
where the state’s dual regulatory interests in protecting children’s
well-being and promoting parents’ authority in raising children “work in
tandem,” as they do in Brown, the state may “advance its interests in
protecting children . . . through a default rule” that locates the choice in
parental discretion.455 This conclusion is consistent with the
“long-recognized compelling state interest in protecting the parental
claim to authority in directing the rearing of one’s own children, with
laws aiding that responsibility.”456 In light of the supervisory challenges
confronting working parents of school-aged children in modern-day
America, observed Justice Breyer, the state’s regulatory assistance is
much needed.457
The alternative to applying rational basis to cases like Ginsberg and
Brown is to reject distinctions between minors and adults and consider
the age-based regulations in a manner analogous to content-based
restrictions on adult speech. This is, of course, far more respectful of
minors’ constitutional rights than is rational basis, and sets the bar high
in terms of the quality of scientific evidence necessary to demonstrate
allegations of harm justifying governmental restrictions.458
Yet, importantly, Justice Breyer did not argue for a different level of
scrutiny. He and concluded that the evidence supporting California’s law
at issue in Brown met that weighty burden. Focusing on minors’
vulnerability, and citing the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, Justice Breyer observed that minors “are ‘more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,’
and that their ‘character . . . is not as well formed as that of an adult.’”459
He continued: “And we have therefore recognized ‘a compelling interest
in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.’”460
With specific attention to violent video games, Justice Breyer discussed

454. Id.
455. Brown, 564 U.S. at 849.
456. Minow, supra note 443, at 473.
457. Brown, 564 U.S. at 849.
458. Ross, supra note 317, at 521 (arguing that “[w]hen sensitive matters of freedom of speech
collide with images of children’s vulnerability,” the state must be required to demonstrate a compelling
interest in shielding children through the specific regulation of speech, the nexus between the
regulated speech and the specific harm, and that the regulation in question “will alleviate the
articulated harm.”).
459. Brown, 564 U.S. at 850 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005); Sable
Commc’ns of California, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
460. Brown, 564 U.S. at 849.
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the scientific evidence in the briefs, and supplemented those documents
with his own review of additional meta-analyses and policy documents.
He concluded that the California legislature had sufficient evidence to
determine that it had a compelling interest in regulating children’s access
to these materials, and that its means for achieving such regulation was
the narrowest means available.461 Justice Breyer pointedly emphasized
the “serious anomaly in First Amendment law” that the majority’s
decision creates when one compares what can be constitutionally
restricted under Ginsberg, and what is permitted under Brown.462
Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow regards the following contrast
by Justice Breyer as one of the most important insights emanating from
the Brown decision.463
[W]hat sense does it make to forbid selling to a 13-year-old boy a
magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting a sale to
that 13-year-old of an interactive video game in which he actively, but
virtually, binds and gags the woman, then tortures and kills her? What
kind of First Amendment would permit the government to protect
children by restricting sales of that extremely violent video
game only when the woman¾bound, gagged, tortured, and killed¾is
also topless?464

Striking the right balances in determining what types of exposures
to speech should be easily accessible to children versus controlled by
adults is fraught with challenges. Yet, as most family law scholars writing
about Brown have reminded readers, deference to parental authority is
typically weighted heavily in the calculus. One may argue that the balance
should be struck differently, and that the state’s or children’s interests
should be given more weight in specific situations. Yet, children’s
unfettered access to gruesomely violent video games seems an unlikely
place to change directions. As Dean Minow points out:
Democracy requires participation by people who know how to make
choices; children sometimes learn by making choices for themselves
but on other occasions learn through the choices made by parents,
teachers, and democratically elected government . . . If minors can
obtain with no adult guidance violent video games identified by their
distributors as inappropriate for minors, they may be shaped before the
adults in their lives have a chance to weigh in. If the social science
evidence of harm from playing such games is valid, democratic
processes in the future may choose more aggression, more toleration
of violence, and reduced sensitivity to human suffering.465

I have devoted substantial space to a discussion of Brown because it
departs so dramatically from the Court’s arguably overprotective
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

Id. at 855.
Id. at 856.
Minow, supra note 443, at 475.
Brown, 564 U.S. at 857.
Minow, supra note 443, at 476.
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jurisprudence that regulates and restricts minors’ access to various forms
of speech. The disconnect between our society’s willingness to censor
materials with sexual content versus violent content is striking, and flies
in the face of available evidence as to the harms children experience from
such exposures.466 Of course, sexual content can be violent and violent
content can be sexual¾rendering it all the more essential that empirical
research findings be parsed and interpreted carefully. Yet, assuming we
can disentangle and keep separate these two categories for the purpose
of discussion, our society’s discomfort with children’s and adolescents’
exposure to information, speech, and images relating to sex, while
tolerating relatively unfettered proliferation of violent materials
available for the consumption of minors, deserves rethinking.467 Brown
brings these contrasting views and associated practices into sharp relief,
given that the distinction is now seared into our nation’s First
Amendment law. Additionally, Brown underscores, like no case before it,
the inconsistencies in the Court’s constructions of children’s
vulnerability across its free speech cases.
What is Brown really about? As noted above, many commentators
suggest that it should have been about state support for parental control
over whether their children can access violent video games, an approach
that arguably does not rely as heavily on empirical validation that minors
are particularly vulnerable to psychological or physiological harm from
exposure to these materials. But, perhaps Brown is also about something
else. Ashutosh Bhagwat, in discussing Ginsberg and some of its
pre-Brown progeny, reminds us that in Ginsberg the Court focused on
the “ethical and moral development[al]”468 effects of youth’s exposure to
the regulated materials.469 He concludes that the:
empirical attacks on the government’s purported independent interest
in protecting children miss the point. They challenge an assertion
which is not being made, and fail to address the true question: whether
the State has a legitimate or compelling interest in inculcating moral
and ethical values in children by controlling their access to indecent
materials as a step towards creating a morally virtuous citizenry.470

Thus, to the extent one examines Brown, and indeed, all of First
Amendment cases reviewed in this Section through this lens, they fall in
line with one another to a greater extent. Indeed, as Bhagwat emphasizes,
whereas children’s vulnerability to psychological harm from certain
exposures can be subjected to empirical study and its “proof” evaluated,

466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Ross, supra note 317, at 505.
See, e.g., KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT 124–63 (2003).
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968).
Bhagwat, Protecting Children, supra 259, at 685.
Id.
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“ethical and moral questions, however, by their very nature [are] not
susceptible to empirical or scientific proof; rather their answers exist in
the eyes of the beholder.”471 Despite the seeming clarity such a lens brings
to some of the First Amendment cases that posit harm to children as a
basis for restricting children’s access to speech, it is exceedingly troubling
if children’s access to speech hinges primarily on governmental actors’
and judges’ vague and value-laden notions as to what promotes
children’s development into moral future citizens, rather than on
scientifically supported evidence of psychological or physiological harm.
CONCLUSION
Children are persons who are not-yet-fully-developed and are
engaged in a rapid process of development. Developmental science
supports the general premise that minors differ from adults on a wide
range of dimensions that may mesh with notions of what it means to be
vulnerable. Legislators and other legal actors rely on many of these
notions in drafting governmental policies, and jurists rely on constructs
of children’s vulnerability in reviewing the policies’ constitutionality. Yet,
there has been little targeted analysis and scrutiny of vulnerability
constructs and how they are applied in constitutional jurisprudence. This
Article is an invitation to begin a more earnest analysis of the concept of
children’s vulnerability as it relates to such jurisprudence, and offers a
modest initiation of this process.
This Article presented a taxonomy of children’s vulnerability
derived from and relevant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence relating to children and adolescents, informed by
scholarship across disciplines, including fields such as bioethics,
philosophy, psychological science, and developmental neuroscience. It
proposed five categories of vulnerability: harm-based vulnerability;
influence-based vulnerability; capacity-based vulnerability; status-based
vulnerability; and dependency-based vulnerability. After providing a
sociohistorical context and some basic understandings about children’s
development from the scientific literature, I examined selected cases
falling within the first vulnerability category of harm-based vulnerability.
This analysis revealed substantial variability in the way in which the
Court has employed vulnerability constructs. In some instances, the
Court has regarded these constructs as social facts requiring empirical
scientific support within the dictates of the applicable constitutional
doctrine. Most notably, in determining the constitutionality of closedcircuit television techniques for courtroom testimony of alleged victims
of child abuse, the Court consumed and fairly applied contemporaneous
psychological science. Furthermore, although cases considering the
471. Id.
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effects of using children in the creation of child pornography did not
delve into relevant research to as great an extent, the Court’s conclusions
there are generally consistent with such findings. By contrast, the Court’s
jurisprudence in considering children as recipients of speech in schools,
or as the audience for sexually-explicit or violent speech, presented
vulnerability constructs that are at odds with scientific research. Indeed,
the Court often failed in the first instance to articulate with precision or
apparent honesty the state’s interest in such regulation. In these cases,
notions of children’s vulnerability are strategically manipulated, allowing
the Court to achieve certain results, while side-stepping elucidation of a
credible account of its underlying rationales.
Further examination of judicial constructs of children’s
vulnerability, and scrutiny of the relationship of legislators’ and judges’
assertions about children’s nature and functioning, as proposed here,
may not change the results of cases. Yet, where the Court makes “factual”
assertions about children’s characteristics or functioning¾the subject
matter of developmental science¾these assertions should be measured
against the body of relevant scientific knowledge. With respect to the
Court’s use of science more generally, UC Hastings Dean David Faigman
suggests that “[t]o the extent that taking facts seriously will accomplish
anything, it is hoped that it will lead the Court to be more plainspoken
about what the reasons for what it does.”472 Along similar lines, Professor
Gary Melton hopes that challenging the scientific basis of developmental
assumptions about children by the courts will promote “intellectual
honesty” possibly forcing judges “to identify the real bases of their
decisions.”473
Constitutional cases must, in the first instance, be decided based on
constitutional principles. Yet, where the Justices invoke
characterizations of children’s vulnerability to determine, for example, if
a governmental purpose or means survives constitutional scrutiny, those
characterizations must also be scrutinized. Concepts of children’s
vulnerability¾as assertions of phenomena that exist in the real
world¾must rest on, and be measured against¾the best available
evidence.

472. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 13, at 185.
473. Melton, supra note 16, at 240–241.

